208. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
3652. From Talbot. Ambassador Battle and I had two and one-half hour talk with Nasser today ranging fully over US–UAR relations and many other issues in world affairs. He had obviously been briefed carefully on my earlier talks with his Ministers and officials and had done his homework sufficiently well so almost all points I had raised were skillfully woven into his comments and responses to my questions.
Tone was personally cordial throughout. He was candid in comments about UAR policies, tactics and difficulties, and equally candid in complaining about certain aspects of US policy. For a time we concluded he had decided to pursue fairly stiff line. However, this turned out to be in part protective coloration for specific concessions to points we have been urging on UARG in recent weeks. Nugget he dropped in middle of fairly assertive discussion on Congo situation was flat statement UAR not now providing arms to Congolese rebels. In discussion of nuclear proliferation, he stated equally definitely that UAR will accept IAEA safeguards on reactors it builds, large as well as small.
He gave us clear impression he has decided to swallow US arms sales to Israel, however unpalatable. He stated Arab water diversion works will not exceed, at least by much, Johnston Plan allocations. Also indicated current disinterest on Cyprus situation, though he helped Makarios last summer.
On other hand, he raised signals of possible further difficulties with Saudi Arabia on Yemen and with British over SAF. He suggested prompt Amer-Sulatan talks to clear misunderstandings over his agreement with Faisal. He urged that US stop bombing attacks on North Vietnam to give NVN chance to respond to proposals for negotiations.
It was clear our decision to sell arms to Israel was much on his mind. We discussed principal Arab-Israeli issues including Jordan waters and refugees as well as arms in detail. He repeatedly averred that Israel can influence US policy but Arabs cannot.
At end of session I made offer, as authorized in my instructions, of US readiness to consider CCC sales of wheat and corn on credit terms of six and twelve months, respectively. I also said we hoped for prompt decision on remainder of current PL480 agreement. I expressed [Page 444] further hope that together we could achieve improvement of climate of relations necessary to enable us to enter negotiations for new PL480 agreement.
Extensive telegraphic memcon being dictated rather hurriedly before my departure Jidda and will follow promptly.2 Suggest Department may wish to divide it into sections by subject and repeat to other posts as appropriate.
I have now had many hours of talk with UARG officials. It is apparent to Ambassador and me that Nasser’s decision to tell us no arms being sent to Congolese rebels represents firm UARG policy decision to attempt to meet conditions we have laid down for completion existing PL480 agreement. For variety of reasons well understood in Department, I believe it very important we now respond by prompt issuance of purchase authorities. You will not be surprised to learn that Ambassador Battle fully agrees. This leaves open for further discussion in coming weeks and perhaps months the question of a fresh PL480 agreement. That, rather than further dialogue on the existing agreement, seems to me the proper occasion for further examination of the many and real problems remaining between US and the UAR.