Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

197. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 6, 1980

SUBJECT

• Summary Report and Recommendations Pakistan/Saudi Arabia

The talks with the Saudis were better than a year ago: franker, more specific and more constructive. There is no doubt that your State of the Union message has had a fundamental impact. They now take us seriously. In Pakistan I believe we convinced the Pakistani leaders that you stand foursquare behind the reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement. As a result, we neither had to up the ante on the $400 million nor promise a formal treaty.

Subject to your guidance, I believe we should now pursue the following items:

1. Since the Pakistanis have basically decided to stand up to the Soviets, we may need to increase our military assistance, but primarily in anti-tank and other defensive-type weaponry. In addition to whatever we can raise from others (and the Saudis promised to make a substantial contribution), we may then eventually have to go beyond the $200 million if we want them to be effective in responding to a low-level threat. Their military position is really deplorable: poor equipment, no infrastructure, little effective communications.

2. As a confidence building measure, and also as a way of keeping tabs on the Pakistanis, we should have regular military consultations on possible Soviet-Afghani offensive options against Pakistan.

3. We need to find some formula for a Congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement, even if for the time being there is no legislative package for Pakistan. This is psychologically very much needed and the timing in Congress [will] probably never be better.

4. To keep India at bay, and especially to prevent the Indians from concentrating all their forces against Pakistan (which makes it impossible for the Pakistanis to build up their northwestern defenses effectively), we should explore with the Chinese the possibility of some Chinese deployments north of Nepal.² This would siphon off Indian forces and keep the Indians honest (though anything along these lines would have to be done very cautiously so as not to precipitate increased Soviet/Indian military cooperation.

5. To mobilize Arab support for our position in the region, and particularly to shore up Islamic opposition against the Soviets, we simply must accelerate our efforts regarding the Palestinians. There is no doubt that this matter preoccupies the Saudis, and they are right in saying that lack of adequate progress on the Palestinian issue would benefit the Soviets quite directly. Either you or Fritz should find occasion to underline our commitment.

6. We should tell Sadat in no uncertain terms that his public polemics against the Saudis are harming U.S. interests in the region—and hence we expect him to desist out of deference to our concern with strengthening U.S. interests.

7. We should try to be somewhat more forthcoming on some of the military items urgently requested by Saudi Arabia—and John West will be writing to you on this matter shortly. Most involve symbolic issues, yet of considerable importance to Saudi pride and to their feeling that we are not reciprocating for their help with regard to oil production.³

8. If the positive news regarding Yemeni accommodation to Saudi demands proves (as is quite possible) to be false, we should actively cooperate with the Saudis in the implementation of the plan developed by Carlucci. Otherwise Yemen will be your next major crisis—and this time in an area directly of vital importance to us.

9. In our next communication to the Soviets we should tell them unambiguously that continued Soviet/Cuban build-up of South Yemen is unacceptable and that it will precipitate U.S. countermeasures. (Aden is quite susceptible to a blockade and it may be better at some point to seal the place off than to be faced with a genuinely effective PDRY challenge—backed by the Soviets and the Cubans—to Saudi Arabia.)

10. As soon as practicable and welcomed by host Middle Eastern countries, some amphibious marine landings and a joint exercise with a U.S. airborne brigade would provide a credible and impressive display of our ability—and therefore will—to project effective American power into the region.

These summary recommendations will need to be staffed out and more fully considered, but your reactions to them would be helpful. In brief, we must capitalize on the extraordinarily effective impact of your recent speech on an area which is simultaneously vital to us and yet extraordinarily fragile and vulnerable.⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book III. Secret. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig—J.” Attached but not printed is a covering note from Brzezinski to Carter, February 6, in which Brzezinski offered to give an oral report of his trip in addition to the “action-oriented” items he provided in the memorandum.
2. In the right margin, Carter wrote: “No.”
3. In the right margin, Carter wrote: “These are not known by me.”
4. At the bottom of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “(Warren was great, and the spirit could not have been better).”