Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

344. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 28, 1984

SUBJECT

• Geneva and Beyond: Your Discussions with Secretary Shultz

Following our brief chat this afternoon regarding your going to Geneva and your dinner with Dobrynin, I have the following thoughts which you may wish to consider as you think through your discussions with Secretary Shultz next week. (I am sharing them only with John Poindexter, and of course will not mention them to anyone else.)

Your Participation in Geneva Meetings

—Although, so far as I can recall, it is unprecedented for the President’s Assistant for National Security to attend a meeting with the Soviets not chaired by the President or himself, I believe the Secretary’s action in inviting you is a good thing and that your presence will add a lot to the meeting if your role is properly defined.

—The fact is that you know the arms control issues more thoroughly than anyone else in the USG, and furthermore, have discussed them in greater depth with the President, so that you are in the best position to know his mind.

—It is precisely the latter, the President’s intentions, which the Soviets will be looking for, and your comments will carry great weight in this regard.

—The Soviets are likely to interpret your participation as either (1) an indication of the President’s seriousness and commitment; or (2) a sign that there is division in the USG and that the Secretary must be watched.

—We need, therefore to make sure that they draw the first rather than the second conclusion. (The presence of a large, multi-agency delegation at Geneva, though not at the actual table, tends to encourage the second.)

—To do this, it will be important that you play a prominent role in the conversation, but one in complete harmony with what Shultz has to say.

—I believe, therefore, that you should have a clear agreement with the Secretary regarding who covers what, and that you should aim to present roughly 40% of the U.S. position in terms of time actually spent speaking.

—As soon as you are sure you will be going, the Soviets should be notified. This will give them an opportunity, if they choose, to add a senior official to their delegation. (They may have trouble, however, deciding just who is an appropriate counterpart, so we should give them as much time to think it over as we can.)

—The notification can be done most rapidly by Secretary Shultz telephoning Dobrynin to say that he has persuaded you² to go, and that he would appreciate his notifying Gromyko. (He should not suggest any change in the Soviet delegation, since they will make up their own minds on this in any case.)

The U.S. Delegation

—We must make every effort to keep our group at the table as small as possible. We have already been told that Gromyko’s group will be five plus interpreter (Gromyko, Karpov, Korniyenko, Dobrynin, Obukhov and Sukhodrev). We should make every effort not to exceed this.

—On our side, Shultz, you and Nitze provide the core. We can add two more and still be in balance with the Soviet side.

—At the risk of seeming self-serving, I would also suggest that my presence would be useful in several respects: I am the only one of our group who knows Russian well and can detect nuances left out of the translation (or asides which may not be translated). Additionally, I have observed Gromyko at some 40 or 50 meetings over a 12-year period and can provide some historical perspective to his approach and mannerisms. Finally, my presence would underscore—in a perhaps minor, but significant sense—your status as co-interlocutor, along with Shultz. The others will be his subordinates, and you should have a member of your staff at the table as well.

—This leaves one slot, and I believe it should be filled by Hartman. This is important both for protocol (since Dobrynin will be there) and to maintain the reciprocal status of our Ambassador in Moscow. If he is excluded, then the Soviets will tend to disregard him as an interlocuteur valable.

Scheduling the Work

—The presence of a large U.S. delegation, many not participating in the talks, as well as the horde of media representatives will greatly complicate budgeting the time of the participants. There will be an immediate requirement after each session to prepare a report to the President, to brief the full U.S. delegation, and to decide on next steps. After the final meeting, the Secretary must also brief the press. Since there may be only 2–3 hours between the morning and afternoon sessions, you might wish to discuss with the Secretary what procedures will be followed to ensure that everything gets done in an orderly fashion.

—I would suggest that the Secretary plan to caucus with meeting participants immediately after each session in order to assign work responsibilities and also to decide whether any aspects of the meeting should not be conveyed to other members of the U.S. delegation. (Though I doubt this will prove necessary, there should be a fail-safe mechanism to ensure that those in the room are aware of any details which should not be discussed with colleagues.) Alternatively, the rule could be established in advance that only the Secretary and you will brief anyone until written guidance has been prepared and approved by the two of you.

—I would also recommend that sufficient time be left following the last meeting to get all ducks in a row before Shultz’s departure. I believe that a second session on the 8th is a virtual certainty, and am concerned that a departure early that evening could unnecessarily compress the time available to wrap up everything. In addition to briefing the press, you and the Secretary will have to devote time to deciding in detail on the content of the briefings Nitze will provide the Allies at Brussels, and we should make sure that time is available for due reflection before everyone rushes off.

Your Trip to London

—The idea of your stopping by to brief Thatcher on SDI is an excellent one, assuming that a private meeting with her can be arranged.

—The only potential problem I can see is that, if your trip to London is widely known, it could give some offense to the other Allies, who might assume that the purpose is to give her preferential treatment in briefing on Geneva.

—It will be difficult to keep the London trip secret, since it will be known that you were with Shultz in Geneva, and that you did not return with him. (His arrival at Andrews will presumably be covered by the media.)

—A possible alternative would be for you to brief Thatcher on the way to Geneva—which could possibly be done without attracting public attention—and even if it did, would be less likely to cause offense to the other Allies than a private meeting just after Geneva. This would require an appointment on Saturday the 5th and departure for London the night of the 4th. Such a schedule would allow you to arrive in Geneva the night of the 5th or the morning of the 6th to participate in any last-minute discussions with Shultz before the Monday meeting.

Beyond Geneva: A Confidential Channel

—Dobrynin was right in his comments to you at his dinner that we need a private channel if we are to make any real progress in resolving important problems with the Soviets.

—However, we should continue to refuse it if it involves Dobrynin alone. This simply gives the Soviets too many advantages. A reciprocal arrangement, however, could be most beneficial to both sides.

—If the Soviets are serious about negotiating, they will accept a reciprocal arrangement, despite their obvious and understandable preference for an arrangement which gives them access to our policy makers and denies us the same to theirs.

—Ideally, we should arrange to use both our Ambassadors in this capacity, with each having access comparable to the other. Achieving this should be an operational objective for 1985.

—At present, however, this will be difficult to arrange, since our Ambassador does not speak Russian, and to be effective these contacts should be one-on-one. (Several potential Soviet interlocutors know little English and those who have some rarely speak and understand it well enough to use it confidently without help.)

—In the interim we might wish to consider a discreet offer to resume the conversations started earlier this year, but not pursued since March.³

Beyond Geneva: Organizing for Coordinated Negotiations

—Although Nitze is now installed to keep an eye on the arms control process, I still feel that we will be in a better position to see that the overall relationship with the Soviets is pursued vigorously, consistently and with appropriate discretion but effective public diplomacy, if a senior officer is designated at State to coordinate and supervise the whole process and report directly to the Secretary. I have previously offered some ideas on this,⁴ which you might wish to discuss with Shultz if you find them reasonable.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (5/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information.
2. The phrase “persuaded you” was underlined twice, likely by McFarlane.
3. Matlock is likely referring to his March 14 meeting with Menshikov. See Document 195.
4. See Document 320.