Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

228. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 19, 1984

SUBJECT

• Next Steps on US-Soviet Relations

In the wake of your meeting with the President last week,² that of Secretary Weinberger,³ a meeting of the Arms Control Policy Group and the forthcoming meeting this Friday between the President and the JCS,⁴ the following scenario seems to me manageable for reaching decisions on the arms control aspects of your dialogue with Ambassador Dobrynin. While the specific content of any ultimate negotiations with the Soviet Union will have to await completion of ongoing work now scheduled to be completed by August 1st, there appears to be a high probability that the US will be prepared to enter a negotiation. The question is whether we should go ahead within the next week or so to agree to open “discussions” with the Soviets (perhaps in August) for the purpose of setting an agenda and agreeing on the timing and venue for the negotiations. I believe the President can make that decision following his meeting with the JCS, perhaps in an Oval Office meeting next Monday.⁵

At my morning session with the President today, he expressed interest in seeking to gain Soviet agreement to also open talks on improvements to verification in the TTBT/PNE context. He would like for you to explore this issue with Ambassador Dobrynin in your meeting tomorrow.⁶ The President’s point is that notwithstanding the Soviet walkout and their separate refusal to discuss verification issues in the TTBT/PNE context, we are willing to accept their proposal for discussions of ASAT arms control. The emphasis should be put on the Soviet attitude toward verification generally. In ASAT, we would be entering an area in which both sides acknowledge serious verification difficulties. There is a reasonable point to be made that the Soviets have an opportunity to demonstrate their appreciation of this issue and willingness to treat verification seriously by agreeing to open talks toward improved verification on TTBT/PNE. (Perhaps unsaid is the obvious point that absent agreement, we would be constrained to point to the Soviet refusal and call into question their seriousness in dealing with verification in the ASAT context. We would also continue to criticize their absence from the START and INF talks.)

The outcome of your dialogue with Ambassador Dobrynin and the President’s meeting with the JCS will facilitate a decision making session with the President next Monday.

If you see problems with this scenario I would be pleased to discuss it at any time.

Robert C. McFarlane⁷

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (3/09/1984–6/20/1984); NLR–362–3–20–6–8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Outside the System.
2. See footnote 6, Document 224.
3. See footnote 3, Document 227.
4. On June 22, Reagan went to the Pentagon for a briefing by the JCS. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In his diary entry for June 22, Reagan wrote: “It was a briefing on where we are going weapon wise, communications & intelligence gathering. I can only say I left for the Oval Office filled with optimism, pride & a sense of safety.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, pp. 360–361)
5. June 25.
6. Shultz and Dobrynin met on June 20. See Document 230.
7. McFarlane signed “Bud” above his typed signature.