Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Defense Files

Papers by the Joint Board

secret
J. B. No. 325, Serial 729

[Washington, December 21, 1941.]¹

Paper A

Tentative U.S. Views on Subjects of British Memorandum, Dec. 18²

(i) The broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers is the defeat of Germany and her Allies. While initially maintaining the strategic defensive, conduct local offensives in appropriate theatres. Ultimately conduct an all-out offensive (1) against Germany and her European Allies, (2) against Japan. Since a successful air offensive must precede any other form of decisive offensive action, the early development of the required air forces, their logistic support and the ground forces necessary to secure their bases must be assured. The first consideration to each of the Associated Powers, Russia, the British Commonwealth, China and the United States, is its own national security. The common purpose demands maintenance of essential communications, especially sea communications via the North Atlantic and air communications via the trans-African Far East route.

(ii) The British Commonwealth is operating offensively against the Axis in the Middle East and with air power in Germany. The United States lacks defensive equipment against air raids on exposed critical production and naval facilities—the only type of attack that is presently indicated against our mainland. Russia is devoting her entire resources to the destruction of the German army, thereby compelling large-scale diversions of German manpower and matériel from other fronts. China is near complete isolation and needs military matériel. She is conducting limited offensives to assist in defense of Malaysia. The maintenance of adequate air and sea communications and the safety of China demand the defense of the Singapore—Philippine—Dutch Indies area. It follows that Malaysia is a theater of present urgent importance.

The following immediate military measures should be undertaken by:

China: Defend China, assist in defense of Burma, and provide facilities for air operations against Japanese homeland.

Russia: Continue offensive operations against Germany.

British Commonwealth:

a. In cooperation with United States maintain sea communications in Atlantic and to Middle and Far East.

b. Strengthen Singapore, Burma and Dutch East Indies to secure those areas and reduce the threat to China.

c. Assist the United States in providing land and air equipment to Russia and China.

d. Defend present occupied areas and acquire additional areas that might further the ultimate objective.

United States:

a. Cooperate with British Commonwealth in maintaining sea and air communications, and in establishing any additional bases necessary to this purpose.

b. Reinforce Philippines, Dutch East Indies and Australia to further the security of China and Southwest Pacific.

c. Supply Russia, China and the British Commonwealth with such ground and air equipment as can be made available.

d. Establish air and antiaircraft defenses to protect coastal military production and naval and shipping installations in the United States.

e. Equip and dispose forces necessary to secure outposts and vital sources of supply in the Western Hemisphere.

f. Strengthen naval powerin Central Pacific including strong reinforcement of Hawaiian garrison.

g. Attain maximum scale in all military, air, shipping and naval production.

All Associated Powers: Initiate preparations immediately to raise and equip forces and provide shipping for later large scale offensive operations.

(iii) Allocation of Joint Forces to harmonize with (i). Only the British Commonwealth and the United States possess troops sufficiently free of enemy pressure or threat to permit of redistribution. Only such forces of the British Commonwealth and the United States are subject to redistribution as are not actively engaged with the enemy or required for immediate security tasks heretofore indicated for these Governments.

The following dispositions should be immediately initiated:

The United States to reinforce the Philippine Islands and Dutch East Indies with ground and air forces with particular emphasis on aviation. The principal operating bases to be established in Australia.

The British Commonwealth to reinforce with land and air elements the forces in Singapore, Dutch East Indies and Burma.

Further detailed allocations cannot be indicated until missions enumerated herein are jointly agreed upon, and operations necessary to their accomplishment have been jointly planned.

(iv) In joint conference make necessary adjustments in the Victory Program³ to initiate the production of equipment and the creation of military forces contemplated in that program.

(v) Create a Supreme Allied War Council to study joint problems and to recommend to the Associated Powers applicable policies, plans, programs and allocations.

Create at once a Military Joint Planning Committee and a Joint Supply Committee to propose the plans and take the actions necessary to implement approved recommendations of the Supreme War Council.

Paper B—Draft

Broad Military Decisions

In General:–

1. Hold where necessary while building up strength. Undertake land, sea and air offensives against Germany and sea and air offensives against Japan, as soon as possible.

Pacific Area.

1. Operate the Pacific Fleet and coastal frontier forces in the Central Pacific, for the protection of sea communications, and in offensive raids for the reduction of Japanese naval strength.

2. Hawaii—Build up air and troop strength as rapidly as possible not only in Oahu but in at least three other large islands of the group so that we may have a defended area rather than a single defended position.

3. Wake and Midway—Continue to support.

4. Palmyra, Christmas and Johnston—support and build up.

5. Samoa—Reenforce.

6. Prepare amphibious and expeditionary forces for overseas efforts.

7. Induce Chile to protect shipping along her coasts.

Far East Area.

1. Support the defense of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand, building up bases as necessary.

2. Endeavor to obtain Russian assistance in the Far East in any way practicable and with particular reference to the early establishment in Siberia of air forces for operations against Japan.

3. British hold India, and if possible Burma, and Malaya.

4. Dutch hold the Netherlands East Indies.

5. British protect communications from the Cape of Good Hope and the Middle East to India, Malaysia and Australia.

6. Increase support to China.

Middle East Area.

1. Continue support of Russia and British in material.

2. Support British effort in North Africa with material and eventually with air units—with a view to the extension of the occupation westward over all North Africa.

Atlantic Area.

1. Continue current operations for protection of communications, shipping, and the defense of U.S. coastal frontiers.

2. Induce Brazil and Argentina to protect shipping along their coasts.

Domestic Measures.

Speed up (not to alter existing priorities):

1. Naval shipbuilding, in particular coastal frontiers forces to operate against submarines, mines, and raiders.

2. Aircraft and antiaircraft production.

3. Merchant shipbuilding.

4. Recruiting and training of Navy and Army forces.

5. Manufacture of critical items of munitions

Reduce:

1. Civilian consumption of materials required by armed forces.

2. Travel by civilians, ashore and at sea.

1. The date does not appear on the papers themselves but appears on a covering “Memorandum for Record” which reads as follows:

   “The two attached papers, A and B, were taken under consideration by The Joint Board, at the called meeting on Dec. 21, 1941, at which time the Board approved them. The papers constitute the approved view by The Joint Board on general strategy, and served as the basis for presentation by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of the War and Navy Departments’ recommendations to the President on December 21, 1941. W. P. Scobey, Colonel, General Staff, Secretary.”

   For the preparation of these papers, see Cline, pp. 88–89.

2. Ante, p. 37.
3. For a description of the Victory Program for production of war materials, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 128 ff.