Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin⁰

Washington, August 29, 1962, 9:10 p.m.

244. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire, and US Element Live Oak. Reference: Berlin’s 282.¹ Subject: Allied Access to East Berlin and Soviet Presence in West Berlin.²

1. We agree that one possible interpretation of recent Soviet actions is that their efforts are directed toward complete elimination Allied position in East Berlin and strengthening Soviet presence in West Berlin. Even before abolition Soviet Commandant, they were already well on way toward elimination Allied position East Berlin, unless Allies were prepared acquiesce in unacceptable conditions, such as showing identification. They may now be attempting guard against Allied action against their position West Berlin, by switching equation from Allied position in East Berlin versus Soviet position in West Berlin versus Allied access to West Berlin.

2. One response open to us is to direct our efforts toward maintenance East Berlin-West Berlin equation. We could conceivably do this in two ways, by increasing our presence in East Berlin and/or by reducing Soviet presence in West Berlin.

3. With regard to Allied presence in East Berlin, we believe it is questionable as to how much we can accomplish. Our presence in East Berlin is not, however, in itself of same fundamental importance to us as Soviet position in West Berlin probably is to Soviets. We believe, however, we might consider expanding our activities in East Berlin, such as uniform personnel in official cars. We have also considered possibility of increasing travel into East Berlin by individuals, but wonder whether this would be desirable.

4. With regard to any effort to reduce Soviet presence in West Berlin, we would have to move carefully, if we want to bring our Allies along with us. We believe our first moves might be directed toward control of Soviet movement in West Berlin. On basis that the shorter the distance travelled the less likely there will be difficulty, we could, for example, insist that Soviets enter West Berlin at entry point nearest installation they wish to get to.

5. We recognize that course of action outlined above could produce situation which could lead to ending Allied movement in East Berlin and Soviet movement in West Berlin. It could also lead to Soviet action against air or surface access to West Berlin. Soviets could withdraw from BASC or otherwise harass air access. They could also harass Allied convoys or trains. We believe that this is risk we might have to take.

6. Request you submit urgently your suggestions for possible action directed toward following objectives, either as alternative courses or in combination:

a. Restricting Soviet presence in West Berlin, and

b. Increasing Allied presence in East Berlin.³

7. You should not at this time discuss above with our Allies.

8. Request other addressees direct any comments on this message to Berlin, so they can be taken into account in preparation their suggestions.

9. In this connection, request you expedite reply to Deptel 240⁴ (not repeated other posts), which requests inventory Soviet activity West Berlin.

10. This message being sent separately through military channels.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–2862. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland, cleared in draft by Rusk and in substance by Gray and Nitze, and approved by Brandin. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Moscow, London, USAREUR, and USAFE.
1. See footnote 3, Document 107.
2. On August 27 Klein had sent a memorandum to Bundy giving a similar analysis of the question of Western access to the Eastern sector of Berlin. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin)
3. The analyses were transmitted in telegrams 307 and 310 from Berlin, August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–3162)
4. Dated August 29. (Ibid., 762.0221/8–2862)