164. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)0
Washington,
August 22,
1961.
SUBJECT
- Southeast Asian Planning
- 1.
- Whatever the final plan for Southeast Asia, we now know that we will want to accomplish certain things. These objectives include the minimizing of any loss of territory in North Laos to the PL, the protection of the flanks of South Vietnam and Thailand from guerrilla infiltration, and the stabilization of the entire area with minimum U.S. military involvement. Accepting these purposes, we should undertake at once those actions which will contribute to the attainment of these objectives, and which will be necessary parts of any ultimate plan. Time is working against us so that it is important to telescope as many of these supporting measures as possible in order to reduce the lead time of results.
- 2.
- The following tabulation indicates some of the courses of action
which should be initiated at once:
- a.
- Political discussions should be started in Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon to determine the willingness of these countries to make a common front against the military and political threat from the North, and the determination of the price which the United States might be obliged to pay for effective collaboration.
- b.
- SEATO Plan 5 should be examined to determine whether, with modifications and variants, it will suffice as the single military plan for the area. Once an affirmative conclusion has been reached, we should initiate action within SEATO to secure agreement upon the necessary modifications to the plan. We should try to get the Thais and Filipinos to raise their contribution of forces. Consideration should be given the early introduction of the SEATO Field Commander and staff into Southeast Asia to coordinate the efforts of the three local countries involved.
- c.
- Plans should be made with Laos to increase the foreign advisers with Laotian units with the ultimate goal of providing them down to company level. Concurrently, press Phoumi to relieve incompetent commanders and replace them by the best available leadership.
- d.
- We should plan to expand the Thai air capability to include fighter bombers capable of taking out ground targets in Northern Laos and Northern Vietnam, and reconnaissance aircraft capable of overt and covert missions in the North.
- e.
- We should urge Diem to increase his capability for operations in the Laotian panhandle and for offensive action against North Vietnam. [Page 376] In connection with the latter point, particular attention is needed to the possibilities of operating by sea against coastal targets.
- 3.
- The principal question which remains unanswered at this moment is the amount of U.S. and outside military force which will be necessary initially and ultimately to accomplish our objectives—then how to disengage the forces brought in. It presently appears that we must be willing to make some commitment at the outset in order to assure Sarit’s support. In any case, we must be willing to give a guarantee to the indigenous governments that, in case of major attack, we will come to their assistance with our own forces. Meanwhile, our study should be directed at establishing upper and lower limits of military involvement which we must be prepared to undertake in order to attain our objectives.
- 4.
- I recommend that the courses of action tabulated in paragraph 2 above be assigned for implementation to the responsible governmental agencies at once, and that we press forward in developing these points while the over-all plan is taking form.
Maxwell D.
Taylor1