Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

109. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 30, 1962, 10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• General Clay
• Mr. Cash

The Secretary opened by asking General Clay when he was last in Europe.

General Clay said he had been in Europe ten days ago, just after the refugee PETER FECHTER had been shot at the wall. He had seen Mayor Brandt.

The Secretary said the East Germans had been putting out the line that they had not gone to the assistance of Fechter out of fear of the West Berlin police.

General Clay said that a similar incident had happened before in the British sector, but there had been no crowds to witness the event.

The Secretary said that one subject that is currently under consideration is how to bring into balance the question of East and West military personnel entering East and West Berlin. He said there were two ways this could be accomplished:

1. we could increase our presence in East Berlin; or

2. we could cut back Soviet bloc presence in West Berlin.

It is feared that the Soviets might achieve a quadripartite West Berlin and then equate their access to West Berlin to our access to West Berlin. He said he would appreciate General Clay’s reactions.

General Clay responded that if we were not careful we would soon face the alternatives of either shooting or getting out of West Berlin if we waited until our vital interests were affected. We should try to avoid being faced with these alternatives. He would increase the Western presence in East Berlin. He would put an end to the use of the APC’s. If the Soviets interfere with our increased presence in East Berlin, he would take action against Soviet personnel in West Berlin.

The Secretary asked General Clay’s views about action against the Czech and Polish Military Missions.

General Clay said he did not think such action would have much immediate value concerning Berlin other than to impress the Czechs and Poles with the seriousness with which we view the situation. He added that he would force the Soviets to interfere first with our increased presence in East Berlin.

The Secretary said he would appreciate General Clay’s comments on whether or not we would risk increased conflicts with the East German police if we increase our presence in East Berlin, an idea which he, incidentally, found attractive.

General Clay said this would provide a logical excuse for running the Soviets out of West Berlin. He felt that cutting both Western presence in East Berlin and Eastern presence in West Berlin would look like a sign of weakness.

The Secretary said he still got the impression that the Germans and French are not really thinking hard concerning what can be done. We haven’t had any sign of their deep interest. They will say that it is important to keep the Soviets from signing a separate peace treaty, but then they fail to come up with practical measures to this end. The Secretary wondered if General Clay had any impression as to what the French and the Germans were thinking about in this connection.

General Clay replied negatively saying that he had stayed away from the Bonn Government on his last trip to Europe inasmuch as it was a business trip. He said that in his last conversation with Adenauer he gained the impression that the Chancellor was considerably influenced by De Gaulle’s position. He added, however, that he was more concerned about the reactions of the people in Berlin and Germany than he was about the reactions of the Government. He thought recent developments had hurt us with the people primarily because of lack of reaction on our part. The principle now governing seems to be that we do nothing until our vital interests are involved. This really backs us into a corner. We must keep the East off balance. When General Clay was in Berlin there was an understanding that an unarmed attempt at rescue would be made in any case similar to the Fechter case. He was puzzled as to why no action had occurred. The Secretary said he did not know whether the necessary information had gotten to the officers concerned in time.

General Clay said he felt that this was no excuse. He continued by saying that the decision to admit the APC’s had had a very bad effect. The Germans know that we did not send armored vehicles in through Checkpoint Charlie because we considered it would be provocative. And yet we have admitted the Soviet APC’s. He did not think this could be interpreted as anything except a Soviet move for a quadripartite West Berlin. If we were afraid to move in this area because of fear of retaliation against our autobahn access, we might be afraid to move in cases of harassment of our autobahn access because of fear that this might then threaten air access.

The Secretary said there was no question but that we would react to interference with our access. We would move immediately into economic and other sanctions, but he was not sure how far other nations would follow us. Any time we attempted to take steps in the trade field, the others shied away from this. General Clay said he did not think particular blame could be attached to the Germans in this regard because the British have more trade with the Soviet bloc.

The Secretary said this might be right, but it would surprise him.

General Clay said that in addition, the movement of Germans into and out of Berlin is tied in with the interzonal trade. No Allied agreement covers the movement of Germans.

The Secretary continued by saying that one of the difficulties was that so many things were not spelled out in workable agreements in the very beginning of the occupation.

General Clay said there was a good deal to be said for this argument, but he didn’t think this would have made much difference after we demobilized.

The Secretary asked where General Clay had been in 1945 and 1946.

General Clay responded that he had been in Berlin.The Secretary said that he was in the Pentagon and the State Department, and that among the colonels there had been a very strong feeling concerning the demobilization. However, the Pentagon had not put up much of a fight against it.

General Clay agreed but said that US officers in Germany had opposed demobilization. If we had kept ten divisions in Germany, there would have been no Eastern bloc. He said that the only charitable thing he could say was that when President Roosevelt entered into the agreements with the Soviets he intended to keep ten divisions in Europe to see that the agreements were carried out. If this had happened the world would look entirely different today. The General said he was unhappy with the present situation because if we did not take the initiative we would soon be backed into a corner.

The Secretary said he knew the President would be interested in General Clay’s views.

General Clay said he had been shocked at both the lack of assistance for Fechter and the admission of the Soviet armored cars, but it was difficult to be critical of the people in the field who are trying to comply with what they think is desired of them. The only way we can change the course of events is by taking the initiative.

The Secretary asked if General Clay would have the Soviet troops for the War Memorial moved through the Brandenburg Gate.

General Clay said there would be obvious advantages in doing so because there would only be a short distance to travel, and there would be no crowds. This would remove the necessity for armed escorts. It would be an improvement over the present situation. In addition, the opening of the Brandenburg Gate would be a boost for West Berlin morale. This idea has considerable merit but only if it were a part of a series of things to be done to establish and maintain our position.

The Secretary asked if General Clay had any travel plans for the immediate future.

General Clay said he did not except that he planned tentatively to go to Berlin with the Atlantic Council in November.

The Secretary said there seemed to be some difference between Mayor Brandt and Bonn. Brandt was trying to get more circulation across the wall, and this would mean more dealings with the East Germans.

General Clay said the West Berliners were a little more realistic and were unconcerned about minor forms of recognition. This is a political issue in West Germany but not in Berlin. Brandt has to live with the situation, and the Chancellor doesn’t. Increased circulation would have considerable effect in relieving tensions. The Secretary said he had seen a report that the East Germans were trying to make an assessment of East German feeling about the wall.¹

General Clay said they had always had trouble in getting police to guard the wall. He thought the East German forces along the wall would be tougher without the Russians than if the Russians were there.

The Secretary asked how much effort the West Berliners were putting into attempts to seduce the East German police covertly.

General Clay said he felt they were doing a pretty good job in this regard.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–3062. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Cash on August 30 and approved in S on September 6. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office.
1. Not further identified.
2. During a meeting with the President at 11:30 a.m., Clay advocated increasing “appreciably” the presence of U.S. soldiers in East Berlin and ending the Soviet use of APCs in West Berlin. In case the East Germans demanded documentation from U.S. soldiers entering East Berlin, he recommended that the United States abstain from entering the Eastern sector and consider denying Soviet access to West Berlin including BASC, Spandau, and the war memorial. (Memorandum, August 30; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin)