Roosevelt Papers
The Coordinator of Information (Donovan) to the President
Memorandum to the President:
It seems to me that, in considering the Azores, there must also be considered the mainland of Africa, even though a thousand miles away. Accordingly, early in September I requested that our research group, together with our Army and Navy officers who were here, make an examination of North Africa. That study is prepared. It consists of 177 pages, and I do not wish to inflict it on you. However, the thesis is that the military and political advantages of occupying Northwest Africa seem to outweigh the probable and even maximum costs to Germany, and the study embodies the following:
- 1.
- The German Occupation of Northwest Africa—Objectives and Costs.
- 2.
- Chronology of events and significant rumors dealing with Western Mediterranean problems.
- 3.
- German “Eurafrican” Objectives as developed in Geopolitical Theory.
- 4.
- The Problem of Vichy.
- 5.
- The German Political and Economic Problem in Iberia.
- 6.
- Germany’s Economic Stake in French North and West Africa.
- 7.
- The Military Problems of a German Conquest of Northwest Africa.
I am attaching the summary and conclusion. If these would make you wish to look at the complete study, I will send it to you.
Summary and Conclusion
I. Objectives.
The positive military advantages to Germany of occupying Northwest Africa are considerable: First, in connection with the Mediterranean campaign; second with respect to the South Atlantic counterblockade; third, and less urgently, with respect to long run exploitation of areas bordering on the South Atlantic.
Equally, if not more important, would be the negative advantage of denying access to an important European flank and Mediterranean rear position.
Economically, the advantage of occupation are at best slight in the short run, problematical in the long run. The maximum increment to occupied Europe of Northwest African supplies cannot be regarded as a significant factor in the German decision. Occupation would however, have the important negative advantage to Germany of preserving a considerable leak in the Allied blockade.
Politically, occupation would remove the last remaining important bargaining levers of France and Spain. There would be, for them, [Page 55] no real alternatives to full collaboration. Further, occupation might be the basis for a significant strengthening of the morale of Italy.
Negatively, occupation would serve to insulate the politically vulnerable peoples of Southern Europe from Allied influence.
II. Costs.
Military advice is to the effect that an action by Germany against Northwest Africa would take the form of a pincer movement through Spain and Tripoli. It is most unlikely that the Germans will move through Spain without Spanish collaboration or acquiescence. The force mobilized by the Germans would be of a size capable of overcoming full French resistance in Northwest Africa, whether or not that resistance is, in fact, expected. On these assumptions it is calculated that occupation would require roughly 9–14 divisions and sufficient planes to achieve air superiority. The transport, landing and subsequent supply of the required force, against the air and naval resistance available to the British and French in this theater would be a difficult but not insurmountable problem for Germany; this assumes Spanish collaboration or acquiescence and the maintenance of the existing supply facilities from Italian and Greek ports across the central Mediterranean.
The net political and economic costs of a campaign against Northwest Africa will vary considerably, depending upon the decision taken by Vichy with respect to collaboration. Other costs would include the loss of entrepôt supplies through Spain, Portugal, and the Canaries; the probable necessity of economic and territorial compensation to Spain and Spanish Morocco; the danger of exposing German troops to typhus; the burden of occupying French Morocco, Tunis and Algeria; and the cost of furnishing the goods not supplied by the country.
In addition, Germany must reckon with probable Allied occupation of Azores and Cape Verde Islands; probable strengthening effect on American morale and unity, caused by German bases at Casablanca and in Canaries.
III. Final Conclusion.
The military and political advantages of occupying Northwest Africa seem to outweigh the probable and even the maximum costs to Germany.
IV. Timing.
Available evidence on the probable timing of a German move is not adequate for sure prediction. The best guess, however, seems to be that they are making preparations for that move. With that in mind, I have a guerrilla project I would like to submit.