Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

148. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, July 28, 1961, 11 a.m.–1:05 p.m.

PRESENT

• The President, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McConaughy, Mr. Steeves, Mr. Cottrell, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Ball

The meeting was opened by Mr. Johnson, who explained that Southeast Asia, in the current context, meant Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia.

Summarizing the current situation, Mr. Johnson remarked that the Communists show no sign of wanting a neutral Laos. Our estimate is that they are very confident about the current military situation and see no reason for concessions. Thus, the question for us is whether we can introduce a new element which will change their estimate of the situation. Without such a change, it is most unlikely that there will be any agreement in Geneva.

Our position is that two elements are required for a satisfactory Laotian settlement: a strong ICC and a government which gives real promise of avoiding Communist domination. Without these two conditions, Laos will pose an increasing threat to South Vietnam. Our situation in that country is not improving. The Vietnamese are killing members of the Viet-Cong in significant numbers, but as these losses are inflicted, more are introduced, and we are on a sort of treadmill there.

The question then is whether we can make a coordinated approach to the problem of Southeast Asia. It is not easy, because Southeast Asia is an American geographical expression rather than a political reality. Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have complex relations one with another, and while their present interests are much alike, there are rivalries and differences which make cooperation difficult.

Turning to the political situation in Laos itself, Mr. Johnson reported a lack of progress in negotiations among the three Princes. His Washington visit has apparently stiffened Phoumi’s back. (Mr. Johnson thought the stiffening was about right, but the President later expressed reservations.) Meanwhile, SEATO Plan 5 is ready if the cease-fire is broken, and useful military negotiations have gone forward with the British. But the British have made it very plain that they are interested in SEATO 5 only if the cease-fire is rudely broken, and then only for defensive purposes and to induce a restoration of the cease-fire.

The new element which is now being considered, in working discussions in the U.S. Government, is the creation of a plan to take and hold the southern part of Laos with combined forces of the Royal Laotian Government, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. The proposal is that we would press in Geneva for a strong ICC, making plain that unless such an arrangement is established, the U.S. will not give up its current position in Laos in support of the RLG. At the same time, we would support Phoumi in refusing to accept any government which would be likely to slip under Communist control. If these conditions are not met, and if the cease-fire is broken, we would then go, not for a re-establishment of the status quo, but for a strong new position, as described, in Southern Laos.

In response to a question from the Secretary of State, Mr. Johnson stated that this proposal did not exclude a Laotian Government with some members of the Pathet Lao in it. The point was, rather, how many, and in what Cabinet positions, and later there was agreement to a suggestion from Mr. Steeves that it is time now to begin discussing particular names in particular posts. Mr. Johnson continued that whatever the Government, the character and powers of the ICC are of central importance.

It was further made clear that if we were unable to agree to proposals made in Geneva and if we should support the Lao Government in a parallel position, we would nevertheless continue to talk and would not ourselves be the agents to break up the conference.

The President then expressed his own concern that Phoumi might be leaning too far forward. His real wish may be to have the conference break up and then get us into military action in Laos. Mr. Johnson replied that the best we can do is to keep in closest possible touch with Phoumi through Ambassador Brown. Meanwhile, we face a period of wrestling around in the debate about a new government. The President at a later point expressed his feeling that we should have to take a Souvanna government, sooner or later. The Secretary of State hoped that we might be able to persuade the King to take the Prime Minister’s job, with the three Princes in dignified posts under him and a government composed essentially of civil servants. Mr. Johnson pointed out that our allies will disagree with us on the estimate of the prospects for any given government’s future (it may be embarrassing if we become almost the only ones who mistrust a given arrangement). Mr. Steeves continued to place primary emphasis on the ICC because without it we can have no real protection. He pointed out that the Canadian Government has now taken a new and strong line in this respect. The President expressed his doubt that we have the power to get what we want in these negotiations.

It was evidently from this same gloomy view that the working party has turned to a consideration of a new military alternative. One part of this alternative plan, as explained above, is the notion of a capture of Southern Laos. The second part, Mr. Johnson explained, is the possibility of responding in a new way to any substantial intervention by the Viet-minh. The force proposed for Southern Laos would probably be able to cope with any Pathet Lao force that might be placed against it. Previously it has been supposed that if the Viet-minh should intervene, any additional action would have to be located in Laos. Now there was discussion of the possibility of meeting any such substantial intervention by the Viet-minh with a direct air and naval operation at Haiphong or Hanoi. And possibly you can deter any such attack in Laos by making clear that there are circumstances in which you would take this more energetic course. Questions from the President showed that the detailed aspects of this military plan had not been developed. It was not clear how great an effect action against Haiphong or Hanoi would have on Northern Vietnam, nor whether it would be easy to hold what had been taken in a single attack. Similarly, no careful plan has yet been developed for an operation to take and hold Southern Laos. Planning is proceeding, and General Taylor is in close touch with General Lemnitzer. But the President made clear his own deep concern with the need for realism and accuracy in such military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false in the event. He was not persuaded that the airfields and the existing situation in Southern Laos would permit any real operation to save that part of the country, and he emphasized the reluctance of the American people and of many distinguished military leaders to see any direct involvement of U.S. troops in that part of the world. In reply it was urged that with a proper plan, with outside support, and above all with a clear and open American commitment, the results would be very different from anything that had happened before. But the President remarked that General De Gaulle, out of painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of fighting in this part of the world.

A relevant element in military planning of any sort is the financial stringency which is pressing the British to reduce their military commitments east of Suez. The current Cabinet order is that this reduction be on the order of 35 million pounds a year. The British, in any event, will be most reluctant to participate in any broader scheme of the kind which is now under discussion.

Another related element is the problem of international opinion with respect to the situation in Vietnam. It would greatly improve our position if the world could understand more clearly what in fact is happening there. In particular, any landing operations in Northern Vietnam would be much more likely to escape from international condemnation if world opinion understands the character of the attack which is now being mounted from the north against Diem. One grave question here is whether certain kinds of information available to the United States should on balance be brought to the surface and placed before the United Nations. This matter is still under study.

Mr. Johnson made it plain that no decision was being sought at this meeting, but that it would be most helpful in planning if it could be understood that the President would at some future time have a willingness to decide to intervene if the situation seemed to him to require it.

The President in reply offered no decision, but he made it very plain that he himself is at present very reluctant to make a decision to go into Laos. He believed that the negotiations in Geneva should be pressed forward, that we should not get ourselves badly separated from the British, that the American people were not eager to get into Laos, that nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in this area, and that he did not yet have confidence in the military practicability of the proposal which had been put before him, though he was eager to have it studied more carefully.

The Secretary of State then turned the discussion to the economics of the situation. He thought it important not ever to tell the President that any active military intervention would be cheap, and he pointed out that by comparison other instruments were very inexpensive indeed, and that we ought to examine what we might do in Southeast Asia if there were no budgetary limitation upon the use of such other instruments. Saving Southeast Asia would be worth a lot of money and doing it without U.S. forces would be worth a lot more. Discussion then turned to the Staley report on Vietnam, and the President agreed to the general line of argument presented by Mr. Ball. (Mr. Ball’s argument was drawn from a memorandum of the Secretary of State to the President,¹ which is attached to this record.) Mr. Ball also discussed briefly a plan for a line of credit to Thailand proposed by Ambassador Young, and the President emphasized that long-term credits of this sort should not be publicly discussed during the debate on foreign aid.

Returning to the military problems, the President emphasized the need for more accurate assessment of the situation in the future. He indicated that it would be wise for anyone making current military recommendations to examine the fate of earlier assessments. He indicated his hope that someone well known to him could go out and look at the situation directly, and while there might be arguments against having General Taylor in Laos, it emerged in the discussion that it might be good for him to go to Vietnam and to learn what he could about the whole situation from that area. General Taylor proposed to look first at the problem itself to make clear what facts need to be checked.

In summary, the President proposed the following five courses of action:

1. We should be closely on top of the conference in Geneva. He would like a weekly report of progress on that front.

2. There would be continued effort to frame a satisfactory government. If we could get an arrangement with the King in the lead, so much the better. Actual names and numbers of the players would now be discussed.

3. He was willing to accept the recommendations of the Staley report, but without a present commitment of precise amounts of money over a precise period of time.

4. The military proposals put forward by the working group will be closely examined, in the light of the criticisms and reservations expressed above. One particular aspect of these proposals is whether they would have an impact upon Vietnamese force ceilings.

5. The President hopes to have a recommendation soon as to who might go out and check the important points of fact relevant to these plans on the ground.

McGeorge Bundy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia, General: 7/29/61–7/31/61. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. The time of the conclusion of this meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book (Ibid.)
1. Dated March 28; see vol. I, footnote 2, Document 109.