Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 26, 1984

SUBJECT

• Horowitz Conversations in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, Administrative Assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy
• Admiral Poindexter
• Jack Matlock

Horowitz said that he had come over to deliver a message from Zagladin, with whom he had a long conversation in Moscow on Thursday, January 19²—that is, after the President’s speech on U.S.-Soviet relations³ and the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm⁴ (although it was not certain that Zagladin had yet received a report of the meeting).

Horowitz said that his meeting with Zagladin began with Zagladin delivering a lengthy and vitriolic polemic against U.S. policy and the President personally. He even compared the present situation to the thirties and the President to Hitler, in the sense that he seemed to be preparing for war. He said the Soviets could not figure out what our aims were. He asked rhetorically if we were trying to frighten them, and observed that our policies had forced Soviet decisions on new weapons which had already been taken and the results of which would be apparent in two to three years. He observed that the Soviets will sacrifice whatever is necessary not to fall behind the U.S.

Zagladin then asked, again rhetorically, if the U.S. was trying to isolate them in the world, and answered that this would not work either. Then he observed that great powers have to allow each other to save face in a difficult situation, and noted, for example, that if oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were cut off, the Soviets would understand if the U.S. considered it necessary to take action to restore the flow. But then he complained about what he called a U.S. “propaganda campaign” directed at the Soviet people. He claimed that the Soviet people fear war, but that “Our greatest fear is what if—God forbid—Reagan is reelected. Every door in every negotiation would be closed.”

At this point, according to Horowitz, there was a total change in Zagladin’s tone. He asked if it would be possible for Horowitz to deliver a message to the White House, and alluded to the fact that the request might appear strange, given the fact that Horowitz works for a Senator on the other side of the aisle. Horowitz assured him that, nevertheless, he was sure he could deliver a message if this was desired.

Zagladin then said that the situation between our two countries is serious, but that Soviet decision-makers have analyzed it and have found one area where progress might be possible. The only realistic first step seems to them to lie in the area of chemical weapons. If we could work jointly on a treaty in this area and bring it to a successful conclusion, then that would “start us on the right road.”

Once this “message” was delivered, the rest of the discussion went back and forth on a variety of subjects, during which Zagladin told Horowitz that Andropov was on the mend and, indeed, that he had seen Andropov that very morning.

Other Conversations: Horowitz is a physician and had some contact with Soviet doctors. One told him that Andropov is suffering from instage [end-stage] renal disease, combined with hypertension. He had responded well to treatment, but had an unexpected downturn in December, from which he is recovering, is now working about three hours a day, and is likely to appear in public before the March 4 local elections. Horowitz was questioned at length, without direct reference to Andropov but clearly with the latter in mind, regarding how to deal with anesthesia during an operation on a patient who had recently undergone surgery. There was also discussion of possible new drugs which suppress the immune reaction, which suggested that consideration was being given to a kidney transplant.

During a conversation with Academician Velikhov, the latter expressed grave concern over U.S. BMD research. He said that the Soviets had researched the field and were convinced that BMD is in fact feasible, although enormously expensive, and commented that the Soviets considered it potentially supportive of first strike intentions. When questioned on the logic of this, Velikhov responded that no defensive system could be a hundred percent effective, but if a nation built one it could launch a first strike confident that the BMD would limit damage from a retaliatory strike to acceptable proportions.

Horowitz said that his principal contact in Moscow was Andrei Pavlov of the State Committee for Science and Technology, with whom he had worked during the 1978 visit of Senator Kennedy and that Pavlov’s deputy, Valery Antonov, accompanied him at all times. (Pavlov had been instrumental in 1978 in arranging a meeting between Kennedy and Brezhnev after the meeting was initially refused.)⁵ He also noted that, before leaving, he received a call from a person named “Latva,” who was identified as a personal assistant to Andropov, and who thanked him for coming. He took this as a signal that Andropov was aware of his visit and wished that fact to be known.

At various times during the visit Pavlov, Velikhov and Antonov indicated they thought the President would be re-elected which would make arms control agreements nearly impossible to achieve in the second term.

Horowitz said that he had also discussed some “private matters” and expected to have further contacts if he could be of use to us. He said that Senator Kennedy considered the matter beyond politics and was ready to be of assistance if we desired, but would not be at all offended if we did not desire. He asked that his report not be disseminated widely and was assured that access to it would be confined to the West Wing.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84–01/31/84). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in Poindexter’s office. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it.
2. Telegram 12229 to Moscow, January 14, reported that the primary purpose of Horowitz’s mission was to discuss the “Fallout from ‘Consequences of Nuclear War’ Forum: Mark Palmer has learned from his sources in Ted Kennedy’s office that the Senator’s AA, Larry Horowitz, will be in Moscow January 16–19 to meet with Velikhov of Academy of Sciences to discuss the possibility of setting up an event in the USSR similar to that held in the US in December on the consequences of nuclear war. No decision has been made yet on whether the US side would actually go ahead or whether the Senator would participate. Kennedy’s office provides this strictly FYI. They do not repeat do not want the Embassy to make any contact with the Soviets on this.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840027–0835) The December 1983 Forum on the “Consequences of Nuclear War,” which was called by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and held in the Senate Caucus Room, brought together Soviet and American scientists to discuss the effects of a nuclear war. (Philip Shabecoff, “US-Soviet Panel Sees No Hope in an Atomic War,” New York Times, December 9, 1983, p. A13; Tom Wicker, “A Grim Agreement,” New York Times, December 12, 1983, p. A27)
3. See Document 158.
4. See Document 159.
5. Senator Kennedy traveled to Moscow in September 1978 and met with Brezhnev on September 9. (Telegram 21718 from Moscow, September 11, 1978; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D780369–1165)