Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

163. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, August 17, 1961.

Before going on vacation I should like to give you my thoughts on the present state of the Southeast Asia problem.

1. A Task Force exists; and a first report should be available by about Wednesday, August 23. This report will examine whether it is realistic to envisage a plan to protect the present de facto truce lines in Laos and to mop-up Pathet Lao forces in the south without substantial use of American forces in the area.

2. I suspect the answer will be something like this:

• —Diem cannot spare enough forces thoroughly to clean up the Pathet Lao forces now located near his borders in Southern Laos. The Pentagon estimates there are 7,000 Pathet Lao in this area—a sizeable contingent.
• —Sarit is unlikely to commit himself substantially in Laos unless he has the most iron-clad guarantees that we will not only pick up the check, but also that we would move massively in his support if the proposed action should lead to substantial renewed hostilities.
• —We are most unlikely to conclude that Phoumi’s forces could, on their own, give a very good account of themselves if they were to be substantially engaged with the Pathet Lao, although the introduction of American advisers down to company level might help.

3. I suspect your planners will tell you this: to hold the present line and to mop up behind it nothing will suffice very much short of the introduction of forces (or the firm commitment to introduce forces) into Southeast Asia from outside the mainland on the scale of SEATO Plan 5 if we are to overcome the three fundamental weaknesses we face: Diem’s preoccupations; Sarit’s uncertainties; and Phoumi’s incompetence.

4. All of this argues, of course, that we should exhaust every possibility of a respectable negotiated settlement in Laos. Here, I suspect, the fundamental question that we will have to answer for the Communists is this: What will the Americans and SEATO do if we don’t give them a satisfactory settlement? Their position on the ground is so good that I believe it unlikely that they will accede to our minimum terms unless they are convinced that the alternative is a substantial American and SEATO commitment to the Southeast Asia mainland.

5. Although you are now well acquainted with the fact that most contingency plans fail to turn up the situation which actually emerges, the best current guess as to how they would proceed is this: they will test the American reaction by stalling in negotiation and by resuming with increasing vigor operations in the south, while leaving the cities untouched for the time being. They may well judge that no American President could sit idly by and see an overt take-over of Vientiane, etc.

6. If this line of thought proves, on staffing, to be sound, what follows? We must produce quickly a course of action which convinces the other side we are dead serious; which convinces Sarit (and other potential partners) we are dead serious; which provides for prompt limited countermeasures to meet limited probes; which provides for the possibility of bringing in substantial American and other forces without initially introducing them.

7. How could this be done?

a. The first appropriate American move may well be to send a military commander and staff into the area to explore our plan with Sarit and Diem on a contingency basis. It is clear that only American leadership as well as American ultimate guarantees can pull these chaps together. For the time being Phoumi should be left out, since his inclusion would encourage him in his inclination to forestall a successful negotiation and to seek a military solution in Laos without our backing. Although the deal with Diem would be coordinated, it might well take the form of a side understanding, given Viet-Nam’s special diplomatic status.

b. The ostensible initial purpose of this headquarters would be to concert planning with Thailand with respect to various future contingencies, including the contingency that a satisfactory settlement is found in Laos. As I pointed out in an earlier memorandum,¹ even under the best of circumstances we shall certainly wish to envisage a beefing up of border control arrangements inside Thailand if a Laos settlement is accomplished. In fact, the discussions and planning would envisage a much wider range of possibilities, including contingency action if a split of Laos is negotiated; if a de facto split emerges and Southern Laos must be mopped up; if the Pathet Lao increase their efforts in Southern Laos; and if the Pathet Lao should take off on a major offensive against the cities. The agreement of the U.S. to commit a commander and staff to the area might begin to give Sarit the guarantee that he needs to think forward realistically.

8. Behind this staff operation (confined initially to ourselves, Diem, and Sarit) we need to open with our SEATO partners contingency planning for a much wider range of alternatives than those encompassed in our bilateral talks with the British. The discussions with the British have merely embraced one case; that is, the case of a major violation of the ceasefire by the other side. If we find that the British are not prepared to contemplate military action, except in this narrow circumstance, I believe the time has come to ask them to stand down, without veto, like the French.

9. With the situation thus cleared, we might envisage a series of actions—embracing the New Zealanders, the Australians, the Filipinos, and Pakistani—accommodated to each of the possible contingencies which might arise. We would be then, for the first time, in a position to mobilize outside forces for whatever level of military activity the other side imposed on us and we would be communicating the seriousness of the American commitment to the other side—as well as to Sarit—before it became necessary to send large numbers of American or other non-mainland troops into the area.

10. This sequence represents the best hope I can now suggest for a successful negotiation in Geneva; for holding southeast Asia at minimum cost if Geneva should fail to meet our minimum terms; and for beginning to build a framework of Southeast Asian cooperation for the long pull if Geneva should succeed in negotiating either a unified or a split Laos. At its core is the judgment that come what may—some coherent military planning on the Southeast Asian mainland is necessary; that SEATO should be the basis for this planning, with or without the British and French; and that initial American leadership and commitment is the only instrument for bringing about the coalescence of will and force required.

11. This is a hard decision; for our troubles with the British and French in SEATO have permitted us a bit of the luxury of the drunk at the bar who cries “Let me at ‘em,” while making sure he is firmly held by his pals.

12. On the other hand, to go this route is, in fact, to recognize commitments we already have upon us—but to act on them positively. Surely we are hooked in Viet-Nam; surely we shall honor our bilateral assurances to Sarit, as well as our SEATO commitment; and—I suspect—despite everything it implies, we shall fight for Laos if the other side pushes too far its advantages on the ground.

13. But my overriding concern is that we communicate with clarity and conviction to the other side the two things that matter: we are prepared for an honorable neutralist settlement in Laos; but we are not prepared to see Moscow’s Hanoi agent take over Southeast Asia. Only if the latter message is lucid and persuasive do I see a chance for a livable settlement. And if we get such a settlement, we should be able to proceed with a much lighter military touch on the Southeast Asian mainland; although our troubles in Viet-Nam, Thailand, and, indeed, Laos would by no means be over.

14. Here, then, is the sequence of action implicit in this view of the matter.

• Step One. Draft a plan covering the full range of contingencies in Southeast Asia—by August 25.
• Step Two. Explore it with Sarit, introducing the man who would ultimately be the American field commander—by September 1.
• Step Three. Simultaneously explore a contingency side deal with Diem—by September 1.
• Step Four. Go to the British and tell them that they must either come in on this or stand down—by September 8.
• Step Five. Take it to SEATO, and get the tasks allocated for the various contingencies—September 8–15.

• Step Six. Surface the SEATO field commander and give him an international staff—by September 15.

  Elapsed time: four weeks from time of your decision.

15. Your decision here is not easy. It involves making an uncertain commitment in cold blood. It is not unlike Truman’s commitment on Greece and Turkey in March 1947; for, in truth, Southeast Asia is in as uncertain shape as Southeast Europe at that time. But—like Truman’s commitment—it has the potentiality of rallying the forces in the area, mobilizing the will and strength sufficient to fend off the Communist thrust, and minimizing the chance that U.S. troops will have to fight in a situation which has further deteriorated. On our side is the fact that the Australians, New Zealanders, Filipinos, Thais, Vietnamese, and Laotians—plus our Pacific forces—are surely capable of dealing with the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, if they are organized and led. And the Communists know this. On our side also is the fact that Communist China is a deeply sick country (you should be fully briefed on this)—in no mood for great adventures, whatever Chet says; and, in any case, this is a wholly defensive plan. Moreover, Southeast Asia for Khrushchev is a matter of exploiting our weaknesses—and preventing Mao from exploiting them—not a primary area of concern.

16. This kind of revival of SEATO appears, then, the only way I can perceive of salvaging Averell in Geneva and laying the basis for holding the area for the long pull without excessive U.S. commitment on the mainland. But it takes a bold U.S. commitment in principle—very soon indeed.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/16/61–8/27/61. Secret. The source text is the copy that Rostow sent U. Alexis Johnson for his and Rusk’s information. Rostow stated in a covering memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, August 18, that this would be his last memorandum before going on leave and that Taylor had “reviewed it in detail and urged that it go forward.” Johnson sent a copy of this memorandum to Rusk on August 21 because he suspected that the President might raise it with the Secretary. Johnson related that he had discussed the memorandum with McGeorge Bundy and Taylor, would discuss it with them again, and urged Bundy to suggest to the President, if he raised Rostow’s suggestions, that the Department be given time to come up with “something well-considered.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/8–2161)

   Rostow also sent a copy of this memorandum to Attorney General Robert Kennedy under a covering memorandum, August 18, in which he explained that the President would probably be making his “fundamental decision” on Southeast Asia while Rostow was on vacation. Rostow characterized the crux of the issue as follows: “the way to save Southeast Asia and to minimize the chance of deep U.S. involvement there is for the President to make a bold decision very soon.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia: General, 8/16/61–8/27/61)

1. See footnote 6, Document 159.