Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

366. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM-295-65

Washington, April 21, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Possible Saudi Arabian-UAR Confrontation Arising Out of the Yemen Situation (U)

1. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested by memorandum, I-21497/65, dated 3 March 1965,² subject as above, a review of the military options and alternatives open to the United States in the event the Saudi Arabian Government requests US assistance to complement the capabilities of its own armed forces to deter or contain possible UAR military action in or over Saudi Arabian territory.

2. The development of US military plans for supporting the Saudi Arabian Government is complicated by the fact of US diplomatic recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic, a UAR-sponsored regime opposed by the United Kingdom and by the Saudis through their support of the Yemeni Royalists. The consequence of this aid to the Royalists is to provoke retaliation by or on behalf of the US-recognized Yemen Arab Republic. Therefore, US military planners face the paradox of supporting the Saudi Arabian Government against a Yemen Arab Republic also supported, at least diplomatically, by the United States. Similarly, any coordinated US-UK effort would be complicated by the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States recognize, diplomatically, different Yemeni factions. For these reasons, all feasible nonmilitary actions, including actions in the United Nations, should be undertaken prior to any US military action in the Arabian Peninsula.

3. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of utilizing UK forces in the Arabian Peninsula before US forces are provided for assistance to Saudi Arabia. UK military forces presently in the area offer a significant capability and can conduct effective military operations in the Arabian Peninsula.

4. It should be emphasized that token forces do not have a capability properly to defend themselves or friendly powers, or to engage and defeat a determined attack. Moreover, if such show of force fails to deter, then the United States must be prepared to conduct land, sea, and air operations on a scale large enough to achieve our political obligations; and our plans must cover these contingencies.

5. The military options available to the United States in support of Saudi Arabia range from increased military materiel and training assistance to the deployment and employment of sizable land, sea, and air forces. The courses of action in JCSM-188-63, dated 6 March 1963, subject: “Courses of Action in Saudi Arabia (U),”³ were believed to be representative of an appropriate ascending order of possible US military force deployments to deter UAR aggressions. However, review with CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has resulted in some revisions and additions to the options previously furnished. For your information, a discussion of the composition, capability, closure time, effect on US readiness posture, and cost, where applicable, of the examples is included in the Appendices hereto.⁴ It should be recognized that these examples are possible military alternatives, not recommended military actions. In addition, these options are not mutually exclusive; a combination of two or more alternatives may be the best course of action to produce the desired result. Moreover, the listing of only air and naval deployments is not meant to preclude consideration of the use of land forces as a show of force.

6. In the event that the situation in the Arabian Peninsula deteriorates, and any use of US military force is contemplated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide further comments in light of the situation existing at the time.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. J. Kirn
Rear Admiral, USN Deputy Director, Joint Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Saudi Arabia 381, 3 Mar. 65. Top Secret.
2. Not printed.
3. For text of JCSM-188-63, March 6, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 177.
4. Attached but not printed.