178. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
McGB—
FYI, Iraqi coup has probably triggered off a period of heightened fluidity in inter-Arab politics which is going to require some fast footwork on our part in next several months.
Possibilities are another Kurdish uprising,1 a second pro-Nasser Iraqi coup, a pro-Nasser or pro-Iraqi coup in Syria, trouble in Saudi Arabia, etc. One reason why Nasser is so anxious to settle Yemen affair is that with all its costs plus a third to a half of his combat effectives tied down there he’s less able to move elsewhere.
Best policy for us is to sit tight and be prepared to deal with whoever comes out on top. Fortunately our policy now allows us this option, and one reason why we shouldn’t overtly choose Saudi side against Nasser is simply that it would tend to tie our hands. It’s one thing to defend Saudis against aggression. It’s another to declare we choose the kings over the bulk of the Arab world; that would be the real way to lose our oil.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. I. Secret.↩
- On March 7, Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency Ray S. Cline sent McGeorge Bundy a paper prepared on March 5 by the Office of National Estimates, entitled “The Kurdish Problem: New Dangers.” In his covering memorandum, Cline noted that “the chances appear to be growing that the Kurdish problem will become more acute in the months ahead. Emergence of an anti-Communist regime in Baghdad has removed the main inhibition on Soviet support of Kurdish dissidence, and this problem may have important implications beyond the borders of Iraq.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Iraq, 6/63–8/63)↩