Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

180. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 26, 1980

SUBJECT

• Getting Our Act Together on Afghanistan (U)

As I noted in my memo of January 7 (Tab A),² the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan offers this Administration a priceless opportunity to begin to speak with one voice on how we deal with and what we say about the Soviets. This is very important from a political (viz., George Bush’s remarks on the subject);³ from a diplomatic (i.e., relations with the Allies and with the Third World); and from a strictly US-Soviet (Moscow should be getting a clear and simple message from us) point of view. (C)

Unfortunately, this is not happening. There has been a stream of Government-originated analysis and public testimony which has muddied the waters with regard to (a) the motivations that impelled the Soviets to attack Afghanistan, (b) the prospects which the Soviets face in Afghanistan, and (c) the length of time that we are prepared to maintain the current series of punitive actions vis-à-vis the Soviets. The line propounded has directly undercut the President’s message. Whether this is intentional or unintentional, I do not know. But what is clear to me is that our interests are being damaged in the process. The harmful line which has emerged, and which has been consciously abetted by the Soviets, is as follows:

Why Did the Soviets Attack? According to one school of thought, the Soviets felt impelled to move into Afghanistan because of legitimate defensive concerns to avert chaos in a neighboring Communist state and because the penalties which such a move would normally trigger in terms of US-Soviet relations and world opinion were no longer operative. Moscow was thus, allegedly influenced by the overall downturn in US-Soviet relations, as exemplified by the Cuban brigade crisis, the TNF dispute, friction over Southeast Asian relief and security matters, US defense increases, SALT II delay, etc. The obvious assumption behind this argument is that the Soviet invasion only has implications for Afghanistan itself, is not connected with the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and Iranian oil, and that making a US-Soviet or East-West issue out of it is a big mistake. The further implication is that if SALT had passed and we had not decided on TNF deployment, the Soviets would not have invaded Afghanistan. Almost all genuine experts on the USSR would argue that this last assertion is highly implausible; that the Czechoslovakia decision in 1968 was a hard one for Brezhnev, but that given his outlook and that of his colleagues, the decision to invade Afghanistan caused little if any internal dissent among the leadership; and that the Soviets would have gone into Afghanistan no matter what the state of US-Soviet relations had been in December 1979. (In fact, it might be useful for Carter partisans to ponder the fact that had SALT passed on schedule in November, and had the Soviets followed-up with an invasion of Afghanistan in December, the President’s chances for reelection at this point would be considerably slimmer than they are at present.) (S)

In any case, excusing the Soviet invasion or laying the blame for it on the feebleness of our diplomacy and the lack of wisdom of specific actions taken by the President (viz., Tab B)⁴ undercut the President’s leadership, question his judgment, and are not appropriate analyses from high officials of the Carter Administration. We are not, after all, participating in a graduate seminar. If we lay emphasis on US culpability for the worsening of US-Soviet relations and indicate that this is the prime factor, or at least a prime factor, in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan, this takes the Soviets off the hook both in the United States and abroad, undercuts the President’s position both with the US public and with the Allies, and measurably weakens our chances for getting a satisfactory reaction on the part of others to Soviet aggression. (S)

The line which should be adopted by all authoritative US officials is the one very clearly enunciated by the President, i.e., that this is an unprecedented event, marks a very grave deterioration of the peace, has extremely ominous ramifications for the future, requires concerted international effort to deal with it, demonstrates the callous insensitivity of the USSR to the ordinary norms of international behavior, and is, in short, the gravest threat to the general peace since the Second World War. In other words, this is no time to be “even-handed” in backgrounding Soviet motivations, nor should we downplay the obvious geopolitical factors which influenced the Soviets to take over Afghanistan in the first place. (C)

A Soviet Miscalculation? Other recent background briefings from “high Government officials” have stressed the “miscalculation” that the Soviets have made by moving into Afghanistan.⁵ According to this line of reasoning, the Soviets are now becoming involved “in another Vietnam” and will not be successful in suppressing the insurgency through military means for years to come. My view, on the contrary, is that the Soviet war aims—to control the population centers, the lines of communication and the major passes leading to Pakistan—will almost certainly be accomplished by this summer, and that Soviet control of the media will then make it possible for them, without necessarily eliminating the resistance everywhere in Afghanistan, simply to declare victory, a declaration which will be greeted with a sigh of relief by our European Allies, among others (Tab C).⁶ (C)

Whether this is a correct analysis or not really begs the question. The hidden assumption behind the statement that Afghanistan is a “Soviet Vietnam” is that the Soviets are having, and will have, so much trouble in that country that this in itself will be a lesson to them to desist from further actions of this kind. The corresponding message for Americans is that the Soviets will derive the same lessons from Afghanistan that we did from Vietnam. This is not only contrary to fact but also undermines our policy, because it implies that it would be sufficient for the United States and our Allies simply to sit back and observe Soviet discomfiture at the “miscalculation.” Strong actions on our part, in this light, are obviously overreactions. Such analysis consequently undercuts our efforts to ensure that our Allies take, and the general public supports, strong, concrete and punitive measures against the Soviets because of Afghanistan. (S)

The Short Duration of Our Reaction. Some public testimony, in addition to much background briefing, leaves the implication that the pendulum will swing back in due course and that within several months we can expect “business as usual” with the Soviets. This has been evident at several meetings I have recently attended. The primary evidence for such belief is that we have carefully maintained the fabric of our relationship and have not “broken any agreements” with the Soviets. In fact, the Soviets are carefully spreading the myth that they will be withdrawing from Afghanistan in short order. The Singaporeans evidently believe such twaddle and have warned us not to be left holding the bag when this fabled event takes place in thirty days. (The Soviets, of course, spread the same sort of stories and repeated them officially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.) (S)

Questioning the long-term commitment of the President to the actions we have undertaken undercuts his leadership, puts his judgment in doubt, and is politically very damaging (i.e., if this is the most serious event since the Second World War, then why will we be engaging in “business as usual” in a matter of months?). Furthermore, it is grist for the mill of those Europeans and others who argue against taking precipitate or strong action against the Soviets. (S)

The Recommended Line. In my view, all top Administration officials should be speaking with one voice in disseminating the following analysis of events in Afghanistan:

—The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was a carefully considered one and grew out of the mission of General Pavlovski to Afghanistan, which began last August.

—The Czars thirsted after ports on the Indian Ocean for centuries. In line with those historical aspirations, Molotov asked von Ribbentrop for a sphere of influence over Afghanistan and Iran in 1940. The Soviets marched into Northern Iran in 1942 and again in 1946. The geopolitical aims of the Soviets in taking over Afghanistan should not be underestimated. Soviet education, doctrine, and outlook would all lead one to believe that the geopolitical factor is an important element in the Soviet design to turn Afghanistan from a buffer state into the Mongolia of Southwest Asia.

—The Soviets are, of course, aware that by introducing their troops into Afghanistan they are measurably escalating the risks of eventual armed conflict. Obviously, they felt the risk was worth taking.

—The elimination of Afghanistan as a buffer state in Southwest Asia, just as the elimination of Cambodia as a buffer state in Southeast Asia, indicates a dangerous, even unprecedented, new adventurism on the part of the Soviets, who have been, ever since 1975, demonstrating a growing willingness to use armed force to settle disputes in their favor in Third World countries.

—Our best forecast is that the Soviets will put enough strength into Afghanistan to prevail militarily and that they will eventually subdue Afghanistan, just as they subdued the peoples of the Baltic and East Europe in the 1940s. Any other conclusion would be wishful thinking.

—While we would welcome being proved wrong, we do not expect the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. Our reaction to the Soviet aggression must, therefore, be firm, measured and long-term in nature.

—The United States has no intention of resuming a “business as usual” posture toward the Soviet Union until we are convinced that the Kremlin has absorbed the message that was delivered in the State of the Union address. President Carter is, above all, determined to avoid future Afghanistans. (C)

Trying to shove this message directly down the throat of the State Department would be worse than hopeless. My suggestion is that you proceed as follows:

a) Raise the importance of speaking with one voice on this issue in the SCC, emphasizing the need of those working in the reelection campaign to have clear, simple guidance on Afghanistan and Iran.⁷

b) Task the Schecter policy information committee to come up with such guidance.

c) Disseminate the guidance developed by the committee to the domestic staff for general guidance to all Administration officials.

d) Once we have an official agreed line, make sure that all top officials, and particularly Administration Soviet experts, adhere to that line. (C)

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Ermarth, Griffith, Henze, Odom, Thornton, and Schecter. In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote: “agree→first rate.”
2. Attached but not printed. Brement wrote to Brzezinski, January 7, to emphasize “the country wants the President to exercise firm, vigorous leadership in foreign affairs. The crisis in Afghanistan will enhance this desire.” Brement argued that Afghanistan gave the Carter administration an opportunity to reverse a “commonly-held perception” among domestic critics and the Soviets, that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union lacked focus and resolve. Brement’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 255.
3. The reference to Bush’s remarks likely comes from Robert Scheer, “Bush Assails Carter Defense Strategy,” Los Angeles Times, January 24, 1980, p. B1. Bush, who was running for President and had recently won the Iowa Republican caucuses, cited Carter’s cuts in defense spending and linked that policy with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
4. At Tab B, attached but not printed, is a January 22 memorandum from Brement to Brzezinski and Aaron, calling their attention to a Department of State briefing book prepared for Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga’s visit to the United States, which listed a number of issues not directly related to Afghanistan that compelled the Soviet intervention. These included the Theater Nuclear Force (TNF) issue in Europe, SALT II, and Soviet troops in Cuba. Of the Department of State attitude, Brement concluded: “In other words, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is our fault.” In the upper right corner, Brzezinski wrote: “Agree! ZB.”
5. Not further identified and not found.
6. Printed as Document 132.
7. The issue did not arise at the next SCC meeting, February 6. See Document 198. Brement attended the meeting, but Brzezinski did not; he was in Saudi Arabia at the time. See Documents 194 and 195.