161. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz1
Gromyko’s approach to START and INF in Stockholm— refusing to enter into substantive discussions but emphasizing that US “forward-based” systems would have to be addressed were START resumed2—suggests that the future of nuclear arms negotiations lies in some form [Page 579] of START-INF merger. In this regard, it is interesting that Gromyko did not dispute your rejoinder that we could not discuss our LRINF missiles without addressing the SS–20 as well. While silence does not connote acceptance, the Soviets surely understand that a “partial merger” on their terms, involving only US systems and excluding the SS–20, is not acceptable either to the US or the Allies.
Since a return to the status quo ante deployment is not acceptable, the policy question at present is what kind of merger would be most advantageous for us, in terms of our strategic interests, Alliance management and consultation, and negotiability with the Soviets, and what kind of approach could win approval in Washington—where other agencies and the NSC staff have been strongly opposed to any form of merger. There are essentially two alternatives:
—A full substantive merger of the START and INF agendas, in which SS–20s, Pershing IIs, and GLCMs are included within the appropriate overall START aggregates for missiles and warheads, with or without sub-ceilings and constraints on freedom to mix;
—A compartmentalized merger, in which the present START and INF agendas maintain their separate identity, and are dealt with as distinct sections under one umbrella negotiation.
Pros and Cons of Full Merger:
The first approach has significant conceptual advantages. Putting US and Soviet strategic and INF systems in overall aggregates would underscore the strategic unity of the Alliance, counteracting to some degree the notion of a separate European balance which has arisen in some quarters in the context of a distinct INF negotiation. Such an approach would facilitate an effort to secure global limits on SS–20s. Were the Soviets to accept this concept—as opposed to their own narrower demand for the one-sided inclusion of US forward based systems—they would have implicitly agreed that the Soviet threat to US allies was a legitimate subject of US-Soviet negotiations on strategic forces. At the same time, this approach would not necessarily preclude our introducing regional elements, such as the offer not to deploy the entirety of our global entitlement of INF missiles in Europe which we considered last fall for the INF talks.
From the Soviet viewpoint, a fully merged negotiation would allow them to claim persuasively that they had not, after all, returned to the INF negotiations, unlike a compartmentalized approach—in which the INF portion would strongly resemble the INF talks in Geneva. The prospects for reaching an agreement with the Soviets on limitations covering INF could also be improved by the expansion of the agenda beyond the intractable political issues confronted in INF. Full merger would create a wider range of potential tradeoffs between differing US and Soviet advantages and perspectives, and between strategic and [Page 580] INF systems. At a technical level, it also would have the advantage of rendering more tractable such questions as whether particular cruise missiles and Backfire bombers are strategic or theater systems, since a place could be found for all systems within the overall aggregates.
A full merger would, however, have certain disadvantages. Consultations with the Allies would become more complicated, since it would be difficult to establish any clear break between INF issues—on which they would continue to insist on a major say, and strategic forces issues—where we would want to continue our past practice of only keeping them generally informed. Tension could develop between the U.S. and the allies over the bounds of consultations, which is one of the arguments in Washington against merger. Substantively, the availability of trade-offs could prove a two-edged sword, raising the possibility of competing US and allied interests or perceptions, which might be exploited by the Soviets to drive wedges in the Alliance. On the one hand, the allies could fear that the US might be tempted to accept imbalances vis-a-vis Europe in return for Soviet agreement to US positions on intercontinental systems. Conversely, some in Washington are concerned that the allies could press us to sacrifice our interest in reducing and limiting Soviet strategic forces, for example heavy ICBMs, and to concentrate our bargaining efforts on INF issues. This concern has been another of the principal arguments against a merger in the Washington community. The obverse of this is that the Soviets would also face difficult choices on trade-offs, as for example between numbers of ICBMs and numbers of SS–20s under a common aggregate. The dilemma for the Soviets is in some way crueler, for whereas US INF and intercontinental systems can both hit targets in the USSR, Soviet INF cannot reach US targets. Thus for the West INF and intercontinental systems are militarily, although not politically, largely interchangeable, whereas for the Soviets they are not.
A full merger would also make explicit the dependence of an agreement on strategic forces, which has heretofore been relatively unpoliticized, on the resolution of INF issues, which have become extremely political. A merger could thus be seen to delay prospects for a START agreement as long as the Soviets remain adamant in refusing any US INF deployments in Europe.
A chart setting forth an illustrative package of limitations under a full substantive merger of START and INF is attached at TAB 2.3
Pros and Cons of a Compartmentalized Merger
The principal advantage of a compartmentalized approach (a “negotiation within a negotiation”) is that by dividing subject matter [Page 581] between INF and strategic forces, it would minimize opportunities for Soviet wedge-driving between the US and the allies, and would facilitate an orderly structure of alliance consultations. In effect, the allies would continue to be closely involved in work on the INF portion of the negotiation, while we would simply keep them briefed on the strategic forces issues. There would be no change in the procedures or the relative importance of the INF issues.
A compartmentalized approach would also be more attractive in Washington, since it would come closest to a continuation of the negotiating pattern we have been accustomed to and would not require any reordering of substantive positions, as a full substantive merger would. For just these reasons, however, the Soviets might find it more difficult to return to a compartmentalized START/INF negotiation than to a fully merged one.
Substantively, a compartmentalized approach would lessen negotiating flexibility on both strategic and INF issues. The separate agendas and problems as they had developed through the negotiations to date would remain largely unmodified. There would be limited opportunity for trade-offs between strategic and INF systems, although a compartmentalized approach could evolve toward a full merger over time. Conceptually, the compartmentalized approach would entail a greater risk of returning to the concept of a distinct European nuclear balance, separate from the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, which would be potentially divisive of Alliance strategic unity.
The Soviet Attitude Toward Merger
If the Soviets eventually agree to a merger of START and INF, they will want to change the parameters of the negotiation to protect their position. Up to now, the START negotiations have been focused on global limitations on US and Soviet launchers and warheads—precisely the principles which the Soviets have rejected in INF. The existence of such potential inconsistencies may cause the Soviets to hesitate on the merger idea. At the same time, the Soviets may appreciate the greater negotiating flexibility and range of tradeoffs which a merger would offer, and could find in some form of merger a face-saving escape from the impasse they created by walking out of the START and INF talks.
At Tab 1 is a summary of the Soviet efforts to bring US forward based systems into the negotiations on SALT I and SALT II.4 This is a continuing issue, where the negotiating record is subject to sharply varying interpretations. In SALT I the Soviets claimed that the larger launcher aggregate which they were allowed represented compensa [Page 582] tion for US FBS—as well as for UK and French systems. We denied this, pointing out that the Soviet launcher numbers were offset by larger US warhead and bomber numbers. In SALT II, the Soviets argued that their right to a monopoly of 308 heavy missiles was compensation for UK and French systems. We have noted that this is not the case, and that the US in any event had no plan to build heavy missiles.
UK and French Forces
No form of merger will resolve the issue of UK and French forces. The Soviets will continue to advance the demands for compensation which they made in INF, and we will continue to insist that we cannot include third country forces in our aggregates. At the same time, it is possible that in the context of a broader merged agenda, there would be more possibility for the issue of UK and French forces to be resolved in the same manner that it was in SALT I and SALT II. That is, as noted above, the existence of asymmetries between US and Soviet forces under an agreement could be interpreted in different ways by the US and the Soviet Union.
Next Steps
If we and the Soviets reach agreement that START and INF should resume on a merged basis, the initial form of that merger should most logically be a compartmentalized structure. This approach would most easily win approval in Washington and with the Allies, in that it is the closest to the pre-deployment negotiating pattern and presents the fewest new issues to be digested. It is also likely that the Soviets, with their cautious and conservative approach to arms control, will want to take an approach which, while enabling them to say that they are not returning to the INF talks, does not force them to make major decisions at the outset concerning the shape of a fully merged negotiation. This being the case, we do not need to make decisions now on the the desirability or structure of a fully merged negotiation ourselves, but it is clearly a subject that deserves careful thought.
Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, January 16–31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to Seitz, Burt wrote: “Ray—I have done the attached memo in its present form because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter, given that we are not yet even back into negotiations with the Soviets. However, given that the Secretary now is clearly interested in the topic, I think he will find this memo of interest. I hope he will find the time in the next few weeks to read it. Rick.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22, Arms Control (01/24/1984–03/25/1984)) In a covering memorandum to Shultz on January 25, Eagleburger wrote: “Rick has done an excellent analysis of two approaches to a merger of the INF and START negotiations and of the advantages and disadvantages of each.
“Rick suggests that we consider first the more modest alternative of a ‘compartmentalized merger.’ That approach will be easier to sell in Washington and may be more appealing to Moscow but is likely to result in little more than a return to stalemated nuclear arms control talks in a slightly different package. As Rick suggests, the ‘full merger’ approach promises more benefits but also poses greater risks. In the end, we may not want to make that leap, but I suggest you discuss the full merger idea with Ken, Rick and Jon before ruling it out.” A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on Eagleburger’s memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, January 16–31, 1984)
↩- See Documents 159 and 160.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- Burt signed “Rick” above his typed name.↩