Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

346. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Palm Springs, California, undated

SUBJECT

• Geneva Arms Control Talks, January 7–8, 1985—Decision Package

ISSUE

Whether or not to approve the attached Decision Directive setting the context and providing specific instructions for Secretary Shultz and the US delegation at the forthcoming talks in Geneva.

BACKGROUND

In preparation for the January 7–8, 1985, US-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva, the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) and the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) have deliberated in a step-by-step process leading up to the decisions to be made by you on instructions for the US delegation headed by Secretary Shultz.²

The attached package provides the major elements necessary to your decision as follows: Tab A—A Draft Decision Directive (prepared by NSC staff on the basis of the above deliberations); Tab B—Views of Agency Principals; Tab C—Summary of START, INF, and ASAT Arms Control Studies (prepared by SACG).³

DECISION DIRECTIVE (TAB A)

The proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) provides the overall national security and arms control context, as well as specific objectives and instructions for the Geneva talks. It provides our best recommendation on how, on a consistent basis, to resolve a number of interrelated issues, and it provides a coherent approach. It is this NSDD (Tab A) that we are asking you to review and approve. The other elements of this package are intended to provide you the counsel of your principal advisors and to inform you of the status of interagency work as you consider the NSDD.

VIEWS OF PRINCIPALS (TAB B)

Views on substantive issues in Geneva are as follows:

US/Soviet Objectives. All principals and agencies agree that hard bargaining lies ahead in Geneva in the search for constructive US/Soviet dialogue and that the priority US arms control objectives there should be both the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms reductions and protection of the Strategic Defense Initiative. They agree with US intelligence assessments that Soviet priorities in Geneva are to block SDI and limit US ASAT capability by bans or moratoria and, in addition, to block further NATO INF deployments while avoiding Soviet reductions. They agree also that the Soviet Union will pursue a vigorous propaganda campaign aimed at publics, our Allies, and to Congress.

START and INF. There is general agreement among agencies and principals that the baselines, tradeoffs, and flexibilities inherent in the current US positions (as spelled out in the SACG’s summary paper at Tab C) offer a sound basis for future talks. However, for START, Secretary Shultz seeks additional authority to table a controversial “common framework” package he privately developed a year ago for use in his meeting with Gromyko at the Stockholm Conference (CDE), but which was opposed by other agencies and was subsequently overtaken by additional interagency work. Also for START, Ken Adelman proposes that if the Soviet Union “seems serious,” we should express willingness to agree to higher levels of warheads (7,000 v. 5,000) and a specific tradeoff of limiting heavy bombers plus heavy missiles to a total of 400 on each side, with no more than 200 of these to be heavy missiles. For INF, both Shultz and Adelman propose to change from the US position of insisting on equal global limits and rights to a concept of equal percentage reductions in deployed Soviet missiles globally and planned US European deployments, so long as an equal global ceiling is retained. In addition, Adelman (and Paul Nitze) favors renewed consideration of the walk-in-the-woods formula which would eliminate any US Pershing II missiles and which is opposed by all other agencies.

ASAT. The Interdepartmental Group could not come up with any limitation proposal (whether short- or long-term) that was agreed to be verifiable or compatible with SDI research or the US national interest. However, the Secretary of State believes that a “temporary” testing moratorium might be appropriate, and the Director of ACDA believes that talks on limiting “incidents in space” may be appropriate and that after substantial additional US ASAT testing has taken place, it might become possible to consider a future ASAT testing moratorium.

Format. Almost all believe it appropriate to consider proposing a division of talks in Geneva into discussion of offensive systems, on the one hand, and defensive systems on the other hand, regardless of basing mode, with space not designated as a separate category. However, Ambassador Rowny prefers to discuss all strategic defense-related issues within the START framework.

Verification and Compliance. Most principals (e.g., Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman) raise these as areas of special concern impacting upon Geneva.

Individual views are as follows:

1. George Shultz. Secretary Shultz’s comprehensive memorandum generally reflects interagency views developed through the Senior Arms Control Group process, and by Paul Nitze, concerning objectives and offense/defense format.⁴ However, Shultz differs substantially from others’ views in recommending: (1) that the US be prepared to negotiate “short-term” limits on testing existing ASAT systems that would aim to have “only a minimal impact” on our SDI research program; (2) a START “framework” package he initially proposed privately to you a year ago, but which was opposed by other agencies and was subsequently overtaken by additional interagency work; and (3) consideration of equal percentage US and Soviet reductions in deployed INF missiles.

2. Cap Weinberger. In two memoranda, Secretary Weinberger expresses profound concern about Soviet violations of arms control agreements and counsels patience and persistence in the talks focused on deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive weapons.⁵ He particularly stresses that the US should not give up the SDI or agree to bans or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons. On SDI he urges that it be presented as the best hope for mankind and for arms control; as designed to protect not any particular target (such as missile bases or cities), but as a reliable shield to protect all; as destroying weapons, not people; and as causing not the militarization of space, but as using space to keep the earth free of nuclear holocausts. On ASAT he shares the concern expressed by the Joint Chiefs that there is a major link between anti-satellite weapons and the development of SDI capabilities, and that it is therefore vital that we not accept any bans or moratoria on ASAT weapons. Concerning verification, he stresses the importance of on-site inspection and international observer teams and other cooperative measures as a means of providing verification assurance not available from satellites.

3. John Vessey. On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey expresses the importance of approaching strategic modernization, arms reductions and a shift to strategic defense as integrated components of our deterrent nuclear strategy.⁶ The Chiefs consider the preservation of SDI to be essential and stress the inherent links between ASAT and SDI research. They point out that substantive limits on ASAT will inevitably affect SDI (since SDI will have the intrinsic capability to destroy satellites). Further, since the technologies involved are highly similar for ASAT and SDI, limitations on ASAT could inhibit the early development of SDI alternatives. The Chiefs cite these facts as arguing for extreme caution in accepting any specific limits on ASAT. The Chiefs support the proposed offense/defense format.

4. Ken Adelman. ACDA Director Adelman joins an emerging consensus on seeking two sets of talks, one on offense (with separate working groups on START and INF), and one on defense, which Adelman believes could be “coordinated” by Umbrella discussions. On START, however, he proposes to consider raising the warhead limit from 5,000–7,000 and a specific heavy bomber/heavy missile tradeoff, a concept derivative of an idea studied earlier but not used. On INF he proposes the “walk-in-the-woods” formula rejected by all other agencies and joins Shultz in considering possible equal percent reductions rather than equal levels for deployed Soviet and planned US missile forces. On space and ASAT, he also goes beyond the general consensus by supporting space “rules of the road” or “incidents in space” negotiations and by supporting consideration of a possible future ASAT moratorium following further US tests.⁷

5. Ed Rowny. START Negotiator Rowny strongly supports the current START position as a basis for sound negotiations on offensive arms reductions and generally shares the consensus of other principals and agencies concerning the US approach to the Geneva talks. However, he strongly opposes the consensus of others who favor proposing future negotiations divided into fora on offensive and defensive arms. For reasons cited in his memorandum, he believes it wiser and safer to set the basic categories as those of “nuclear arms” and “outer space arms,” respectively, with the latter category to be negotiated only upon prompt Soviet resumption of START and INF negotiations. Additionally, he proposes to keep strategic defense-related items within the framework of START (wherein missile and bomber defense issues and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty have been the subjects of prior discussions).⁸

6. Bill Casey. Director Casey, in the first of two memoranda, points to severe limitations upon existing and prospective National Technical Means (NTM) in assuring compliance with arms control agreements, limitations which are increased by Soviet deception practices, missile mobility, and new offensive technologies.⁹ He thus concludes that verification will be a pacing factor in any future strategic arrangement with the USSR and must be an integral (and even more important) part of our planning. In a second memorandum, Casey assesses Soviet objectives and programs, noting that while the Soviets are determined to block SDI and to constrain US strategic modernization programs, they will not accept significant arms reductions, nor let any arms control agreement slow their own research and development efforts, nor accept an agreement preventing a significant level of Soviet force modernization. Casey strongly urges you to resist pressure from the public and within the US Government to offer up the SDI research program or to restrict necessary development or testing in an effort to get an arms control accord, since he believes there is no way such concessions on SDI can produce reductions in Soviet offensive forces of commensurate value in long-term stability and safety. He also counsels against any concessions (in a Geneva communique following the Geneva meeting) on including UK and French systems or on accepting Soviet definitions of “prevention of militarization of space.”

SUMMARY OF START, INF, AND ASAT ARMS CONTROL STUDIES (TAB C)

In summary, the interagency positions for these three areas are as follows:

START

—Ceiling of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads;

—Ceiling of 850–1,250 deployed ballistic missiles;

—Ceiling of 400 heavy bombers, including Backfire;

—Maximum of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber;

—Throw-weight limit on ballistic missiles either direct, or through an acceptable Soviet offer, or indirect (2,500 ICBM warhead subceiling, and 210 heavy/medium ICBMs, including no more than 110 heavy ICBMs);

—Willingness to trade off between areas of US and Soviet interest and advantage;

—Build-down of ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers; and

—Study of alternative approaches.

INF

—Five US criteria include: (1) equal rights and limits; (2) US/Soviet systems only; (3) global limits; (4) no adverse effect on NATO’s conventional deterrent capability; and (5) effective verification;

—Zero US/Soviet LRINF missiles is preferred outcome;

—Interim equal global limit on warheads and launchers;

—Possible limits on specific LRINF aircraft;

—Consider not offsetting entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by US deployment in Europe;

—Distribute future US reductions from planned Pershing II and GLCM levels appropriately;

—Accept an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads; and

—Study of alternative approaches.

ASAT

—The President’s March, 1984, report to Congress reported on a one-year interagency examination of five potential ASAT arms control approaches and concluded that: (1) ASAT and SDI technology overlap is pervasive and any effective ASAT limitation would restrict SDI aspects; (2) no verifiable, equitable, and consequential limitation that does not restrict SDI has been discovered; (3) an ASAT test ban would impact on SDI schedules and costs and leave Soviets with an ASAT advantage; and (4) while a comprehensive ASAT ban is clearly not feasible or in the US interest, the Administration would continue to seek to develop specific limits on specific systems.

—Subsequent to the above report, agency views diverged sharply on the feasibility and impact of possible ASAT limitations, with some (Defense, JCS, and CIA) holding to the above views and with some (State and ACDA) believing a “temporary” testing moratorium (State) or a future moratorium and “incidents in space” talks (ACDA) could be considered.

—During the summer, three sharply contrasting alternative approaches to discussion of space arms control issues were considered by agencies, with very strong disagreements reflecting different agency views.

Recommendations

In view of the above considerations, I recommend:

That you consider the proposed Decision Directive at Tab A on the context and instructions for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva, giving it your final approval (with appropriate revisions, if required) following further discussion with principals.

That you review the messages from principals at Tab B.

That you review, as time permits, the summary of START, INF, and ASAT arms control studies at Tab C.¹⁰

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 01/01/1985–01/03/1985. Top Secret. Sent for action. According to the President’s Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) The memorandum is unsigned. In a December 28 memorandum, Kraemer, Linhard, and Lehman forwarded to McFarlane this memorandum and a “proposed decision package for the President’s use in making final decisions and in providing instructions to the delegation for discussion of arms control issues in Geneva on January 7 to 8, 1985.” They continued: “The cover memorandum from you to the President outlines the contents of each of the three major tabs and portrays the fundamental consensus and differences of principals and agencies on the substantive and procedural issues resolved in the Decision Directive.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]).
2. The package (see footnote 1, above) was likely used during Reagan’s December 31 meetings with McFarlane, Shultz, and Weinberger to finalize the plans for Geneva. In his diary, Reagan wrote: “This New Year party at Lee & Walter Annenbergs house is tradition. It’s also become my once a year golf game. With all the socializing, had time for meetings with Bud, George S. & Cap pinning down approach George will take with Gromyko in Geneva Jan. 7 & 8. Then Jan. 2nd it was back on A.F.1 & the White House.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 412) In his memoir, McFarlane wrote of the Geneva preparations: “In California, I had a long session with the President to go over this material and then moderated sessions with Reagan, Shultz and Weinberger. On the afternoon of New Year’s Eve, we met at Sunnylands, the estate of Walter Annenberg, founder of TV Guide and a well-known philanthropist and friend of Reagan’s. We sat in the library, and everyone was in casual attire. Cap, predictably, wanted the line held on one or two levels of force, but the arguments were not shrill, and within 24 hours we had all come to an agreement on the language to be approved by the President as the instructions Shultz would carry to Geneva to negotiate with the Soviets.” (McFarlane, Special Trust, p. 303) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “The struggle now centered over my instructions for the upcoming Gromyko session in Geneva. While the focus would be on the scope and structure of renewed arms control talks, the underpinning, I persuaded the president, should be the substantive positions we had developed in 1983 on INF and the flexibility worked through on START over the past year but never presented to the Soviets. Beyond that, we had a philosophy to present about the emerging strategic reality and the need for a shift of emphasis toward defense. The final product—16 tightly packed pages—was discussed carefully with the president on December 31. Cap Weinberger, Bud McFarlane, and I were present. Cap argued. Bud and I met his points. The president approved the document, which carried the recommendations of all three of us. I finally had the negotiating room I needed.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 510–511)
3. Tabs A, B, and C are not attached but are summarized in this memorandum. Tab A, NSDD 153, is printed as Document 348.
4. See Document 343.
5. See Documents 340 and 342.
6. See Document 339.
7. Adelman’s December 26 memorandum is not attached. A copy is in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) & Talking Points [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva] (1/2).
8. Rowny’s December 28 memorandum is not attached. A copy is in the Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I 01/01/1985–01/07/1985 (1).
9. See Document 338 and footnote 2 thereto.
10. There is no indication of Reagan’s approval or disapproval of the recommendations but see footnote 1, Document 348.