Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

179. Annex From the President’s Daily Brief¹

Washington, January 23, 1980

USSR: PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN

Four weeks after launching its invasion, the USSR has encountered a range of political and military problems in Afghanistan that portend an even deeper and larger Soviet role.

[less than 1 line not declassified] Soviet officials in Kabul indicate Moscow is dismayed over the failure of Babrak Karmal’s government thus far to take hold. Babrak has made an effort, at Soviet behest, to try to appear more moderate than his predecessors, but he is so obviously a Soviet puppet that his regime would collapse if Soviet troops were to withdraw. [less than 1 line not declassified] Soviet officials have complained about the factional and personal rivalries within the regime, and one [less than 1 line not declassified] Soviet official in Kabul has even speculated about a successor to Babrak.

The disintegration of the Afghan military has speeded up since the Soviet invasion. Rather than welcoming Soviet support against the insurgents, some units have clashed with Soviet troops and the rate of desertions has increased. The Soviets do not appear to have an effective remedy at hand.

General Sokolov, the USSR’s First Deputy Minister of Defense and chief commander in Afghanistan, reacted to ineffectiveness in one Afghan unit by recommending that its Soviet advisers be replaced. But Afghan military dissatisfaction will increase as Soviet advisers—under pressure from their superiors to produce results—take an increasingly heavy hand in Afghan military affairs.

The Insurgency

The introduction of Soviet troops—far from intimidating the insurgents—has probably served to increase popular support for the rebellion. The insurgents have taken advantage of the demoralization of the Afghan Army and bad weather to maintain a steady harassment of isolated Afghan towns and Soviet lines of communication. In particular, the Soviets have had problems keeping open the Termez-Kabul road, which passes through extremely difficult terrain.

This has led the Soviets to undertake a number of small-scale sweeps and to launch tactical airstrikes and helicopter attacks at suspected rebel concentrations. In the northeastern provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan, the Soviets have undertaken a more ambitious operation to ensure that the besieged provincial capitals do not fall to the rebels. This drive, however, has been hampered by bad weather, poor road conditions, and insurgent harassment.² We have no evidence that Soviet forces have been able to engage the rebels on terms that would allow the Soviets to bring to bear their superior firepower and air support.

We have had several reliable but fragmentary reports of Soviet casualties. One report from a Soviet town near the border reports the recent arrival of a large number of coffins bearing remains of Soviets killed in Afghanistan. We believe the Soviets have sustained as many as 2,000 killed and wounded since the invasion began. We have no information about the number of insurgent casualties.

Prospects

Moscow probably will not find early relief from these problems. The Babrak regime shows no sign of pulling together, and the situation in the Afghan military will be extremely difficult to retrieve. Even under the best of conditions, it could take years to assemble an Afghan military force capable of controlling the country. Thus Moscow almost inevitably will have to take a more direct hand in running and pacifying the country.

An early collapse of the rebellion also seems unlikely. Better weather in the spring probably will bring an increase in insurgent activity.

All of this does not mean that Moscow cannot maintain essential control or keep whatever government it wants in power in Kabul. Nor is there the slightest sign that the Soviets might seriously contemplate withdrawal.

Politically, Moscow probably will intensify its effort to establish a more effective Afghan Government. If Babrak cannot do the job, the Soviets could engineer yet another coup in Kabul, as embarrassing as that might be for them. But they are unlikely to come up with a formula that resolves the contradiction between their interest in a government with broader support and their intention of dominating Afghanistan.

Militarily, the Soviets could continue on their present course, under which their military forces maintain control of Kabul and other essential points and conduct counterinsurgency operations necessary to prevent major setbacks. But this seems unlikely since it would allow the insurgents a free hand in most of the country, allow them to prey on extended Soviet supply lines, and present the Soviet leadership with the prospect of continued casualties and a steady drain on resources.

The Soviets now have the forces in Afghanistan to conduct a somewhat expanded counterinsurgency effort. It is unlikely, however, that the forces now there could end the insurgency. If the Soviets seek to end the insurgency—and, as seems likely, cannot rely on effective support from the Afghan Army—they will have to commit more forces.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President’s Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The annex printed here was found in this form.
2. A situation report on Afghanistan, January 25, prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, noted that Afghan and Soviet military forces faced a “serious dilemma” regarding the insurgency: “They must carry out orders that state ‘the rebels must be destroyed using all resources’ and, at the same time, adhere to a government policy of refraining from attacking villages or pursuing rebels who take sanctuary in villages and homes. That policy is part of a propaganda program to reduce hostility toward the Soviet and Afghan armies.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, SITREPs)