Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, September 1, 1962, 1 p.m.

667. Paris also for USRO and McGuire; SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak; CINCUSAREUR for POLAD. Reference: Deptels 580, 586, Berlin’s 307, 310.¹ I have already commented on problem raised by Clay in Berlin’s 270 and 282² and have little to add to excellent concrete suggestions made in Berlin’s 307 and 310. As far as General Clay’s views are concerned I agree with basic thesis but would like to add following observation on tactics we might utilize in dealing with Sov presence in West Berlin.

The Russians have a real interest in maintaining a presence in West Berlin, not only as a means of influencing a possible Berlin settlement but also in providing themselves with a means to intimidate Western policy and action on access to West Berlin. Course of events since construction of wall, culminating in action of 22 August shows that while they may be willing to liquidate 4-power structure, they strongly wish to retain unilateral right of presence in West Berlin. This presence is important to them not only in symbolic and prestige terms, but in important process of equating their access to West Berlin through Friedrichstrasse with Allied access to West Berlin. As pointed out in previous messages, they are not interested in equating Sov entry into West Berlin with Allied entry into East Berlin, since East Berlin was sealed off by the wall and would be closed completely at any time by administrative requirements concerning identification. Addition of jeeps to SovAPC’s may indicate that Sovs are attempting to make their “convoys” to war memorial even look like Allied convoys on Autobahn, thus emphasizing that they are seeking to establish this equation.

Aside from connection between Sov access to West Berlin and Allied access to West Berlin, presence of Sov forces at war memorial and Spandau has intense emotional and symbolic significance for Russians. They simply could not leave an unprotected war memorial in West Berlin or risk the release of Hess, Shirach and Speer without profound effect on their propaganda of unilateral victory in World War II and their charges of continued activity by “Hitlerites” and “revanchists”.

Therefore, Soviets would not willingly relinquish their rights concerning memorial and Spandau and I believe they would go a long way in making certain concessions or seeking time before forced to do so. In no sense, would they give up these rights without intense retaliation.

I do not place as much emphasis on our presence in East Berlin as a basis for cutting off West Berlin to Sovs. Our continued presence in East Berlin serves no definite purpose and actual or symbolic presence of our forces there has only marginal utility in relation to our greater objectives in West Berlin. If we send increased numbers US personnel into East Berlin as a means of policy, we simply invite a program of individual harassment which would immerse us in a maze of protests obscuring our basic objectives.

As set out in mytel from Berlin,³ we should now concentrate on containment and control of Sov presence in West Berlin rather than to strive towards any symbolic or propaganda advantages in maintaining our presence in the East sector. Therefore, I agree with Gen Clay that under no circumstances must we show identification as a price of entering the East sector.

I agree completely with Gen Clay about presence of SovAPC’s in West Berlin and in Embtel 652⁴ we have proposed plan which would lead to their removal from scene. While breaching wall at Brandenburg Gate may be too much to hope for, we could settle for Sandkrug Bridge but insist that Sov guards travel in buses rather than in armored cars.

For reasons advanced, most effective way to deal with Sovs would be to institute selective controls on entry of Sov war memorial and Spandau guards rather than by instituting a blanket prohibition which would include BASC personnel. If Sovs equate their entry with Allied access to W. Berlin, we could by various initiatives control, or prohibit, their access to objectives in W. Berlin which they too may consider important for their purposes. While we should seek by various means to prevent the Sovs drawing a precise relationship between West Berlin and Allied access routes, we should recognize that this is precisely what they may do. Therefore, we should be prepared to deny them access to West Berlin on same grounds they may hinder our access, rather than becoming involved in East sector.

BASC is an entirely different matter. Just as it in Soviet interest to maintain physical presence at memorial, it is certainly in our interest to maintain Sov presence in BASC. When Sovs fail to participate in BASC we could be faced with a situation of grave import which could require immediate implementation of our contingency plans in order to maintain free and uncontrolled air access to Berlin. We should, in short, do nothing to make Sov presence in BASC impossible as long as they wish to maintain it.

One way of assuring this for the time being is to treat Sov presence at war memorial, Spandau and BASC as separate problems rather than as one. What we should seek to prevent is Sov use of entry for changes of guard at memorial as mechanism for supplying personnel for other Soviet undertakings in West Berlin. Provisions for relieving guard at memorial should be confined to that alone. If and when problem arises about Spandau and BASC, it should be dealt with in terms of situation existing at that time without connection with provisions concerning memorial.⁵

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, USAREUR, and SHAPE.
1. Telegram 580 is printed as telegram 244 to Berlin, Document 108. Telegram 586 summarized Clay’s views as presented to the President in their meeting on August 30 (see footnote 2, Document 109). Regarding telegrams 307 and 310, see footnote 3, Document 108.
2. Telegram 270, August 25, summarized the pros and cons of showing identification papers in entering East Berlin and concluded that to do so would damage U.S. prestige and serve no useful end. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.54/8–2562) Regarding telegram 282, see footnote 3, Document 107.
3. See footnote 1, Document 104.
4. Dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–3162)
5. On September 4 Norstad cabled his concurrence with these views. (ECJCJ–9–13923; Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak)