Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 5, 1980, 1805Z

2027. Subject: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan: Updated Assessment and Policy Recommendations. Ref: Moscow 2026.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Begin summary. This cable updates the Embassy’s continuing assessment of the current crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations and recommendations for dealing with it.

My overall recommendation is to maintain a tough stance on the sanctions already announced (without dribbling out minor new ones), while leaving open the door for later redemption; to make clear by our actions that we object only to Soviet behavior and do not seek to overthrow the Soviet system; to proceed carefully in defending areas of vital interest in order to avoid our having forced on us a choice between defeat on the ground and nuclear war; and to explore ways to maintain a dialogue.

Specifically, I recommend:

—continued freeze on most if not all new trade deals while allowing, subject to more stringent strategic guidelines, the completion of contracts already underway and continued delivery of spare parts;

—continued honoring of existing agreements at the government level, including civil air and maritime (with good faith efforts to overcome trade union resistance), Embassy construction, etc.;

—continued freeze on scientific and cultural exchanges except for routine academic exchanges and other low-level exchanges on a case-by-case basis;

—stop further moves with China, especially in military-related fields;

—informal explorations on getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan and also on starting up arms control talks, using me and Dobrynin for smoking out the possibilities and possibly by sending an unofficial interlocutor such as Averell Harriman. End summary.

3. I am deeply conscious of the seriousness of the present crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. My staff and I are continuing to review our assessments and recommendations to be sure that we give you our best advice, both as to Soviet motivations and tactics and as to U.S. actions.

4. We continue to think that Moscow miscalculated the consequences when it went into Afghanistan, but are now inclined to think the miscalculation was more acute with regard to the rest of the world than to the U.S. They probably expected, and possibly intended, a worsening of relations with the U.S., though not of the breadth and depth that materialized. Perhaps the operation in Kabul was botched, and they had expected a smoother change of regime followed by a call for Soviet support, under circumstances in which world reaction would have been narrower and the U.S. could have been more easily depicted as an excitable anti-Soviet warmonger. The line now being purveyed, both privately (including by Gromyko) and publicly—that even before Afghanistan the U.S. had deliberately worsened relations with the USSR—indicates an intent to blacken us before the rest of the world and to undermine our policy at home.

5. The Soviet leaders may actually have convinced themselves that the Carter administration is out to do them in. Their restraint at Vienna—their refusal to go much beyond the signature of SALT, to resolve the Jackson-Vanik problem,³ or to take other steps—signalled their reservations. Their paranoia about China may have been one reason for their mulish attitude throughout 1979. (I have recently read Brezhnev’s letter to the President in December 1978 warning against the arming by the West “of a neighboring country which pursues an openly hostile policy toward us . . . we must do what we consider necessary . . . due attention to our defense,” and asserting we were at a crossroads, one turning of which threatened “confrontation and increased threat of war.”) The standard litany of charges against us also includes many other items including TNF and the Middle East, about which the Soviets also feel strongly. It is odd that our China policy has dropped out of this litany, for example as recited by Gromyko to me last week.⁴ It probably means that they think talking about it may be counter-productive, that we are too far along the road of working closely with China to be deflected by words.

6. Of course the great disadvantage of the Soviet system is that there is no built-in balance, no one to point out emphatically and publicly the fallacies in the skewed views of the old men in the Politburo. If they decide it is right to try to “teach the U.S. a lesson,” to show the U.S. electorate that failure to cooperate with the USSR will lead to a dangerous situation, there apparently is no one to explain to them that such a policy is highly counter-productive if not dangerous. Since they pride themselves on judging others by actions, not words, it is up to us by our actions to get across to the Soviet leadership that they have misjudged us: we are not trying to do them in, but we cannot be stampeded by a show of strength.

7. In these circumstances, the President’s cool but determined approach may have to continue for some time. We will want to show our capability for moving along lines that could hurt their interests on key sensitive points—China, international isolation, a possible new arms race. At the same time we must make clear that we are not trying to destroy the Soviet Union; we are prepared to talk arms control; and we are prepared for the present to move slowly on the above sensitive points to see if the Soviets will change their behavior. We may have to continue along these somewhat limited and constraining lines for several months, if not longer. My guess is that they will not show much desire to talk seriously until they become convinced of the inevitability of President Carter’s re-election. Meanwhile, it will be important not to move too quickly on matters they consider affect their vital interests, particularly China.

8. I want to offer a few thoughts on setting ourselves up for confrontations.

A. There is an obvious danger that one side or the other will make a mistake about the other side’s determination and perception of its own interests. It is of course vital to communicate one’s own perception of vital interests, as the President has done with regard to the Persian Gulf region. A great danger arises however if we assume that the threat of direct military combat between Soviet and American forces will cause Moscow to back away and that therefore only token forces will be required to make the threat valid.

B. I can see at least two circumstances in which the Soviets would not eschew local hostilities. One would be that they consider their own vital interests directly engaged, therefore giving them—in their eyes—no choice. The other, less likely but not outside the realm of possibility, is that the Soviet leaders would conclude that the U.S. must be taught a more powerful lesson by being forced to back away from nuclear confrontation as the USSR did in 1962. However misguided, the calculation could be that if U.S. theater forces were defeated in, for example, the Persian Gulf area, the U.S. would decline to go nuclear and that the shock of this decision would reinvigorate forces in the U.S. and the rest of the world seeking an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

C. But I believe it would be a grave error on our part to continue assuming that the Soviets want to avoid at all costs any confrontation which could go nuclear; I can even envisage some Soviet leaders wanting such a confrontation if they expect (however naively) to be able to pre-ordain an American backdown by arranging it at a time and place of their choosing. At the moment they face a new arms race—both strategic and theater—even if SALT II is ratified; the U.S. may be seen as moving toward a military alliance with China; and the Soviet economy is rapidly losing momentum. They may feel that if a confrontation must come, it should be sooner rather than later.

D. My point is that we should not bluff in moving toward confrontation with the Soviets at this stage in history and at a point near their borders: tripwire forces may not deter them, and might even invite their attack; they may not believe any threats to use tactical nuclear weapons; and if we are forced to use them I personally believe the worst predictions about escalation will come true.

9. I also have some other policy suggestions, flowing from the above analysis and in most cases not much different from what we are already doing.

A. A general point is that we should not give Moscow grounds to believe that the U.S. follows a policy of trying to destroy, fragment or overturn the Soviet regime; if the Soviet leadership comes to that conclusion its inferiority complex could result in a “cornered rat” syndrome and a turn toward calculated confrontation.

B. Our remaining “China cards” should not be played this year, particularly those which appear to be intended to build up Chinese military potential, because that too could support any inclinations here to seek a confrontation with the U.S. sooner rather than later. Moreover, once played they lose their usefulness as leverage and become excuses for Soviet counterreaction. And they help unify the Soviet people behind the Soviet leadership.

C. Obviously the various sanctions imposed after Afghanistan must be maintained for an extended period unless Soviet policy gives us cause to ease off. The lesson we are trying to teach by means of the sanctions will be easily dissipated if we do not assiduously maintain them.

D. A corollary is that having administered the lesson (of which the Olympics boycott is important and deserves determined follow-through), we should stand back and await the results. Continued dribbling out of further sanctions beyond those specified by the President will give the impression of terminal anti-Sovietism rather than a stern lesson. Moreover, we ought to save a few measures for counter-retaliation for any Soviet retaliation against our sanctions and as new sanctions in the event of further Soviet misbehavior.

E. Another point about economic sanctions: Our policy of stern application of sanctions even to the point of self-sacrifice, if it is to have any chance of contributing to improved Soviet behavior, must also leave open the possibility of some day resuming normal trade relations. I would be deeply concerned in this regard if we were to cut off completely the delivery of contracted items and particularly of spare parts. It would be satisfying indeed to see major Soviet projects grind to a halt until they can arrange alternate suppliers or install new machines not dependent on U.S. spare parts. But this would only be a temporary setback to them, while signalling that we have written off U.S.-Soviet trade for decades to come. I believe that would be a dangerous signal to send. Instead I recommend that contracts which are signed and well launched, as well as normal spare parts supplies, should be obstructed only if a good case can be made under revised, more stringent strategic guidelines. I am not concerned about the political consequences of discouraging new deals even in totally non-strategic areas during the coming year; this conveys the proper message and is in tune with our policy on agricultural exports.

F. Scientific, cultural and educational exchanges should be an important part of our long-term repeat long-term strategy, because they can be helpful in gradually opening up this society to the kind of counterpressures against foreign adventurism and domestic repression which we would like to see gain a foothold. But since that internal process will require decades, at the present juncture we can afford to proceed tactically and we should therefore continue to hold down large-scale and visible exchanges (while if possible preserving the basic academic exchanges) until the Soviets give good reason for us to signal that they are worthy partners in this sort of endeavor.

G. The most important and urgent positive signal is the one we have already given, that we are prepared even now to continue the arms control dialogue. Tactics and timing are important and are discussed below.

H. Finally, there is the urgent question of the struggle for the support of the rest of the world in opposing Soviet external aggression. It is still true that the Soviets, when they think their backs are to the wall, will pursue what they see as their vital interests without regard to world opinion. But it is also true that they have gradually come to place increased weight on their acceptance by the rest of the world. This is a positive development and it is obvious that we should exploit it to the fullest. Without trying to spell out specifics, I would merely comment that it is important that while organizing the power to resist Soviet aggression we also continue the effort to persuade the neutral and non-aligned countries to put political pressure on the Soviets. India and the Islamic countries are obviously important in this regard. How we approach the Third World as a whole is outside my competence, but even from here it seems obvious that simply appealing to them to be anti-Soviet may strike them as self-serving. One of our Western friends here, with much Third World experience, has urged that we approach the developing nations in terms of helping them achieve their own goals and aspirations.

10. Recommendations on mechanics and timing.

A. It is important that we continue to take a tough stance, not appearing to have second thoughts about our present course, even while leaving openings for the Soviets to signal willingness to start talking about some of the most serious issues. This will not be easy but deserves our best efforts.

B. Obviously a key element will be continued dialogue between you and Gromyko through both me and Dobrynin. As we have seen in the most recent exchanges, Dobrynin has begun offering “personal ideas” for a solution of the Afghanistan problem itself; the tactic is to get Washington to venture out on a limb on the basis of Dobrynin’s suggestions. You might wish to respond by feeding me some ideas to give Gromyko, also on a “personal” basis. That way we get some reaction from Gromyko first hand without committing you and the President to anything. This could be done even more unofficially by using Arbatov (who is expected to be back to work soon). I am frankly not optimistic that we could find any basis for an early Soviet withdrawal, but I see an advantage in dangling some ideas for letting the Soviets extract themselves gracefully if they are so inclined. At least we could find out for sure whether they are so inclined. Movement toward an internal regime of “national reconciliation” together with some sort of effort to repatriate the refugees back from Pakistan and pacify the border seems unlikely at this stage, but there would be no harm in exploring it if it could be done unofficially. Perhaps some UN involvement would be feasible. Conceivably we could also discuss some sort of “hands off” agreement regarding Iran.

C. We need to follow up quickly on SALT I and SALT II interim observance (Gromyko did not respond to that portion of my démarche) and, even without waiting for a solution in Afghanistan, to pursue explorations about TNF talks, and about how to prepare for SALT III. Perhaps Washington will conclude that talks could be held behind the scenes at the SCC [CCD?], augmented and kept in continuous session for the purpose, or perhaps you would wish to develop a scheme along the lines of my suggestion for a new joint committee of experts to explore the possibilities for balanced unilateral restraint. In any case I think we should settle on some coherent proposal and then begin to explore it, also in an unofficial way through “personal ideas” which I would float or some other means. (Of course we have to be careful not to appear too eager on interim observance of SALT, lest they decide to shake us up by indicating doubt that interim observance can continue very long.)

D. One other avenue for exploring some of these ideas informally would be to send Averell Harriman over on a private visit.⁵ He would have access to Brezhnev and other leaders and would be taken seriously, but he could also discuss these issues informally and unofficially. If Harriman is too political and too closely connected to the administration, you might consider someone else, perhaps a businessman with good connections here.

E. The measures we have taken thus far have had a three-fold purpose: showing the Soviets that such behavior cannot be cost-free; deterring future aggressive behavior; and, ideally, forcing a roll-back in Afghanistan. The first point we will have made if we stay the course. If we succeed in the second one—deterrence—the effort will have been well worth it, particularly if we were able to gain believable commitments against future such actions. But realistically we must admit, for purposes of choosing our long-range approach to relations with the Soviets, that the third may not happen. We may be faced with a fait accompli, the continued existence of [garble—Afghanistan] as an [garble—East?]-European style—or even Mongolian-style—satellite. In our actions and our public pronouncements about the duration of the measures we have taken, we need to balance that possibility against the intractable need for that minimum level of dealings with the Soviets which will head off nuclear confrontation.

F. It is nevertheless just barely possible that the Soviets are having second thoughts, and we should not neglect opportunities to explore the possibility of a relatively quick reversal in Afghanistan. If there is any such opportunity, it might lie in the early deadline created by the Olympics. Therefore if we are going to give the Soviets any prodding on Afghanistan while offering to drop our opposition to the Moscow Olympics, we should do so quickly.

G. I frankly doubt, however, that it will be successful. It is for that reason, and with an eye to the long-range prospects and dangers, that I think we should begin exploring possibilities for getting back to the arms control table. Some say that it will be impossible to have any serious talks, even on arms control, while contacts are frozen in other areas. But I think we have to give it a try.

Watson

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
2. Telegram 2026 from Moscow, sent earlier in the day February 5, alerted the Department to expect telegram 2027. Watson wrote: “The world is beginning to look more dangerous to me. I am sure that everyone recognizes that an error in judgment on either side could elevate finally to thermonuclear war. We are dealing with a monolithic government with top leadership average age of 69. They have badly miscalculated in Afghanistan. We have tried unsuccessfully to understand and predict this government for nearly 50 years with notable lack of success. Furthermore, although Afghanistan is unforgivable, we must recognize that our record does not look lily white to them.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1641) Watson’s characterization of Soviet miscalculation was corroborated in an intelligence memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, February 19, that noted that many leaders had become “disturbed about the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Soviet foreign and domestic policy.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1–2/80)
3. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 required the relaxation of Soviet emigration restrictions before most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union would be considered.
4. See Document 186.
5. No record of a visit by Harriman to Moscow was found.