342. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- The Geneva Talks (U)
(TS) In my memorandum to you of December 24,2 which concerned broad policy themes, I did not address several narrower issues with which I know you will be concerned. One point in my earlier memo, [Page 1222] however, is worth repeating: because of the major link between anti-satellite weapons and the capabilities we may ultimately need for a thoroughly effective Strategic Defense, I know of no potential ASAT limits, including moratoria, that would not also significantly and negatively affect our SDI.
(TS) Here are some thoughts on the more immediate issues you face in preparing for Geneva:
(TS) 1. Soviet Violations. Our efforts to elicit Soviet compliance with arms control agreements will be seriously set back, unless we reinforce our position that the Soviets cannot expect to continue “business as usual.” I believe we should stress to the Soviets at Geneva that we are very seriously concerned about the expanding pattern of Soviet violations and the problems that this poses for the negotiation of new arms control agreements. The Soviets should be put on notice that there are limits to our tolerance of such activities.
(TS) Indeed, Soviet violations bring home the point that any arms control agreement will entail risks for the United States. This is because, as their behavior proves, the Soviets are unlikely to be deterred from military activity merely because they would be violating agreements. Verifying Soviet compliance with our START and INF proposals will be exceedingly difficult; we cannot prevent some forms of Soviet cheating, even with the most stringent verification measures. But most of the difficulties we would face, we face now under SALT II; at least our current proposals would improve on SALT II by requiring militarily significant reductions in offensive nuclear forces and attempting to tighten up some of the existing verification loopholes, such as the SALT II provision allowing the Soviets to encrypt part of their missile test data. Alternatives to the current U.S. proposals, ostensibly designed to solve our verification problems, will not solve those problems but could lull us into falsely believing that Soviet military capabilities have been limited.
(TS) 2. Procedural Objectives. For now, I believe we should be more concerned with establishing the appropriate structure, venue and timing for future negotiations, and less concerned with substantive negotiating issues. Our immediate procedural objectives for the January meeting should be to seek Soviet agreement on the establishment of three separate negotiating fora: (1) on reductions of strategic offensive arms; (2) on limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces; (3) on the offense/defense relationship and military uses of space. There is particular merit in having separate negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range forces; separate talks will help us carry out more effective consultations with our Allies, who have a special interest in intermediate-range forces, and who understand and support our position as it evolved in INF.
[Page 1223](TS) I do not think it is necessary, for our purposes, to have an agreed statement with the Soviets setting forth the precise purposes and objectives of these various fora. If the Soviets insist, however, then the objectives should be stated substantially as follows:
(1) To reach a long-term agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive forces to agreed, equal, far lower levels, in a manner that enhances strategic stability;
(2) To reach an agreement limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces to the lowest possible agreed equal levels;
(3) To reach understandings on:
• the relationship of offensive and defensive forces (both ground-based defenses and space-based defenses against aircraft/cruise missiles and against ballistic missiles);
• the use of space for military purposes so as to enhance strategic stability by fostering conditions conducive to preventing the military uses of space for offensive purposes (including uses by ICBMs);
• a possible phased move to greater reliance on strategic defenses and lesser reliance on offensive forces, including the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. Your SDI proposal actually could accomplish this, and so it must not be given up.
(TS) The main Soviet objective will be to halt or severely constrain our SDI program. They have elected to approach the task through a combination of a concerted propaganda campaign against “the militarization of space” and specific, unverifiable proposals, the effect of which would be to halt or cripple our SDI without limiting their ballistic missile defense. Therefore, we would make a grave mistake if we accepted any procedural arrangements that might help the Soviets hold arms reduction agreements hostage to “progress” on stopping our SDI, or our willingness to delay or stop work on ASAT, just as we would make a mistake to convey any impression that SDI is only a “bargaining chip” for obtaining offensive force reductions.
(TS) 3. Things to Avoid. Given our overall objectives, I believe we should:
(a) Avoid any commitments, either on form or substance, that would foreclose or hamper the possibility of a transition by both the United States and the Soviet Union to a strategic relationship dominated by defensive rather than offensive forces;
(b) Avoid creating inflated expectations about the pace or scope of future negotiations; those expectations inevitably lead to such situations as Congress’ holding the Peacekeeper hostage to “progress” in negotiations;
(c) Avoid any understanding with the Soviets or any agreed statement indicating a U.S. willingness to halt or modify our SDI research program, to accept restrictions (beyond those already contained in the [Page 1224] ABM Treaty) precluding the eventual deployment of SDI types of ballistic missile defense systems, or to cancel scheduled tests of the ASAT MV;
(d) Avoid accepting any agreed statement suggesting that space is not now militarized (by ballistic missiles), or implying that possible uses of space are of greater, or equal, concern with offensive forces;
(e) Avoid a moratorium on ASAT testing.
(TS) Any moratorium on ASAT testing will restrict our ASAT more than the Soviets’ because of the state of our program (it is still in development), whereas they have already proven their system. Furthermore, ASAT limits of virtually any type will limit our SDI program; and the more restricting those limits would be on ASAT, the more they would also restrict SDI, and some of our other activities.
(TS) 4. Things to Seek. There are several modest but useful steps we might take to try and reach some early agreement with the Soviets, in order possibly to create a more conducive climate as we tackle the harder issues. For example, we could:
(a) Pursue your proposal to establish a dedicated U.S.-Soviet communications channel for the exchange of military-technical information. The negative Soviet response to our earlier proposal on this point can be attributed to the strained political environment; they might react differently were the atmosphere better. Moreover, when dealing with those in Congress who advocate more far-reaching proposals, we might want to be able to state the Soviet view on our more modest proposition.
(b) Follow up your offer in your UNGA speech of September 24 for an exchange of experts at each other’s nuclear test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapon tests.3 We could attempt to begin this exchange by inviting the Soviets to send a team of experts to our Nevada Test Site.
(c) Seek agreement on additional confidence building measures such as more detailed notification of, and even exchange visits to, our respective maneuvers and troop exercises, etc.
- Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.↩
- See Document 340.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 308.↩