Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

378. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Regional Director for Near East and South Asia (Strickland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert)¹

I-36093/65

Washington, August 25, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Military Alternatives Available to US from Possible Saudi-UAR Confrontation over the Yemen

At Tab A² we have set out the military alternatives available to the US in the event of a Saudi-UAR confrontation over the Yemen. The alternatives set forth in Attachment A have been submitted by the JCS (Tab B).³ These are not recommended military actions and have been labeled as possible military alternatives.

JCSM-295-65 (Tab B) notes that in the event the situation in the Arabian Peninsula deteriorates and any use of US military forces is contemplated, the JCS will provide further comments in the light of the situation existing at the time. In this connection, STRIKE’s 788/65 (Tab C)⁴ proposes under the guise of a combined training exercise with Saudi Arabia a show of force designed to initially position forces and initiate useful measures that would facilitate active operations if required.

In addition, there are STRIKE’s contingency plans that can be considered in the event it is decided to come to a full-fledged exercise in shoring up Saudi integrity.

At the present time we are hopeful that the Nasser-Faisal dialogue goes well and some improvement in the situation is evident. We still have in the planning stage the idea of introducing an airborne rifle company into Saudi Arabia. This force (approximately 200 with 10-12 transport aircraft) would assist the Saudis in (a) tactical principles of employment of small units, (b) use of supporting weapons, (c) operation and care of vehicles and communications equipment, and (d) basic field military sanitation.

It is to be noted that the introduction of the airborne company may or may not be utilized. Our Embassies in Cairo and Taiz do not favor it at all (see Tab D).⁵

Other means of assisting the Saudis in the event the outcome of the Nasser-Faisal dialogue is good, and assuming the Saudis accept, are (a) in the buildup of Saudi air defense capability and (b) sales of US type equipment to the Saudi White Army.

The political courses of action available are set forth in Tab E.4

It is somewhat difficult to pin down the type of force required to enhance an effective military course of action without knowing what is required or the mission to be accomplished. If a high-level decision is made to undertake a US military course of action in Saudi Arabia, the JCS should be given specific guidance in order that the composition of the force can be determined to meet the stated mission.

Eugene L. Strickland
Brigadier General, USAF

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, 092. Yemen, 25 Aug. 65. Top Secret.
2. Not printed.
3. Document 366.
4. Not printed.
5. Telegram 48 from Taiz, August 22.