1. I attach here a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing
aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities. These include
developments in the media, civil defense sector, security operations,
political harassment, logistical steps, the economy, intelligence
preparations and political activity.
2. The depth and breadth of these activities demand increased and
continual review to assess whether they are in preparation for a crisis
or merely to embarrass or politically influence events in the United
States.
3. In the light of the increasing number and accelerating tempo of
developments of this type, we will shortly begin to produce a biweekly
strategic warning report which will monitor and assess the implications
of these incidents which we report on as they occur, but have not, thus
far, pulled together in any systematic way.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency3
U.S./SOVIET TENSION
The recent SNIE–11–10–84 JX
examined a range of Soviet political and military activities that
are influenced by Soviet perceptions or a mounting challenge from
U.S. foreign and defense policy.4 Each Soviet
action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or
political purpose consistent with developing military readiness or a
“get-tough” policy to counter the current U.S. stance.
This summary will consider some longer term events that may cause
some reflections about the kinds of actions the Soviets could
orchestrate that would create a political embarrassment for the U.S.
in the wake of deployment of INF in
Europe. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war
is greater than it was before the INF decision, that Soviet vulnerability is greater and
will grow with additional INF
emplacements and that the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing
II has lowered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden
attack. These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building U.S. defense
budget, new initiatives in continental defense, improvements in
force readiness, and a potentially massive space defense program may
be propelling the USSR to take
national readiness measures at a deliberate pace. There is a certain
consistency and coherence in the symptoms of measures being taken
that suggest central decisionmaking. Some of “civilian to
wartime-type” of activity suggest a broad-based plan. These
activities may all be prudent precautions in a period of anxiety and
uncertainty on the part of the Soviets. Some of the measures we
perceive follow.
A. Media
Soviet media have portrayed the environment as dangerous to the
domestic populace. The risks involved have been recognized in that
in December 1983, the Soviets carefully modulated the tone to allay
what appeared to be brewing hysteria. A message has been that the
present state of U.S.-Soviet relations is comparable to those
between
[Page 828]
Nazi Germany and
the USSR prior to WWII and that
the Soviets will not be surprised again.
B. Civil Defense
It is difficult to document an increase in attention to this area,
but the civil defense exercise at Omsk in March in which 800 persons
walked 50 km was without precedent in our knowledge. Civil defense
remains an area of perennially high interest in the Soviet domestic
media.
C. Security
Procedures
—Leningrad has become a closed city to Western attaches. U.S., UK, French and Canadian attaches in
Moscow have been denied travel to Leningrad on numerous occasions in
1984. The Soviets prevented attache travel by international visas
from Helsinki to Leningrad to Helsinki in May 1984. Their
willingness to ignore the international portion of that trip to
prevent attache travel indicates high-interest activity in the
Leningrad area and/or a critical time-frame.
—In May 1984, valid visas for 58 Americans planning tour travel of
USSR were cancelled.
Apparently, the decision was made by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Moscow. The trip included a flight from Naples to
Leningrad and it appears that those with defense security clearances
were denied visas.
—According to the DAO Moscow, there
has been an important change in the “political atmospherics”
surrounding attache operations. [less than 1 line
not declassified] in particular, has become intense. The
publication of an article in Red Star, 25 May
1984, against U.S. Naval Attaches suggests the Soviet campaign will
be generalized and expanded.
—[less than 1 line not declassified] a
Hungarian Ambassador at a non-European Embassy has forbidden all of
his staff to have contact with Western officials.
—The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly issued a
directive in late 1983 that officials abroad should terminate
contact with U.S., British and West German officials.
—The changes in Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) in East Germany
impose significant restraints on operations of the Allied MLM.5
[Page 829]
Most of the training
areas, major unit facilities (air and ground) and their observation
vantage points are now in the PRA. The new boundaries effectively
restrict the missions to autobahns when traveling any distance in
East Germany. [less than 1 line not
declassified] restrictions severely hamper the right to
free and unimpeded transit guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin
agreements and similar agreements.6
—In June 1984, for the first time since 1972 a portion of the City of
Potsdam was included in a TRA.7
—The Soviets continue to declare multiple TRA’s in addition to the
PRAs.
—There have also been other travel restrictions. In Poland, there has
been a perceptible increase in surveillance of attaches in the
southwest corner of the country (Wroclaw, Zegnia, Swietoszow,
Zagan), but not elsewhere. There has also been an increase in
instances of surveillance since late 1983.
—Three recent incidents occurred in Poland where army and security
personnel detained NATO attaches
and then forced them to drive through a military restricted area for
posed photography. In each case, the attaches were detained on
public roads in an apparently well-planned effort at
intimidation.
—In the Soviet Union, Pravda articles in June
called for greater vigilance of Westerners and Soviet dissenters.
Other reporting indicates that harassment of Western reporters has
increased. Soviet border guards are conducting more intensive
searches of Western visitors.
—[less than 1 line not declassified] there has
been a steady increase in civilian companies apparently enforcing
discipline and improving “piece rates.” The greater presence of
guards and security people at defense-related production plants is
also reported.
D. Political
Harassment
—On 20 February 1984, the Soviets imposed new restrictions on Allied
flights in the three corridors linking Berlin to West Germany.
Basically, altitude restrictions apply to the entire length of the
corridors, rather than the central portions as had been the
practice. New traffic-identification demands have also been made and
met by the Allies.
[Page 830]
—On 22 March 1984, an East German military vehicle rammed a French
MLM vehicle killing the driver and injuring two others.
—On 18 April 1984, the Soviets briefly detained an eight-vehicle
French Army convoy at an Autobahn Checkpoint.
—On 2 May 1984, a U.S. military train bound for Berlin was delayed by
East German railroad officials.
—On 16 May, East Germans refused to pull a French military train to
Berlin until the French protested to the Soviet Embassy.
—[less than 1 line not declassified] East
Germany party official, the Soviet leadership wants to remind the
West of the fragility of free air access to Berlin. East Germans
look to take advantage of the Soviet behavior.
—On 8 June, the U.S. Consul General in Leningrad was called to a
Soviet review of the assault on Ronald Harms on 17 April accusing
the press coverage of being an exaggerated claim in a U.S.
Government anti-Soviet campaign.
E. Logistics
The 1983 study of Soviet railroads concluded that the industry must
improve its performance.8 The need for attention to
the railroads is beyond question, but the new campaign which
features early completion of the BALCOM line adds a sense of urgency
to transportation improvements.
F. The Economy
—There has been a significant reduction in production of commercial
aircraft in favor of military transport production since about June
1982. DIA studies show commercial
aircraft production down 14 percent in 1983.9 Not only are
traditional Soviet aircraft customers not adding new aircraft of
Soviet make to their fleets, but the Soviets are buying back civil
aircraft from Eastern European airlines. The increased allocation of
resources for military aircraft production is supported by DIA production data.
—Other changes under way in selected segments of the economy point
toward shifts to military needs. The termination of military support
to the harvest, by directive of March 1984, may say that the success
of the harvest is less important than the maintenance of military
capabilities at high readiness. Such a decision is consistent with a
leadership perception that danger is present, but inconsistent with
the alleged
[Page 831]
priority of
the food program and stated Soviet concerns about internal security
problems owing to shortages and consumer dissatisfaction.
—In December 1983, [less than 1 line not
declassified] production of tank chassis at the Chelyabinsk
tractor plant for the first time since World War II. A second plant
has also converted from tractors to tanks. Since July 1983, the
first new nuclear weapons storage facility in a decade is under
construction at Komsomolsk. Throughout the USSR, floorspace for ammunition and explosives plants
has been expanding since about 1980 after a decline of several
years’ duration. In April, the East German ammunition plant at
Luebben increased to full three-shift 24-hour production and has
more than doubled its output. These developments cross several
sectors of national economic life and indicate that decisions are
being made consistently across economic sectors.
—The increases in production are complemented by developments in the
factors of production, especially labor and management. These have
been subjected to one of the most strenuous and long-lasting
campaigns to improve performance and expand output ever undertaken
by Soviet authorities.
—At the same time, there has been a cutback in Soviet support for the
East European economies, Soviet demands for better quality products
from them, and higher prices for Soviet exports. These trends became
evident in the fall of 1980 during the Polish crisis and have
persisted. Although there are many sound reasons for the trends,
they complement those already mentioned.
—Rationing of key products may be affecting commercial interests.
State-owned trucking companies in Czechoslovakia are reported
operating far below capacity due to insufficient fuel rations
allotted as of 1 January 1984.
—In Poland, Jaruzelski apparently has formally agreed with the USSR to give up civilian production
capacity to supply the Soviets with more military hardware.
—In a Magdeburg, East Germany metal processing cooperative, there are
resource allocation shortages and increased target plans for 1984.
While the imbalance could be blamed on poor management, the
situation was exacerbated by a new bank law that prevents using
state financial reserves since 1 January 1984.
G. Military
Activity
—In June, DAO Moscow reported that
rail movement in support of Soviet troop rotation, although with a
slightly reduced volume, was continuing. (This extension also
occurred during the last two rotation periods.) Extending the
rotation seems to conflict with other Soviet efforts to minimize the
impact of rotation, and the flow of personnel over three months
would seem to disrupt programmed training.
[Page 832]
—Other irregularities have occurred in the troop rotation. Past
railroad rotation activity was marked by a regularity of arrival and
departure times. This rotation has been scheduled inconsistently.
Additionally, there have been a number of anomalies. Railroad cars
have arrived at Weimar, East Germany with approximately 75 troops
but departed with only 35. [3½ lines not
declassified]
—The Soviets may, for the first time during peacetime, be keeping a
portion of their nuclear forces in Eastern Europe on quick-alert
status, using sites for their SS–22 brigades in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia.
—On 23, 24, 25 and 26 March 1984, approximately 3,650 Soviet troops
arrived in Hungary.
—In June 1984, [less than 1 line not
declassified] that during the past 6–12 months additional
SPETNAZ troops have arrived in Hungary. [less than
1 line not declassified] an increase of SPETNAZ forces in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as an ongoing “aggressive
indoctrination” of Warsaw Pact forces.
—[1½ lines not declassified] he is concerned
about stockpiling of material and an increase in Soviet troop
strength in Hungary.
—In Hungary, a recall of an undetermined number of reservists was
under way in May 1984.
—In the fall of 1983, the length of service for Czechoslovakian Army
draftees with missile/rocket specialities was reportedly extended
from two to three years. The length of service for air defense
draftees with missile training was similarly extended.
—In Poland, the length of required military service for new reserve
officers was to be increased from 12 to 18 months effective in
1984.
—[less than 1 line not declassified] a
mobilization exercise involving armed forces and territorial forces
as well as civil defense elements is to occur in June in
Czechoslovakia.
—[less than 1 line not declassified] since
1983, men up to 35 years old have been drafted without consideration
of family difficulties or their profession.
—The Soviets have pressed for stationing additional troops in Poland.
[less than 1 line not declassified]
additional Soviet air elements are already sanctioned by the
Poles.
H. Intelligence
Activity
A spate of clandestine source reports have related the extraordinary
intelligence directives that have been issued. The thrust of these
directives is to increase the authority of the intelligence agencies
at the expense of career diplomats and to focus intelligence
collection on survivability of networks and on warning. [2 lines not declassified]
[Page 833]
I. Political
Activity
—In external relations, Soviet activity has been intense. A series of
relatively low-level harassments concerning Berlin air corridors and
ground access to Berlin fall into this category and have the
potential to become more escalatory. The Soviets have recently
cancelled a long-standing commercial accord with the U.S. The level
of official harassment of Western attaches is high throughout the
Warsaw Pact, even including a shooting incident in Bulgaria. New
travel restrictions have been placed on Western diplomats in the
USSR.
—A message of dissatisfaction in U.S.-Soviet relations is clear, but
more than the message the Soviets may actually be paying
costs—surrendering commercial contacts and their own freedom of
access. Activity resembles a calculated and careful withdrawal on
multiple fronts; a limitation of exposure and vulnerability.
J. Military
Behavior
The behavior of the armed forces is perhaps the most disturbing. From
the operational deployment of submarines to the termination of
harvest support to the delayed troop rotation there is a central
theme of not being strategically vulnerable, even if it means taking
some risks. It is important to distinguish in this category those
acts which are political blustering and those which may be, but also
carry large costs. The point of blustering is to do something that
makes the opponent pay high costs while the blusterer pays none or
little. The military behaviors we have observed involve high
military costs in terms of vulnerability of resources for the sake
of improved national military power, or enhanced readiness at the
price of consumer discontent, or enhanced readiness at the price of
troop dissatisfaction. None of these are trivial costs, adding
thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of
concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.
