110. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- German Ambassador’s Farewell Call
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Ambassador Grewe of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Mr. William J. Tonesk, Deputy Chief of Protocol
- Mr. Richard H. Davis, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
NATO Council
The President received Ambassador Grewe at 11:30 this morning for his farewell call and after preliminary courtesies the President commented [Page 302] on the importance of the NATO Council to which the Ambassador is being assigned as the German representative. He added that the appointment of Ambassador Finletter indicated our great interest in the NATO Council and remarked that as the prestige of permanent representatives arise, the significance of the Council will increase.
The Ambassador replied that his predecessor on the Council, von Walther, had been a distinguished representative and he was looking forward to his own work. He expressed the opinion it might be useful to have some representative from the Ambassadorial Group on Berlin speak to the Council from time to time on the work of the group. He thought the Council felt it had not received in the past a full and up-to-date briefing.
UK Entry Into CM
The President referred to newspaper reports of the Chancellor’s recent TV interview regarding Great Britain’s entry into the Common Market and asked the Ambassador what he thought. The Ambassador somewhat embarrassedly explained that Macmillan in his answer to a question in the House of Commons in July had stated that entry into the Common Market did not mean entry into a European political union. There then followed Macmillan’s letter of July 25 to the Chancellor seeking to clarify this statement.1 The Chancellor in his TV interview was merely reflecting the earlier Macmillan statement. The Chancellor’s remarks had been interpreted in a negative way and perhaps the formulation had been unfortunate. The President asked in view of the Rome Treaty how one could separate the economic from the political union of Europe to which the Ambassador replied that the political union was not formally linked with the Treaty, but in substance, of course, it could not be separated. The German public as well as most of the German political leaders realized this and he was sure Germany supported Britain’s entry.
Western Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
The President requested the Ambassador’s views on the possibility of a Western Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to which the Ambassador replied that since it was a German suggestion, they had been happy about the President’s press conference statement.2 They had understood the French also favored the idea but it later came out that they did not. The Germans hoped at least at a later stage that the Foreign Ministers could [Page 303] meet in view of the new problems and the new situation which had arisen in Berlin. The President expressed agreement that a meeting should take place some time in the coming weeks either in Washington or in Europe.
Possibility Soviets Introducing German Question Into UN
In reply to the President’s general question on this subject, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the Soviets would not raise the question of Berlin in the UN in a specific manner since they probably estimate the votes would go against any change in the status quo. The Soviets might discuss Berlin and Germany in general in the GA in order to persuade the neutrals of the justice of Soviet proposals and to create a favorable atmosphere to carry out further Soviet intentions.
The Ambassador continued that the Soviets would probably emphasize the existence of two German states and the need for both to enter the UN. This had a certain appeal to the neutrals. It would be necessary to explain to them that this favors the Soviet viewpoint. Moreover, there was a problem of non-recognition which has become even more difficult.
Recognition of East Germany
Picking up the Ambassador’s last remark, the President asked whether we could through the years continue to persuade other governments not to recognize the East German regime. The Ambassador said “yes” but that sacrifices would be necessary. Bonn was considering all aspects of this question but it was a painful decision. The President wondered whether the Soviets would pay rather heavily to get this non-recognition policy reconsidered and whether it was possible we might get something better rather than undergo a gradual erosion of our position. The Ambassador expressed some doubt that the Soviets would be willing to pay anything for recognition and pointed out the great difficulty for West Germany because all their old policies and indeed the Constitution would have to be revised if the non-recognition policy were abandoned. The President expressed appreciation of the internal difficulties. The Ambassador added that he was speaking only personally on this subject as he had no authorization to raise the question.
Soviet Use of APC’s
The President referred to his talk with General Clay yesterday3 and our concern with the Soviet use of APC’s in conveying their personnel to the Soviet War Memorial in the British sector. There was a question whether we should prohibit or limit them. What were the Ambassador’s [Page 304] views? The Ambassador felt the problem was the Soviet attempt to equate their access to BASC, Spandau, and the War Memorial with Western access to West Berlin. The problem of APC’s was important from a psychological point of view. He expressed the opinion it was important now to equate Western patrols in East Berlin with Soviet access to the War Memorial and Spandau. The important point was reciprocity. The President remarked the question was whether to prohibit the APC’s from coming since the necessity for them had passed. Perhaps we should require them to go through the Brandenburg Gate in the future but not to permit them to use APC’s to Spandau.
Recent Exchange of Letters
The President said he appreciated the Chancellor’s reply to his latest letter4 and said he believed the exchange had been useful. The Ambassador agreed but expressed the opinion it was necessary to have more personal contacts—not necessarily between the President and the Chancellor but, for example, between Secretary Rusk and Schroeder.
US Commitment to Europe
The President wondered where the stories had arisen about a change in US strategic posture. The Ambassador replied that he thought the trouble had arisen from a change in US strategic concepts which was necessary. He was hopeful that viewpoints now had been brought much closer particularly through meetings between Strauss, McNamara, Nitze and Gilpatric. He realized there were different accents in US and European strategic concepts. The President referred to a talk he had with a “European” yesterday5 who wondered whether the US would really carry out its nuclear commitment to defend Europe. The President had replied, of course, but the very question revealed a strong current of disbelief which was probably encouraged by the French. The President added there should be no doubt of a US commitment since US security was so intimately tied to Europe’s.
The Ambassador answered that he fully believed this as his speeches in this country attested. He admitted there was an unhappy influence from the French side which we should try to counter.
Miscellaneous
The President referred to the fact the Ambassador had been here during two Administrations and during times which had been difficult and expressed his opinion that relations between the two countries were basically sound though they had their ups and downs like all relations. He commented [Page 305] that the Ambassador had the chance in NATO for very effective service in the common cause.
The Ambassador said he looked back with great pleasure on his service in Washington and thought that something had been achieved during his tour of office. The Alliance had passed through difficult times, particularly last year, but had met the test on the whole well. We had agreed on sharing financial burdens, there had been an enormous increase in exchanges, etc.
The President referred to a University of Michigan survey on the American mood toward Germany and contrasted it with the Shirer book. The Ambassador replied he thought the mood of the great majority of Americans toward Germany was favorable but a certain circle of intellectuals was quite negative. Their influence was out of proportion to their numbers and they had a certain appeal.
The Ambassador then remarked he wanted to emphasize how much he appreciated the President making himself available to see him on frequent occasions and he wished to stress the good cooperation which he had enjoyed with the Department of State. He said he realized some of the arguments he had used, he would not have used in the President’s position but he hoped the President realized he had to speak of German national interests.
The President concluded by again expressing his appreciation of the Ambassador’s efforts through a difficult period. Since 1958 the exist-ence of Soviet missiles had made operations more hazardous and most people did not appreciate that we were operating under a much more difficult pattern than before. He expressed agreement with the Ambassador’s remarks on the usefulness of more frequent meetings and again expressed the thought the recent exchange of letters with the Chancellor had been helpful. The Ambassador remarked that the Chancellor is 86 and had deep-rooted distrust. The President remarked that the period of John Foster Dulles was often referred to as “rosy” in our relations but that if we really looked back at that period there had been difficult times too. The Ambassador agreed.
The meeting closed with a mutual exchange of courtesies.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Secret. Drafted by Davis on September 1. The meeting was held in President Kennedy’s office.↩
- Regarding Macmillan’s exchange of letters with Adenauer in July, see Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 123–125.↩
- For a transcript of the President’s news conference on August 29, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 648–655.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 109.↩
- See footnotes 1 and 7, Document 98.↩
- This conversation has not been further identified.↩