Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, April 17, 1965, 2:44 p.m.

6406. Suggested Scenario for Talbot’s Meeting with Nasser.

FYI: This meeting is important to both US and UAR. We hope it will produce confirmation that UARG intends carry out policy adjustments essential to resumption of US aid. Egyptians are looking for a signal that US declarations of desire to resume aid are sincere.

With expiration of Title I agreement approaching and Egyptians in grim mood, we wish to accord them such a signal. We suggest following approach: End FYI.

1. Open on a candid note by remarking you have just come from chiefs of mission conference. Nasser might be interested in knowing how participants see present situation in Near East. After conveying your impressions, you could comment on our arms policy along lines of FYI section of Deptel 5632² and Depcirtel to Arab capitals on this subject.³ You might also wish to draw on separate telegram on specific issues between US and UAR.

2. At this point, to promote atmosphere of give and take, you might solicit Nasser’s views on these matters.

3. Nasser may, as Kamel has advised, broach UARG desire for resumption of aid. If not, might be advisable for US side to broach it. Moving from area problems to Egyptian problems, you might note USG understanding of weighty economic problems UARG faces. You might go on to indicate USG regret that our support for efforts to find solutions these problems has lately been blocked by US–UAR policy differences. It might be well to review at some length the deterioration of the climate of opinion regarding the UAR in Congress as a reflection of wide-ranging sentiment throughout the country. While there are a number of major policy differences between the US and UAR, the Congo problem was the proximate cause of the latest difficulty. The Administration made a major effort to obtain authority for the President to continue useful economic relations with the UAR. It succeeded only by making it clear that a substantial improvement in relations must precede such further cooperation. Congressional reaction focused heavily on arms shipments to the Congo and the cessation of such shipments was clearly made a condition to the resumption of assistance.

This is not to say that many Americans are not continuing to work toward the improvement of US–UAR relations. For example, Eugene Black’s reports of his conversations in Cairo have been helpful in clearing the air.

4. You might elicit Nasser’s views on prospects for reviving satisfactory climate.

5. If Nasser’s reply is encouraging, we suggest you convey following:

a) USG willingness to consider now Egyptian request for CCC credit for corn. FYI: Terms on wheat (6 months) not likely be competitive with European offers but better on corn (12 months). End FYI.

b) Your desire to bring about the assurance of further purchase authorizations to complete Title I agreement and your intention to work to this end provided that in the meantime the UARG can see its way clear to stop arms shipments to the Congo. (We leave it to you to develop a form of words that will make this point clear without sounding too much like an ultimatum.)

c) You would hope a period of quiet and steady improvement would create favorable Congressional climate for negotiation new Title I agreement.

6. You might conclude with reaffirmation of genuine USG desire for cooperation. Our insistence on improvement in climate is not capricious but reflects political realities that cannot be ignored. USG has global interests and commitments to consider which we hope Nasser will recognize.

FYI. As we see it, UARG believes it has made some difficult political concessions—notably tolerance of arms sales to Israel. Longer USG delays in reciprocating, greater is danger that Egyptian extremists will foreclose possibility of salvaging US–UARG cooperation.

By reopening tap to allow thin stream of economic aid, we perceive better than even chance of confirming UARG on its present conciliatory course. This action would be consistent with ambassadors’ findings (Geneva’s 1599).⁴ It would demonstrate that we are not stringing Egyptians along—that USG has will and capability to meet concession with concession. (We suspect FRG is thinking along similar lines in regard to its own problems with UARG. Embassy will have noted the several reports, of which German Foreign Office appears to be unaware, that Werner carried aid package to Cairo.)

“Satisfactory climate” cannot be defined in terms of specific issues. It will obtain when sum total of UARG positions on major issues between us reflects conscious Egyptian effort to adapt to USG requirements. However, improvement in regard to Congo must be part of picture. End FYI.

For Bonn: Above position is preliminary, not to be discussed with FRG.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jones and Symmes; cleared by Jernegan, Bennsky, and McGeorge Bundy and in draft by Deputy Director of AID’s Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Kean and in substance by Emmett B. Ford of GER; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Bonn.
2. Document 193.
3. Document 194.
4. Telegram 1599 from Geneva, April 12, reported that Talbot and U.S. Ambassadors to Near Eastern countries, who were meeting in Geneva, recommended completing the deliveries of surplus grain to the UAR committed under the current P.L. 480 agreement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) UAR)