162. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)1

SUBJECT

  • Increased Danger of US-Soviet Conflict

Attached is a quick paper on the subject of the increased danger of US-Soviet conflict. If there is time, I would like to develop one additional point upon which I need to secure additional information. That has to do with Soviet efforts to improve flight control procedures in the Far East, in the aftermath of our rhetorical censure of their behavior.

Tab I

Paper Prepared by Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff2

INCREASED DANGER OF WAR FACT OR FICTION?

During the last few months, a feeling has emerged in both the United States and in West Europe that the danger of a war has increased. The shootdown of the Korean Air Lines passenger jet, the bombing attack on our peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, the terrorist bombing of the leaders of the Republic of Korea in Rangoon, and the suspension, which we hope is temporary, of the START and INF arms control discussions have all contributed to the feeling that the world has become a more dangerous place, and that the superpowers may be edging toward a conflict.

These events, of course, have had some effect, a negative effect, on the state of US-Soviet relations. It is curious, however, that the [Page 584] government of the United States is being held responsible by some people for the present state of affairs. It was not the United States that was the perpetrator of these acts, but the Soviet Union, its allies and proteges who have attacked civilians and walked out of negotiations.

Did the United States, by its actions, create an environment in which clashes between the superpowers became more likely? What, in fact, has the United States done over the last three years? We have made substantial progress toward rebuilding our armed forces to repair the damage that they suffered during the 1970s as a result of reduced budgets. While there is some debate about exactly how large the increases in our defense budget should be, no one that we know of, aside from George McGovern, has denied the need for those increases. It is interesting to notice that the chief defense analyst of the Carter administration Defense Department, Russell Murray, has now publicly stated that his office completed a study back in 1980 that showed that US defense spending increases of the size we have recommended were in fact necessary to restore the forces needed for our security (Washington Times, 19 January 1984; Armed Forces Journal International, June 1982, p. 57).

We have carried through on the policy chosen by NATO more than five years ago to deploy cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS–20s. We remain ready to return to a world in which no such missiles are deployed, or limited, equal numbers are deployed.

We defended our citizens in Grenada and defeated a coup d’etat led by pro-Soviet would-be dictators. And, unlike some other unfortunate recent episodes, we acted effectively and in time.

Part of what we are seeing, of course, is a self-conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Union to use rhetoric to fan the belief that the world is becoming more dangerous. They know that, to the extent they succeed in convincing world opinion this is so, the onus will increasingly be on us, rather than them, to make new concessions. Precedents for this kind of behavior can be found both in Khrushchev’s effort in 1960 to abort the summit with President Eisenhower and also in subsequent Soviet provocations over Berlin, which were intended to try to prevent President Kennedy’s defense buildup.

The real question, of course, is whether the chances of war have been increased by our programs to rebuild American military strength and support our commitments around the world. The Soviet Union, by means of its recent, angry statements, says that we have. History tells us something quite different.3 World War II became unavoidable [Page 585] when the democratic powers of West Europe surrendered first part, then all of Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler. This capitulation only reinforced Hitler’s belief that it was safe to attack Poland, because the great democracies were too weak and timid to fight.4 It reinforced the feeling of other nations that France and Britain were not reliable allies. The North Korean attack on South Korea became more likely when the Truman administration in 1950 mistakenly and inadvertently backed away from its public commitment to defend South Korea.

The record is clear. War is not made more likely when the military power of democracies is restored. It becomes more likely when the strength or will of those nations comes into question. No one has accused our Administration of allowing that to happen. We intend to keep it that way, and by doing so, and by remaining willing to engage in productive negotiations with the Soviet Union, we will keep the world as safe a place as a strong, prudent, United States can make it.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84–01/31/84). Confidential. Sent for information. In a handwritten note to McFarlane at the bottom of the page, Poindexter explained: “Bud, This is in response to Jim Baker’s question to me earlier in the week. Bob Sims has provided copy to Jim. Jim and Paul Laxalt appear on Sunday talk shows and they may use the points made here. John.”
  2. No classification marking.
  3. From this sentence forward, the text was circled. It is unclear whether Poindexter or McFarlane made the markings.
  4. “to fight” is struck through.