Office of the Historian

132. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Will the Soviets Succeed in Afghanistan? (U)

There is a lot of loose talk around the State Department and elsewhere, reflected in the Oberdorfer piece this morning, suggesting that Afghanistan is “the Soviet Vietnam.”2 This is whistling in the dark and the motivation for at least some of this whistling is to provide a rationale for tepid action by the US in response to the Soviet invasion. If the Soviets are going to learn their lesson on the ground in Kabul—so goes the logic of the argument—then there is no important reason for us to pay too large a price in terms of overall US-Soviet relations to show them that this was a wrong decision. (S)

However, unless General Pavlovski does not know his business (and I strongly doubt this), the Soviets should have the Afghan situation cleared up in a matter of months. This will require:

a. Control of Kabul and all major population centers;

b. Control of major roads;

c. Control of the major passes between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and

d. Effective restriction on the ability of the outside world to obtain solid information on the insurgency (control of the press is vital). (S)

Given the above, it will be possible for the Babrak regime to declare the end of the insurgency and to “prove” it by inviting selected outside observers to see for themselves that the country is secure and that “the people” support the government. This should be no trick at all for a major army. It is generally forgotten that the US Army cleared out South Vietnam. In 1971, for example, the entire country was “pacified,” and it was possible to visit every one of the 44 provincial capitals—day or night. If we had shown the ability or inclination to stay in [Page 361] Vietnam with forces roughly the size of that we had there in 1971 for an indefinite period (a commitment of the kind which the Soviets are obviously ready to make in Afghanistan), then we would clearly have “won” in Vietnam. (S)

In sum, the war aims of the Soviets in Afghanistan are clear, limited, and achievable in short order. All decisions that we make have to be based on this supposition. My fear is that Afghanistan will not be the Soviet Vietnam; that it will be the Soviet Entebbe.3 (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/1–8/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton, Sick, Odom, Albright, Schecter, Henze, Griffith, Larrabee, Ermarth, and Hunter. Brzezinski wrote: “I agree” at the top right of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote: “1/3/80” beneath Brzezinski’s note.↩
  2. See Don Oberdorfer, “The Making of a Soviet Coup,” Washington Post, January 2, 1980, p. A1.↩
  3. A reference to the successful hostage rescue operation conducted at Entebbe Airport, Uganda, by the Israel Defense Forces against Palestinian hijackers, July 4, 1976. Time magazine declared it “one of the most daring, spectacular rescues in modern times.” (“The Rescue: ‘We Do the Impossible,’” Time, July 12, 1976, pp. 21–22)↩