Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

131. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

• Czechoslovakia Revisited: Patterns and Lessons (U)

While there are obvious differences between the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in assessing the risks the Soviets were probably influenced at least in part by their experience in Czechoslovakia, particularly world reaction. It may be useful, therefore, to briefly review developments in the post-invasion period for insights into Soviet attitudes and possible diplomatic moves in the future.² (C)

In my view there are several aspects of the post-invasion period which are important in the present context:

1. The sobering impact on Eastern Europe. The invasion not only halted the deterioration of the situation in Czechoslovakia but had a sobering impact on all of East Europe. This was particularly true of Romania and Yugoslavia. While they condemned the invasion, they also were more cautious for several years thereafter in undertaking initiatives that might irritate the Soviets and showed a distinct interest in fostering a limited improvement of relations with Moscow. The Soviets probably calculated that the invasion of Afghanistan would have an analogous effect, not just in Eastern Europe but in some other countries bordering on Afghanistan.

2. The rapid dissipation of public indignation in the West. While most countries reacted with shock to the invasion, it proved difficult to maintain public indignation over a sustained period of time. “Normalization” and the retention of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia soon became a fact of life, and a year after the invasion the West was actively engaged in detente diplomacy.

3. Moscow’s continued interest in detente with the West. Contrary to the expectations of many, the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not sound the death knell of detente, but proved to be, as Michel Debrey accurately predicted at the time, only “a detour on the road to detente.”³ In fact, one of the most striking features of the post-invasion period is how quickly Moscow moved to revive the strands of its detente diplomacy left dangling at the time of the invasion.

—In his October 3 speech to the UNGA, Gromyko explicitly called attention to Moscow’s desire for improved relations with the West, especially the United States, and announced his government’s willingness to resume the renunciation of force talks with the FRG.⁴

—In November Kosygin signalled Moscow’s interest in an early start of the SALT talks during a visit to Moscow by former Secretary of Defense McNamara and Senators Gore and Pell.⁵

—By mid-spring 1969, with the publication of the communique at the end of the Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest (March 17), the Soviet campaign for detente was in full swing.

—In July in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Gromyko signalled Moscow’s desire to

1. Begin SALT Talks

2. Begin discussions on Berlin

3. Resume negotiations with the FRG on a renunciation of force treaty.⁶

Thereafter, detente was off and running, with the West in hot pursuit.

In short, the Soviet intervention only temporarily set back Soviet detente efforts, while at the same time it allowed the Soviet Union to arrest the deterioration of the situation in Czechoslovakia, which if it had continued, would have had serious consequences not only for Soviet interests in Czechoslovakia, but in East Europe as a whole. (U)

In analyzing the diplomatic costs of any intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviets probably concluded that, as with Czechoslovakia, world indignation would be great for a few months, but that this concern would diminish rapidly and six to eight months later they would be able to conduct business as usual—especially if they moved to stamp out the insurgency swiftly and forcefully. At the same time, they probably calculated that with US-Soviet relations at a low ebb, SALT in limbo, and an election coming up, they had little to lose, and that there was no prospect for a significant change in bilateral relations until after January 1981 anyway. Better to take unpleasant action now, and get it over with than be forced to intervene later, when such action might seriously impede chances for an improvement in relations. (C)

In sum, Soviet actions in the period immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia suggest that Moscow will probably not abandon its detente efforts, but rather resume them after a sufficient interval has elapsed. However, as Fritz has argued, their incentive to do this will be greater if we take rapid and resolute action. If we move swiftly and decisively to meet the Soviet challenge, we may be able to preserve the basis for a balanced policy toward the USSR over the long run. If we don’t, Moscow’s appetite is likely to increase with the eating, regional insecurity is likely to grow to the detriment of US interests, and the chances of any meaningful cooperation with the USSR will be destroyed for years to come.⁷ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 45, Afghanistan Invasion: U.S./Allied Relations, Olympics, Grain Embargo: 1/80. Confidential; Outside System. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote: “agree, ZB” in the top right corner, and drew an arrow pointing to the edge of the page. See footnote 7, below.
2. For documentation on the U.S. response to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80–99.
3. Michel Debré was Prime Minister of France from 1959 until 1962. The source of this quote was not found.
4. Excerpts from Gromyko’s speech were printed in the New York Times, October 4, 1968, p. 14.
5. The visit, November 18, was reported by Anatole Shub in “Sens. Gore and Pell Reach Moscow Amid Signs of Shifting Soviet Trends,” Washington Post, November 19, 1968, p. A17. World Bank President and former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, met with Kosygin a week earlier. A report on their meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 314.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 65.
7. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this paragraph and wrote: “agree” beside it.