Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

133. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

• NSC on Afghanistan (U)

Despite the obvious strategic and historic importance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there will probably be a tendency to deal with the event in isolation. This will focus debate on such issues as 1) how to impose political costs on the USSR, 2) should we increase support to the Afghan insurgents. (S)

To combat that tendency we need to articulate an understanding of the broader crisis and a strategy for dealing with it. Because it so illuminates the weight of Soviet land combat power in the north and Soviet willingness to use it in the most cynical way, the invasion sharply increases the prospect of eventual Soviet military domination of the greater Middle East and US exclusion from the region, except perhaps from Israel. Next we shall very probably see civil strife in Iran with direct Soviet involvement, a PDRY take-over of North Yemen, increased Soviet efforts to destabilize Turkey and Pakistan, and intense Soviet pressure on other states in the region to line up with Soviet interests. (S)

The result after several years could be a pattern in the Middle East and South Asia in which most of the region’s states are either Soviet vassals (on the model of Afghanistan) or willing members of a Soviet-dominated security system because it seems the safer course (a role India has come close to playing in the past). (S)

US policy overall must be guided by the realization that this prospect is now a fearsome probability, but not a certainty. We must therefore combat the probability as effectively as we can while at the same time planning against its occurrence, without making it a self-fulfilling prophecy. (S)

This will require of us a policy of deeply echeloned containment. In contrast to the situation in the late-1940s and early 1950s, we cannot credibly draw a defensive perimeter and threaten massive military action if it is crossed. There are many perimeters, and some will inevitably be crossed. (S)

The first layer, or forward echelon, of our policy must be a systematic effort to make Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Indochina as costly and painful as possible. This will require extensive support to Soviet opponents wherever we find them, not on the basis of their worthiness or chances of winning, but on the basis of their ability to tax Soviet power. We must proceed in this prepared politically and psychologically for the certain event that some of these clients will fail and that our support may after the fact be regarded as having assured their demise. (S)

The second layer or echelon of policy should be a three-part effort 1) to fortify as best we can the key remaining buffer states of the area, Turkey and Pakistan, with military and economic aid, 2) to win the key “swing states” of Syria and Iraq away from Soviet influence, and 3) to increase our permanent military presence in the area, on-shore as well as off-shore. (S)

With respect to the first two elements—fortifying the buffers and winning over the “swingers”—the obvious complications of doing these things become politically tolerable if one simply accepts the necessity of trying to achieve them without a prior guarantee, or even high likelihood, of success. (S)

We need on-shore military presence now mostly for political reasons, to counter the political weight of Soviet military power in the north and to show that we have the nerve to push through the evident political obstacles to get on-shore presence. Over the next year a minimum goal should be a tac air contingent and marine presence in Oman. The risk of destabilizing Oman will simply have to be taken. Oman is no safer in our absence. But we should also start planning for a more ambitious option of inserting the necessary land, air, and naval forces into Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to protect Gulf oil against direct attack or stoppage of oil flow through political side effects of events elsewhere. All this, incidentally, calls for the prompt creation of the greater Middle East command we have talked about. (S)

Another element of this second layer of policy we must examine carefully, but not necessarily decide as yet is: under what conditions of Soviet involvement in Iran would we be prepared to put US forces into Iran? (S)

The third echelon of policy should be a composite of actions to increase the level and tempo of our overall defense effort in the context of more active measures to restore national economic health. It is probably not necessary to revisit the President’s FY81 defense budget decisions now. But against the likely picture of the 1980s, the President’s conception of adequate spending levels in the out years is almost certainly too low. Instead of 4.5–5.0% annual increases, we shall be forced into something like 6.0–7.0% rates or even higher. What we need now is a major (not a back room, or one-man) planning effort on how to accomplish this acceleration. Undoubtedly other dimensions of this “quasi-mobilization” policy will involve stiff oil import taxes, tax changes to stimulate investment, somewhat looser monetary policy, and perhaps price controls to manage inflation. (S)

The fourth echelon of policy will involve political efforts on a broad front to get our NATO allies and Japan to do likewise in defense. (S)

The fifth policy echelon will involve the way we manage our direct relationship with the USSR. The foregoing may suggest that we will have foresworn any semblance of detente for the next decade. Quite the contrary is the case. If we move swiftly to create the necessary echelons of containment, we may preserve the basis for a balanced policy toward the USSR in bilateral relations and in Europe. (S)

US resolve and effectiveness in the East-West competition will actually restore in Moscow an incentive to try to deflect us by political means, an incentive that has obviously declined in recent years. We must move to place issues of regional stability at the center of our bilateral relationship where the Soviets will be forced to deal with them. Faced with the certainty of stiff competition on all fronts the Soviets will, in time, at least show an interest in damping that competition in some regions. In the meantime, there is no reason why the dialogue on strategic arms stabilization cannot in due course resume. The Soviets will probably have an interest in it. The main obstacle to our pursuing a nuanced or balanced policy now is the lack of confidence at home, e.g., in the Senate, that we are adequately postured for the competitive side of the relationship. (S)

Even at this late date, I doubt that the Soviets fully appreciate the depth of the national about-face taking place here. They seem to believe that US-Soviet relations can be returned to the uncertain mix of the last several years after the elections, that the competitive elements of our policy will be ineffective, and that our allies can be coaxed away from us. Only US actions across all the policy echelons discussed above will sober their outlook. But the chances for peace in the next five years would be improved if somebody were to go to Moscow now, not to negotiate or to debate, but to tell the Soviets exactly how we view the period of struggle ahead. That person should have the absolute confidence of the President and labor under no suspicions that his mission is to rescue detente by acquiescing in Soviet power grabs. You’re the only candidate with the credibility to do this. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 1, Afghanistan. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information.