Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

367. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, April 21, 1965, 1827Z.

813. Conversation with Assistant Secretary Talbot with King Faysal, April 19.

Introductory Exchange.

Meeting attended by Crown Prince Khalid, Deputy FonMin Saqqaf, Royal Protocol official and interpreter, Abd al-Aziz Majid, and Ambassador Hart.

Mr. Talbot began by expressing appreciation that King had left proceedings Islamic conference Mecca to take time to receive him at Jidda. He brought warm greetings from President Johnson and Secretary Rusk and stated that strong US friendship for Saudi Arabia and interest in its integrity and independence remained unabated. Progress developing under Faysal’s wise leadership was much admired by US and significance this effort, while retaining strong religious values guiding Saudi nation, was understood and appreciated. Talbot also referred to US global commitments, its efforts in Southeast Asia and its special interest in maintaining peace and stability in Middle East.

Faysal thanked Talbot for his greetings and comments. With regard to Vietnam, he remarked that as he had recently told Ambassador Hart situation there had deteriorated because initial US stand had not been sufficiently firm; once US took determined action Communist side immediately began to appeal for solution by peaceful means. Addressing himself to relation between Islam and progress Faysal emphasized Islam contained nothing which should slow up progress of any nation, in fact, greatest leaders Muslim world were those who had been devoted followers of prophet’s teachings.

Conversation quickly turned to Yemen, Faysal referring to his 1962 talks with Talbot in Washington-New York,² when he had predicted that entry UAR troops into Yemen would create serious complications. Facts had borne this out and it was continued presence UAR forces in Yemen which constituted main problem. Had upheaval in Yemen been limited to Yemenis alone they would have settled matters in due course. SAG could not pretend to be indifferent to UAR intervention, which had proved to be directed against Saudi Arabia. Tracing history of efforts to solve problem before and after Arab summit, Faysal said that once Yemen had been returned to Yemeni hands, SAG was ready respond to any request for help, no matter who Yemeni leaders then were. It was not in Saudi interest to have problems in Yemen. Solution now rested entirely in UAR hands. UAR and SAG should both get out of picture. Moment UAR desired solution it would be easy. It had only to leave Yemen. Nasir had made public statement that conversations between him and Faysal had no mention UAR military withdrawals.

Should Faysal publicize the secret agreement he had with Nasir? Meanwhile, UAR was publicly berating SAG and SAG was remaining silent. He had no intention of replying. However, this situation could not go on indefinitely. How long would UAR remain in Yemen? Faysal did not understand Nasir’s ultimate aims for at Alexandria he had said he wanted some way out. Faysal had then paved way after return from Alexandria and had presented proposals which would have made it possible for UAR to withdraw from Yemen with dignity so as to avoid adverse reaction from people of UAR or other countries. Elements of these proposals were first of all, cease-fire, and secondly, mutual UAR-SAG efforts to bring together key people of Yemen to decide for themselves on their future. Observers had been sent. Faysal, right after Alexandria, had stopped all aid to Royalists as gesture of sincerity. Royalists abided by cease-fire for long time, but after Erkowit meeting UAR violated cease-fire so flagrantly Faysal ultimately felt obliged renew aid to Royalists. SAG had felt it useful in order to forestall complete stand-off by Republican-Royalist Yemenis at projected national conclave (Haradh) to suggest structure of a temporary govt (“state of Yemen”). Faysal then gave resume its provisions, already known to Dept. Discussions over this SAG proposal had continued without success. Emissaries had come and gone and after Ramadhan Saudi Ambassador to UAR had returned to report to Faysal that UAR would accept Saudi proposal provided provisional govt were called “Republican” and Yemen in fact remained permanently republican. Faysal said this was form of dictation to Yemenis in advance of meeting for self-determination. Saudis could not accept this. Meanwhile, Marshal Amer had made speeches to same effect in Yemen and in UAR. Saudi Ambassador was finally instructed on return to Cairo to inform UAR Govt that such statements were contrary to Faysal-Nasir agreement. However, Ambassador had not yet been received. It was not fair to ask Saudi Arabia to accept a dictated solution.

Before responding on this matter, Talbot said he wished refer to Southeast Asia and to Faysal’s remark that force should have been used sooner against Communists. US had helped Filipinos to get rid of Huks by policy of limited assistance and hoped to assist Vietnamese to solve their problem as Asians rather than by bringing in “white-faced Americans” to do job for them. However, South Vietnam had never lacked awareness of US sense of purpose. Talbot was glad Faysal believed North Vietnam was ready to have peaceful solution; up to now US aware only of North Vietnamese insistence on unacceptable conditions. To this Faysal responded that what he had meant to imply was that other side was now “crying all over the world” for peaceful solution. Talbot noted US did not yet rule out possibility of major confrontation with Red China. Faysal remarked that intervention of Red China in Vietnam would be understandable in its way, but why should some Arabs take similar position and intervene in un-neutral fashion against US in Vietnam, Cuba and other places?

Talbot said he would like to review recent developments in US relations with UAR. Particularly as concerned Yemen, including mention of his April 18 conversation at Cairo with President Nasir.³ As Faysal already knew, US relations with Egypt had been narrowed by important differences to point where they were now very narrow indeed. Ambassador Hart, following his return from Washington, had reported to His Majesty elements of this situation as seen in Executive dept of US Govt and in Congress. Problems between UAR and US had almost nothing to do with internal situation of UAR. Here US had actively supported and encouraged development, indeed tried to get UAR to concentrate on domestic progress. Differences had arisen over relations with third countries in which US had interest and found Egyptians heavily involved. First of these third country situations was Yemen. US relations with Egypt had never been really satisfactory since start of Yemeni affair. Then came our deep concern over Egyptian assistance to Congo rebels. We also found ourselves questioning what was going on in South Arabian Federation and in Persian Gulf. During same period African students in Cairo set fire to US library and Nasir had made speech which US found unacceptable. We were now coming to end of chapter in sense that because of Yemen no new development loan had been made to UAR since 1963, and 3-year PL-480 program was running out at end of June. We also had problems over Jordan waters and UAR in connection with “an old and familiar subject.” In this context Talbot had been instructed to go to Cairo and examine with Nasir and with others attitude of UAR toward US and to explain US position on various subjects. He had raised many subjects, including Yemen. He had told Nasir US had been greatly heartened last August when there appeared be approach to solution of this long, troublesome and costly dispute. As His Majesty had mentioned, we ourselves—although not an immediate party—had made earnest efforts to help. Ambassador Bunker’s work had, unfortunately, not been successful but we hoped parties directly concerned could find path to settlement. Meanwhile, our failure to give economic development loans to UAR, while never announced as policy, had been clearly understood in Cairo; however, we had kept food supply going. Subsequently we found our hopes for direct settlement had been premature. On earlier occasion Talbot had told His Majesty that US concern for security of Saudi Arabia would remain firm and indeed it had. Sometimes we heard rumors we favored keeping Nasir bogged down in Yemen because this helped Israel and because Israel favored this course. We do not know Israel’s position on this matter or its activity, but as for ourselves, Talbot could assure His Majesty US position was that Yemen should be governed by Yemenis and we did not approve or condone presence large UAR forces in Yemen. In response to Talbot’s questions Nasir had described events as he saw them and His Majesty would not be surprised to learn that there were differences with His Majesty’s description. Nasir had admitted there were differences in interpretation of SAG-UAR agreement. Talbot had then asked Nasir what could be done to end this unfortunate situation. Referring to Cyprus, Talbot had said that US was urging interested parties to meet for substantive talks and hoped similar course could be followed on Yemen. Nasir had replied that he did not see much value at this stage in talks at ambassadorial level. Talbot had then asked whether he expected to meet Faysal again and, if so, whether in the near or distant future. Nasir had expressed strong view Yemen problem solvable only by direct Saudi-UAR agreement. Chance to meet Faysal might occur if Faysal attended Algiers Afro-Asian conference or next summit. Meantime since he had once sent Marshal Amer to talk with Sultan latter might undertake return visit and meet with Amer to discuss differences in interpretation of Nasir-Faysal agreement.

Talbot said Faysal would not be surprised to learn that Nasir spoke rather strongly of Saudi assistance to Royalists and termed it “breach of understanding.” Nasir had also spoken without noticeable enthusiasm of situation in Yemen, where people were taking money both from Saudi Arabia and from UAR.

Faysal responded wryly: “We know our people there. They are the Royalists. If they can get something from the other side that is up to them.” As for agreements, SAG and UAR had had two, each embodying exchange of notes, but there had been no result. As for sending Sultan to UAR, Faysal was agreeable to any recourse, even to going himself, but when Saudi Arabia was being insulted (in Cairo press) it would be interpreted as submission to blackmail. Nasir wanted to prove that writing one or two articles would force Saudis to come to him. Saudis could not accept that. Let UAR write hundreds of articles if it wished.

Talbot made clear he was not acting as another Ambassador Bunker. However, because Nasir knew he was coming to Saudi Arabia he was conveying Nasir’s reflections. To this Faysal responded SAG was ready now and had always been ready to work to solve this problem but would not accept dictation. If Nasir found situation in Yemen good, then let it be. “We are at our ease.” Talbot rejoined that he did not find Nasir “at ease.” Economic conditions in the UAR made it in Nasir’s interest to solve problem. Furthermore, Nasir very aware of US interest in Saudi Arabia’s integrity and independence. Talbot had strongly affirmed there would be great trouble for UAR in its relations with US if Nasir brought trouble into Saudi Arabia. Faysal responded Nasir naturally wanted SAG to desist from helping Royalists so could dominate Yemen and threaten Saudi Arabia. Why should not both UAR and SAG stop interfering in Yemen, Nasir withdraw and Faysal stop aid?

Talbot commented US is frequently blamed by either side of controversy for favoring the other and cited India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. This seemed to be our lot and was not dissimilar to role in which leader of any country finds himself between domestic factions. To this Faysal replied, “We never suspected you were partial. Nasir is the one we are addressing. Why does he deviate from sound solution and seek some other course?” Yemen was different from Kashmir or Cyprus. Saudi Arabia did not have designs on Yemen nor did it desire even a preferential position in that country. What Saudi Arabia wanted was that both outside parties should quit; Nasir to quit and Faysal to quit.

Talbot rejoined that US shared Saudi desire that Yemenis govern themselves without outside interference. US had expended 160 thousand American casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars since World War II without seeking any territory or influence. Faysal again asked why Nasir stayed in Yemen. Talbot responded it was US belief that eventually Yemeni people would resolve their problems and have a Govt of Yemenis. This being case, we wondered whether it would be necessary to continue to give aid to Royalists. It was complicating factor as Ambassador Hart had already explained. Faysal asked how, if SAG stopped aid to Royalists, anyone could guarantee that Yemenis would be in position to resist UAR tanks and planes. Why not have both outside parties pull out? Talbot replied he did not disagree; in other places Arabs were having troubles with Arabs, Faysal knew Arabs better than we, and would perhaps be able to explain. Faysal responded that illogic comes from Arabs as well as from non-Arabs.

Talbot then reviewed food-grain program to UAR and said that question of unshipped balance originally promised FY 65 must be decided soon and probably would be. After that, there was larger question—partly political, partly economic and partly psychological—whether another food-grain program to UAR should be started. Faysal commented that in previous conversation he and Talbot had agreed needy people should be helped. However, if this permitted Nasir to divert money to cause trouble in the area, this disturbed him. Faysal said it was inconceivable he ask US to stop shipping food to the hungry, yet how was this problem to be avoided? Talbot and Faysal both agreed this constituted basic dilemma of the program.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

Hart

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POLSAUD-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tel Aviv for Talbot, Cairo, London, Taiz, Aden, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Dhahran, Kuwait, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, Document 58.
3. A report of Assistant Secretary Talbot’s conversation with Nasser on April 18 was transmitted in telegram 3653 from Cairo, April 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA) A summary of Talbot’s April 18 conversation with Nasser is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Document 208.