377. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
109. I opened audience with King morning August 14 in Taif with statement I had been instructed see him as follow-up my meeting with Prince Sultan August 11. I referred to three requests which Prince Sultan had made of USG on King’s behalf.
Re first request, said I had transmitted urgently to Washington info re UAR aggressions and threats described to me by Sultan. Indicated I had also expressed in my message what Sultan had characterized as King’s deep concern with developing situation.
I then asked King whether he considered situation as serious as it had appeared three days before. I noted Cairo press reports re meeting of Saudi Ambassador Mohammad Ali Reza with Nasir August 11 and of Ali Reza’s subsequent return from talks with King.
King said degree of seriousness of situation at any one time difficult to gauge. Certainly threat exists, has existed and will continue to exist as long as Nasir’s troops remain in Yemen. He assumed we had independent reports of UAR build-up in Yemen and could judge for ourselves extent of current threat. He commented that even in course of Saudi-UAR negotiations UAR planes flew over Saudi Arabia, tanks crossed into Saudi territory, and UAR threatened along border. What he had asked Sultan do in seeing me was to “make clear” to US nature of recent developments. I told King that largely on basis information SAG had provided we were again making representations in Cairo.
I said I knew that President and Secretary were very anxious that he continue his negotiations with Nasir. As he knew, in Viet Nam though faced with a very difficult situation, President continued to make himself available for negotiations with adversary. I urged that “thread of dialogue” with UAR, no matter how narrow, be maintained.
King affirmed without hesitation “we will continue to talk despite everything.” (Mas’ud told me August 15 that King and Nasir would definitely meet before Arab summit conference.)
Re Sultan’s second request, I said my government was arranging to dispatch destroyer to Saudi Arabia as soon possible. When date of arrival known, I would inform King through Mas’ud (did so August 15). Subsequent destroyer visits would also be accelerated. King seemed [Page 711] pleased and implied he had proposed destroyer visits to Sultan “to deter the Egyptians.” (No mention was made re visit to Jizan.)
Re third request—dispatch of air unit—I said unfortunately this was not possible at moment. Nevertheless, matter was under study and my government was following developments with care. As King knew, it was difficult for US justify US military measures in Saudi Arabia as long as SAG involved in Yemen imbroglio. On other hand, we had indicated several times our support for maintenance of Saudi Arabia’s integrity. Important thing was to prevent escalation.
King said he assumed US would protect Saudi Arabia’s integrity and fulfill spirit of friendship prevailing between our two countries. He said matter of dispatch of air unit decision for US to make in context foregoing. He did not desire place “unnecessary burdens” upon US. Re linkage our support to so-called Saudi involvement in Yemen, he wished state categorically that, unlike UAR, not single Saudi soldier fighting in Yemen.
Said I had one more matter to raise. My government held strongly to view that SAG should register formal complaint before UN re series of UAR aggressions. Absence of such complaint complicated Saudi case at UN and weakened USG ability support Saudis in possible UN debate. King replied that SAG had communicated much of this information privately to UNSYG in response latter’s referral of Yemen complaint. However, he said SAG did not wish make public protests and noted fact SAG concealed from its own public information re UAR aggressions. (Latter is true: info re UAR aggressions kept out of local press and Prince Sultan has reprimanded officials in Jizan and Najran for relaying reports of UAR overflights, etc. to SDI pilots and others.) I said that, nevertheless, SAG should seriously consider registering formal complaint at least for procedural reasons, especially in UN debate in progress. King asked who SAG opponent in possible UN debate might be. I said I assumed UAR. He smiled, noting that current complaint before UN is YAR complaint (and no doubt was wishfully thinking that by then YAR delegate to UN would in effect be Saudi camp view current Taif reconciliation between Yemeni factions).
Comment: While it is clear Sultan acted on King’s instructions when he summoned me August 11, also true King predictably showed himself less flappable than Sultan. However, relaxed way in which King received turn-down re dispatch air unit may be deceptive since Mas’ud told me August 15 that King disappointed with response. (I, therefore, agreed with Mas’ud’s proposal that in his talk with King today Mas’ud emphasize “under study” aspect of my response. Mas’ud claimed UK had offered send unit. I made no comment. He said further that SAG prepared defray all costs of dispatch USG air unit.) King does not seem to question ultimate USG determination [Page 712] carry out its stated commitment re protecting Saudi integrity but does want US take every possible military measure nip UAR attack in bud. Sooner we can notify King of reinforced company exercise—assuming decision affirmative—the better. Also occurs to us that prompt dispatch US military mapping mission to undertake Persian Gulf median line survey would at this important juncture demonstrate helpful USG response to standing SAG request. Same time would add to over-all USG military presence in country.
King seemed sincere in his intention to keep negotiating door open with UAR, even though there was no suggestion he optimistic talks would lead to settlement Yemen question.
View similar request made of HMG by Sultan, have conveyed gist of foregoing to British Charge Brown.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POLSAUD-US. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Taiz, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, USUN, Dhahran, London, CHUSMTM Dhahran, COMIDEASTFOR, and Aden.↩