Office of the Historian

166. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, August 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Weekly Report on the Geneva Conference (August 14–21)
1.

Allied misgivings, in the face of General Phoumi’s opposition, as to the wisdom of the French Ambassador’s approach to Souvanna Phouma on the tripartite Paris decisions of August 7, delayed Falaize’s mission to Xieng Khouang for over a week. With the authorization of the French Foreign Minister, however, he left for Xieng Khouang on August 22 via Bangkok, Souvanna having refused to meet him in Phnom Penh.

[Page 380]

One of the major problems we are up against with Phoumi is his refusal to withdraw the RLG’s cease-fire proposal which, if accepted, would deny the ICC adequate authority to supervise the cease-fire agreement between the Lao parties. In addition, Phoumi’s disapproval of the Foreign Ministers’ decisions, attributable to a number of factors, including (a) his dislike of the French in general and of Falaize in particular, and (b) his conviction that in the last analysis, it is useless to expect fruitful results from any negotiations with Souvanna Phouma, have led the General to adopt a rather intractable attitude. Ambassador Brown and Chief MAAG are watching the situation very closely as Phoumi might, as a last gambit, seek to draw us into a military action by renewing the fighting.

2.
As of August 19, the Geneva Conference had completed about one third of its examination of the draft protocols on ICC with more items agreed to in principle and sent on to the Drafting Committee than the U.S. delegation had anticipated, though in some cases agreements were qualified by reservations such as to raise doubts on the Committee’s ability to reconcile varying texts. The Drafting Committee on ICC is composed of the previous membership of the Soviets, Chinese Communists, UK, Indians, and French, with the addition of the U.S., Canada, and Poland.
3.
Sharp exchanges early last week, especially on the part of the Chinese Communists, on the withdrawal of foreign military forces, were followed by milder debates on withdrawal procedures, prisoners of war, and restrictions on arms imports. Certain concessions made by the Communist bloc indicate increased Soviet willingness to reach agreement but probably only to speed up the Conference in order to get down to the basic issues on which the Communists and the West diverge.
4.
The U.S. delegation, in the light of paragraph 3 above, underscores the need to develop U.S. and Allied tactics at the forthcoming crucial negotiations that will bring the Soviets to modify their present positions. Ambassador Harriman has returned to Washington to discuss this subject. The U.S. delegation comments, however, that the bloc will make no concessions so long as there exists any possibility that an eventual Lao government might accept their draft.
L.D. Battle1
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos, General: 8/10/61–8/31/61. Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was sent to Hyannis Port as part of the President’s weekend reading.↩
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Melvin S. Manfull of S/S signed for Battle.↩