Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

345. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Palm Springs, California, December 30, 1984

SUBJECT

• Preparations for Geneva

We have reached the climax of our preparations for Geneva. As a footnote, looking back on other preparations during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, this has been by far the smoothest. This hasn’t had anything to do with me; it has been the consequence of your willingness to invest a substantial amount of time in listening to opposing viewpoints among your Cabinet officers as they arose, and providing firm guidance on your thinking. This means that today we have put behind us virtually all of the problems. It is true that a few remain but I expect we can resolve these here in Palm Springs. (S)

As you know, we have two purposes at Geneva. First, we want to get Soviet agreement to open formal talks within a month or so on the entire family of nuclear arms control issues; in short, to establish the format or procedures under which we will do business in the coming months. Second, we want to begin a process of education and persuasion with regard to your view of how together we can agree on a road which will lead us toward less reliance on offensive systems and more on defensive systems. This latter goal represents a truly historic initiative. For a generation the world has lived under the surreal notion that we are better off being unable to defend ourselves under a balance of terror. Your concept of changing that has provoked enormous public interest and criticism. But there is no question that you have the moral high ground with the American people. In order to assure that we keep it that way, we have been preparing a “public affairs blitz” involving your speaking to the nation, and a widespread campaign involving dozens of spokesmen inside and outside of government who will carry the gospel into the 14 major media markets in the next three months. I intend to meet with the network news directors next week to state plainly that this issue is of such historic importance as to warrant a truly vigorous national debate and that you have directed me to make available to them our full cooperation in presenting our rationale and technical concept (within obvious limits). As a separate but related matter, you have thrown the left into an absolute tizzy. They are left in the position of advocating the most bloodthirsty strategy—Mutual Assured Destruction—as a means to keep the peace. (TS)

In helping you to reach final decisions, it seems to me that two stages are in order. First, last week at the conclusion of our work, I invited your Cabinet officers to submit their final views to you. This was as much to assure that everyone felt comfortable that they had been heard and to help to minimize guerrilla press warfare. Those views are attached.² There is nothing particularly new in them but I would recommend that you scan the highlighted portions. I should call to your attention Bill Casey’s rather bearish memo on how verification problems are going to grow worse in the years ahead (Tab 4).³ That is not central to the Geneva work, but is an issue we must give quite a lot more attention to in the months ahead and I have set work in motion to do this. (TS)

The second stage will be your actual review of a Decision Directive which I will have ready for you tomorrow morning. In it I have tried to capture compromise positions which will minimize the margin of disagreement between Cap and George. I have sent it to George today in draft and will try to get it to Cap as soon as he arrives tomorrow.⁴ (TS)

There is one important change in the game plan we are proposing, Mr President. It concerns our preference for the forum in which we talk about strategic defense. Under the Soviet formulation, “Preventing the Militarization of Space” we would be left on the defensive with the entire focus being on our space research while they get off relatively scot free. But, as you know, they have had a far more ambitious “defensive” effort underway than we have for the past 15 years. It just so happens that most of theirs has been on ground-based air defense and ground-based ABM systems. All of us think it would be far wiser not to agree to “space talks” but rather to broaden the scope to deal with “nuclear defensive systems.” This would put the Soviets in the box since they have a number of ground-based nuclear defensive systems, while most of our research is on non-nuclear systems. It would enable us to point out publicly that the defensive balance favors the Soviets rather dramatically. In sum, instead of proposing three fora—START, INF and SPACE—as we discussed three weeks ago, we now propose that you approve our proposing two—nuclear offensive (which would encompass both START and INF), and nuclear defensive—negotiations. (TS)

After you review these two documents—this package containing the views of your Cabinet officers—and the draft decision document I will send you tomorrow morning, I would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you tomorrow (Monday⁵—tentatively set for 11:00 a.m.) to get your reactions. Then if you wish, you could also meet with George and Cap on Tuesday morning before signing the directive. I am at your disposal. (TS)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR–362–7–38–4–7. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. According to the President’s Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. The memoranda are not attached but are printed as Documents 338, 339, 340, and 343.
3. See footnote 2, Document 338.
4. See Document 348.
5. December 31. See footnote 2, Document 346.