Office of the Historian

198. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, February 6, 1980, 9–10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Pakistan/Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

    • State
    • Warren Christopher
    • David Newsom
    • Matthew Nimetz
    • Richard Cooper*
    • Peter Constable
    • George Vest*

  • OSD

    • Secretary Harold Brown
    • W. Graham Claytor
    • William Perry*

  • JCS

    • General David Jones
    • General John Pustay

  • CIA

    • Frank Carlucci

  • White House

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron
    • Henry Owen
    • Lloyd Cutler
    • Hedley Donovan

  • NSC

    • Gary Sick
    • Thomas Thornton
    • Robert Blackwill
    • *Present for last ten minutes only

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The meeting was devoted almost entirely to a report by Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher on their mission to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the assessment of the situation by both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is graver than ours. They both see Soviet actions as part of a deliberate strategic challenge to the U.S. and the region. The Pakistanis see four options facing them:

1. Possible Soviet penetration of their borders.

2. Soviet penetration and retention of some territory.

3. Aggression against Pakistan by India, possibly Soviet-inspired.

4. A coordinated Soviet-Indian attack against Pakistan.

The Pakistanis believe they can handle the first contingency. They are worried about the second since it might be intended to humiliate them and they would probably lack the capability to eject Soviet forces. The third is a major concern, since they are convinced that the Indians are aggressively minded and in league with the Soviets. The fourth would be a calamity for them, and only superpower intervention could stave off a major defeat. (S)

The Pakistani objectives in the talks was to upgrade the 1959 Agreement to the status of a treaty, to increase the aid package about [above] $400 million, and to keep their options open regarding possible opposition or accommodation with the USSR. The latter was probably a device to keep pressure on us on the other two points. In fact, they have taken a rather firm position—both at the Islamic Conference and in the final communique of this trip—opposing the Soviets.2 Accommodation does not appear to be a genuine option for them. The party was impressed by the evident determination of Pakistan to fight if need be to protect its independence. After intensive discussions, it was agreed that we would not present the aid package to Congress until we had sounded out other powers about the assistance they could provide. It has not been decided exactly how to proceed with Congressional affirmation of the 1959 commitment, but the initial reaction of the SCC was that [Page 566] the legislation on the 1959 agreement and waiver of the Symington Amendment should only be presented to Congress in the context of a specific aid proposal, rather than being sent up independently. The Pakistanis were evasive on non-proliferation. In the initial series of talks, there was some indication that a nuclear explosion might be imminent, but this was probably a negotiating tactic and was specifically denied later by Agha Shahi. (S)

Mr. Christopher noted that the Pakistanis appear to be considering an “Islamic option,” which would include a security umbrella from the United States but rely primarily on the Islamic states for the bulk of direct support and cooperation.3 The Pakistanis were very pleased by the degree of support they received at the Islamic Conference, and they may find this an attractive alternative to a total reliance on the U.S. However, they did not seem to have thought this through, and the exact form of an “Islamic option” remains very unclear at this point. In general, the SCC thought that such an option could be entirely consistent with what we are trying to do. The nature of the security umbrella and the exact role of our cooperation would have to be defined much more precisely. (S)

In Saudi Arabia, the mission was struck by the change of mood from a year ago. The Saudi response to our proposals for a closer security relationship was much more positive. Both the Saudis and the Pakistanis seem to have reacted very positively to the President’s State of the Union address and the explicit security commitment which it announced. The Saudis took an alarmist view of the situation in the PDRY, including a report of Soviet and Cuban troop exercising there which we cannot confirm. They asked for more reconnaissance overflights. Mr. Carlucci noted that our overflights along the border had failed to discover any useful information, [2 lines not declassified]. The Saudis complained about the slowness and inadequacy of the U.S. response to their requests for advanced military equipment. They outlined the levels of aid they were prepared to provide to Pakistan but asked that these numbers be very tightly held and, if necessary, that the actual levels be revealed by the Pakistanis rather than us.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 108, SCC–269, 2/6/80, Pakistan/Saudi Arabia. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “Zbig—C.”↩
  2. For the text of the joint U.S.-Pakistani statement issued on February 3, see the Department of State Bulletin, March 1980, p. 65.↩
  3. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “good.”↩