Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

178. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[cable number not declassified]

Washington, January 22, 1980, 2340Z

COUNTRY

• USSR/Afghanistan

SUBJECT

• Comments of a Soviet Diplomat on Factors Leading to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan [1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

• [3½ lines not declassified]

1. (Headquarters comment: The source made the following remarks in an informal conversation during which he said that he felt that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was unwise and not in the best interests of the USSR. [2 lines not declassified])

2. In early January 1980, officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs who, in late December 1979 and early January 1980, were involved in the support of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan said that the Soviet decision to intervene was based on the following factors:

A. The Soviets were humiliated by the outcome of the August 1979 issue of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. They considered that they had backed down on this issue in deference to the right of the United States to dominate events on its borders. The Soviets also accepted an unfavorable resolution of this issue because, at the time, they still had hopes for a treaty from the second session of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II).

B. Soviet leaders saw the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to modernize its Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) as an act requiring a response.

C. The Soviet Embassy in Washington was reporting in November 1979 that there was no chance of the U.S. Senate ratifying the SALT II treaty.

D. Soviet personnel in Afghanistan had been tortured to death by Afghan dissidents and retribution for these acts had become an emotional issue with Soviet leaders.

E. The intervention of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was considered a valid precedent for Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet view was, “who today remembers the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic?”²

3. The most important of these factors, according to the Soviet Foreign Ministry officials, was that the U.S. had imposed its will on Cuba in 1979 and that the USSR must demonstrate that its will must be respected in areas close to its borders, as well.

4. The Foreign Ministry officials also said that the possibility of a boycott against the Moscow Olympics had been considered during the planning for the intervention in Afghanistan and that, in fact, it had been planned that Soviet troops would be out of Afghanistan by 1 May 1980 to avoid disrupting the games. The Ministry officials said that U.S. call for a boycott of the Olympics was a sore spot with the Soviets and that Moscow would take a boycott seriously. Valentin Falin, First Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee’s International Information Department and former Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, was quoted as saying that now, because of the U.S. ultimatum, it would be difficult for the USSR to withdraw its troops before the Olympics.

5. According to Falin, Soviet leaders were completely surprised by the coup which overthrew the Government of Afghan President Mohammad Daoud in 1978. At that time, and again in January 1978, Nur Mohmmad Taraki, Daoud’s successor, asked for Soviet support, but was refused. The Soviets did not trust Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin and repeatedly warned Taraki to beware of Amin. According to Falin, Taraki’s attendance at the non-aligned summit in Havana in September 1979 was a mistake as it gave Amin the opportunity to plan his coup. Following that coup, the Soviets warned Amin not to kill Taraki. The Soviets held Amin responsible when, after three weeks in prison, Taraki was strangled. In November 1979, the internal situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point where Amin asked for Soviet intervention despite that fact that he realized the Soviets were not his friends. In sum, as Falin explained it, the surprise overthrow of Daoud by a leftist regime had started a chain of events which the Soviets reacted to rather than initiated. The Soviets were prepared to accept the Daoud regime and did not try to replace it, but when a pro-Soviet regime came to power, they could not ignore it nor refuse to support it.

6. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

7. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [1 line not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 5, Afghanistan: 1/22/80. Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not declassified]. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. For documentation on the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana.