Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 21, 1984

SUBJECT

• My meeting with Dobrynin June 20

We met for a little under three hours, and went through some 25 issues on the US-Soviet agenda. The meeting demonstrated that our dialogue is well enough established now for us to be able to move through successive topics in very businesslike fashion with an occasional sense of motion on details suggesting that some desire for progress is appearing on their side. I was accompanied by Rick Burt, Dobrynin by his Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov.

In the preliminaries at the outset of the meeting, Dobrynin expressed uncertainty about the meaning of your press conference statements.² I told him that you are prepared as always to meet with Chernenko. I said you believe there should be content in such a meeting, and while we are not saying major agreements have to be reached, a significant, concrete agenda should be addressed. I added that perhaps some items on our agenda today could contribute to a summit agenda.

Dobrynin went on to say that they were interested in our response to Chernenko’s last letter and talking points,³ but it developed that his main point, which he made early in the meeting and returned to at the end, was that it would be “good for you and good for us” if we concentrated on getting some negotiations going on one or two of the “big” security issues.

In our review of the US-Soviet agenda, I began with arms control issues, and it emerged from this discussion that Dobrynin’s prime candidates for “big” issues to work on were nuclear testing and outer space.

—On outer space, I explained your concerns about verification and your skepticism about negotiations, but told him that as a result of Chernenko’s letters and our discussions you are taking a fresh look at the problem and would be making a decision soon. Dobrynin asked whether we were considering just anti-satellite weapons or all of outer space. I replied that we were looking at a range of things, and that verification was a real problem, but you were focussing on the most promising areas, and would be making a decision soon. At that point Dobrynin said he had just received a telegram calling him back to Moscow, and he would be leaving July 3. I noted I would be leaving for Asia shortly thereafter,⁴ and said I would try to get back to him before he left.

—On the Stockholm talks he was evasive. I told him that the offer in your last letter of Chernenko and the Dublin speech to discuss non-use of force commitments together with our confidence-building measure proposals was a direct response to Chernenko,⁵ and that we are disappointed by the lack of an answer. His reply was that although they were “interested,” they needed additional clarification and elaboration of what the offer means before they can respond.

—On START and INF he was absolutely rigid. I reiterated that we considered their walkouts from the two negotiations unjustified, and that we remained prepared for private discussions on nuclear arms reductions. He replied that they are not prepared for such discussions while INF deployments continue, since they believe deployments have changed the strategic situation, and merely reiterated their position that they would reverse their “counter-measures” if we were prepared to withdraw our new missiles.

—On chemical weapons and the MBFR talks in Vienna, he was not forthcoming either. I said that although verification is a major problem in both areas, our new proposals were meant to be constructive, and I urged them to negotiate. Dobrynin grumbled about our MBFR proposal, and his statement that they are prepared to make progress in both areas was pretty weak.

—On nuclear testing, he pressed for resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, and I worked hard to explain how important it is to concentrate first on reducing the margin of error in verification of the threshold testing and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties (TTBT/PNET). That was why we had proposed very confidential discussions involving such measures as calibration tests, I said, and I stressed that progress on verification could help us move in another area where verification was difficult, namely anti-satellite weapons. But Dobrynin was very dug in on ratification of the two treaties first, calling it a “matter of principle” for the Soviets. Although he suggested that new verification proposals could be discussed in resumed CTB negotiations, simply getting us back into CTB talks was clearly his main purpose.

—On strategic defense, I reiterated that this was a research program, that we have no intention at this time of departing from the ABM Treaty and that we remain prepared to have a confidential discussion about ballistic missile defense in START, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) or some other forum. Dobrynin said he took note of my statement on abrogating the ABM Treaty and would get back on the question of discussions. I briefly touched on Soviet proposals concerning non-first-use of nuclear weapons, a code of conduct for nuclear powers and naval arms limitations, and rejected them all. He was not anxious to pursue them either.

—On hotline upgrade, I pointed out they had our proposal for another round; Dobrynin said they would be getting back to us soon. I said we hoped this could be settled this round; he responded that it would be. Since both he and I would be out of town in July, I suggested that Gromyko and Art Hartman in Moscow might exchange the notes settling the issue. He said he would have to ask Gromyko about a Moscow venue but didn’t think it would be a problem.

We discussed only two regional issues, southern Africa and the Middle East. On southern Africa I reminded Dobrynin of our offer to have Chet Crocker meet with his counterpart for an update, but he said that they think we owe them a reply to Gromyko’s presentation to Art Hartman April 3 before they consider other meetings,⁶ and I promised to send Art in with our views. On the Middle East I sketched out our position on the Iran-Iraq war, and made the point that we have a common concern about Iraqi use of chemical weapons. I reminded him of my suggestion that experts join us for a special session. He replied that they also think the war “completely useless,” and are also against any military movements in the area that could make the situation worse. On talks, they think any bilateral discussions should address the problems of an overall settlement; I replied that if they wanted a small-group discussion, it could discuss this problem too, and he appeared to agree.

Turning to human rights, I repeated that the Sakharovs were an issue of world concern and would remain one until the Soviets clarified their situation.⁷ I also mentioned a number of other human rights issues—Soviet Jewry, harassment of Americans, problems in Leningrad and binational marriage cases—and gave him your view that the way such issues are handled will have a big impact on our overall relationship. He groused about the contacts our diplomats there have with dissidents—“they are looking for trouble”—but made no other reply.

We concluded with a checklist discussion of bilateral issues:

—I described the steps we propose to take to revitalize activities under our agreements on agriculture, housing and the environment. On health, I told him we are considering a number of steps, but the Soviet approach to Mrs. Bonner’s request for foreign medical treatment is holding up initiatives to expand activities.

—I told Dobrynin Art Hartman would be tabling our draft of a new exchanges agreement in Moscow soon.

—On the Kiev/New York consulates, I repeated our request to send a study team to Kiev to look at our facilities there. Dobrynin replied by raising the resumption of Aeroflot flights. I said we are prepared to talk about it, but we are waiting for a Soviet reply to our February proposals in Montreal to improve air safety in the northern Pacific.⁸ In addition, I said, there may be a problem for Soviet planes under our noise abatement regulations, and American carriers flying to the Soviet Union would have to have a better deal than before. All in all, I suggested, we should move ahead on the consulates, while also talking about Aeroflot. Dobrynin said he would pass the suggestion back.

—In this same connection, I noted that the Incidents-at-Sea talks between our two navies had gone well, and described the Soviet Navy’s proposals we are looking at (Dobrynin appeared not to have heard of them). I suggested we might look at similar opportunities for other contacts between our two militaries, in keeping with the interest in such contacts you expressed in your March 6 letter.⁹

—On the Economic, Technical and Industrial Cooperation Long-Term Agreement, Dobrynin said they would have a reply soon to our proposal for a ten-year extension, and I said we were thinking of an eventual Joint Commission meeting in terms of cabinet-level participation.

—On the Pacific maritime boundary talks, I proposed resumption July 23 (instead of in June, as they have proposed). He said they would be back to us, but there appeared to be no problem.

—On fisheries, I said we would be getting to them soon and were working on an allocation for them, but it would be less than before. When Dobrynin grumbled, I said this was true for most countries.

In conclusion, I told him once again you wanted to see motion in the relationship, and noted that even if there is little on the “big” security issues, we do seem to be making progress on the bilateral side. Dobrynin reiterated that movement on one or two of the big issues we can talk about bilaterally would be good for both countries and once again identified outer space and nuclear testing as the prime candidates, and ones on which they would like an answer from us.

Looking at the meeting in the big picture, I think it was probably an important discussion, with some interesting implications for US-Soviet relations overall.

The most interesting is the way Dobrynin chose to play the two issues now at the top of the Soviet agenda, outer space and CTB. On substance, he had no new ideas to offer. But he defined these topics in the context of the desirable negotiations between the superpowers, negotiations that “would do you good, and would do us good.” Getting talks going on such issues would show the world that the two superpowers are talking to each other, that both sides can address important problems, he observed. And, while he reiterated that the Soviets are not concerned with US domestic politics, he pointed out that if we cannot move on issues like these, by the end of the year there will be nothing to indicate that the two sides are working on major topics.

We should ask ourselves what this means.

Clearly, the Soviets would like to draw us into negotiations on topics they have long promoted. In CTB, they would like to blunt our technological potential in the field of nuclear testing, especially as it relates to our Strategic Defense Initiative. On outer space, they know we are catching up to their early lead, and here too they are worried about our superior technological capacity.

At the same time, this focus on getting arms negotiations underway this year may also reflect a change in Moscow’s political approach to us. It could well mean that there are at least serious doubts in Moscow that “hibernation,” the deep chill the Soviets suddenly reintroduced in our relations last month, is working, or will work for them over the rest of 1984. Your policy of firm but reasonable openness to dialogue and negotiation with the Soviets has given us the initiative in the eyes of world opinion. What the Soviets may now be saying, it seems to me, is that in face of your program for US-Soviet dialogue, small bilateral business will not be enough to preserve their credibility, and they have invested so much in being rigid on START and INF that their credibility would be further weakened by returning to these negotiations in the immediate future. Hence, they may now believe that, aside from START and INF, it is in their interest as well as ours to see movement on arms control between the superpowers, and they have chosen nuclear testing and outer space as the prime candidates.

As you know, I believe that the area where we ourselves can safely move is ASAT. By defining our objectives for talks clearly, we can protect our technological interests in any ensuing negotiations. I do not believe we should pick up on the Soviet interest in resumed CTB negotiations; instead, we should continue to seek improvements of existing verification methods for the TTB/PNE treaties that would enable us to ratify them. That said, we should also be wary of creating any direct linkage between space arms control and improvements in verification of nuclear testing.

In general, however, it is worth pointing out that even though the meeting may have pointed to some evolution in the Soviet approach, it also demonstrated that our current posture is the correct one. We should keep plugging away on each item of our broad agenda with the Soviets. Progress on a number of these items could provide the basis for a constructive meeting between you and Chernenko. But, while we should be ready to engage them constructively on the range of issues between us, we must avoid appearing anxious to go to the summit. If we seem overeager to get there, we will be taking pressure off them to meet us half-way on the substance, and that should remain our primary objective.¹⁰

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations May–June 1984. Secret; Sensitive. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: “RR—(On mtg w/ Doby) I want to lay out our concerns about their military buildup and relieve theirs over us being a threat.” A handwritten note on another copy of this memorandum reads: “President ret’d original to RCM on 8–27–84. RCM gave original to Jack Matlock.” (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (06/21/1984–07/26/1984)
2. During his June 14 press conference, the President was asked repeatedly about the possibility of a summit meeting with Chernenko. Reagan was clear when asked: “Would you be willing to meet with Mr. Chernenko even if he won’t send his delegation back to the nuclear arms talks?” He responded: “Yes, yes, I’m willing to meet with him.” For the full text of the press conference, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book I, pp. 851–859.
3. See Document 223.
4. Shultz traveled to Asia and the Pacific region from July 7 to July 17.
5. See Document 211. Regarding the Dublin speech, see footnote 3, Document 224.
6. Hartman and Gromyko met in Moscow on April 3. See footnote 5, Document 209.
7. See Documents 219 and 220.
8. The ICAO continued to meet in Montreal to discuss Pacific air routes in the aftermath of the KAL shootdown and safety precautions for civil aviation. See footnote 8, Document 185.
9. See Document 190.
10. In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled: “On June 20 Shultz invited me for another conversation. This time it lasted more than three hours.” He continued: “We took stock of all controversial and unsettled questions, but made no attempt even to outline solutions. The discussion undoubtedly proved useful for putting all our affairs in systematic order.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 553–554)