Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

177. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, March 6, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Courses of Action in Saudi Arabia (U)

JCSM–188–63

1. In response to a request by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the possible courses of action which might be undertaken in support of Saudi Arabia.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize the difficulties and dangers implicit in employment of US forces in the Arabian Peninsula. There are severe difficulties, from a military point of view, in maintaining forces in operations at the end of such a long logistic support line. In addition, the boundaries of the disputed territories are unidentified; tribesmen of either side are indistinguishable; regulars, irregulars, and general populace are blended together. These facts seriously complicate active military operations. It should be appreciated, too, that any US intervention or show of force must involve adequate forces to be able to accomplish the necessary military tasks if the deterrent fails.

3. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of staff believe that prior to the use of military forces, strong representation should be made through political channels to dissuade both Nasser and Faysal from taking any provocative acts which might lead to open warfare. Concurrently therewith they should be persuaded to disengage and withdraw their support of opposing Yemeni forces. All feasible nonmilitary actions, including action in the United Nations, should be attempted before undertaking any military action in the Arabian Peninsula.

4. It is recognized that the situation could develop to the point where the employment of combat forces would become necessary. Before undertaking to provide US forces, every effort should be made to obtain UK forces for this purpose. The United Kingdom has a deep interest in all political and military actions taken in the Arabian Peninsula. UK military forces presently in the area offer a significant capability and consist of the following:

Aden
		Strength	Major Units
	Army	4,600	1 Inf Bn
			2 Tank Bns
			1 Marine Commando Bn
	Navy		Aircraft Carrier 1
			Patrol Escort 4
			Amphib Force Flagship 1
			LST 2
			LSM 3
			Coastal Minesweeper 4
	Air Force		Fighters (Hawker Hunter) 34
			Bombers 2
			Reconnaissance (Hawker Hunter) 4
			Transports 37
Bahrein
	Army	1,100
Cyprus
	Army	3,300	1 Bde Gp
	Air Force		Jet Ftrs 13
			Jet Lt. Recce 15
			Jet Lt. Bmrs 23
			Prop Med Range Bmrs 12
			Helicopters 6

The UK forces in the Middle East can conduct effective military operations anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula. The combination of coordinated US and UK military capability represents a responsive and flexible force for establishing a credible deterrent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that concert with the United Kingdom in the Arabian Peninsula is essential. Mutual interest in the area requires it and such action provides a united front to further aggressive acts on the part of Nasser.

5. Assuming Faysal’s agreement to withdraw support from the Yemen Royalists, the following is representative of an appropriate ascending order of possible US military force deployments, should such action become necessary:

a. Dispatch a military team to Saudi Arabia to arrange for the deployment of initial US forces. The psychological impact of the introduction of this team might deter continued Egyptian aggression.

b. Demonstrate US intent to support the Saudi Arabian Government by deploying a token Air Defense Squadron consisting of:

• 3 fighter bomber aircraft
• 2–4 Recce aircraft
• 1 Mobile Radar Unit

Air refueling and support elements as required.

Reaction times are:

• 48 hours for the aircraft
• 96 hours for the Mobile Radar

The above forces would be deployed from the United States.

c. If b, above, fails to influence Nasser effectively, implement Phase I of CINCNELM OPLAN 200–6 with the mission of conducting show-of-force operations in the Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean employing:

1 Carrier Task Group—EUCOM (to operate in eastern Mediterranean)

MIDEASTFOR consisting of:

• 1 Seaplane Tender (Command Ship)
• 2–4 Destroyers

Show-of-force operations include aerial patrols of the Saudi Arabia–Yemen border, aerial patrols in the Red Sea, fleet exercises off the northern coast of Egypt, and naval patrols in the Red Sea. Deployment of designated Carrier Task Group to the objective area could be accomplished in 30 to 40 hours. On 5 March 1963, two MIDEASTFOR destroyers were located at Aden; deployment of two additional destroyers from the Mediterranean would require about two–four days.

d. If show-of-force operations have not produced desired results, after giving Nasser due warning, US/UK forces should conduct military operations as follows:

(1) US forces in Saudi Arabia and UK forces in Aden conduct bombing attacks against selected targets in Yemen.

(2) US forces in the Mediterranean and UK forces in Cyprus conduct bombing attacks against selected targets in Egypt.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor¹
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, Bunker/Bunche Missions. Top Secret.
1. Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.