Office of the Historian

398. Memorandum for the Record0

Washington, June 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Meeting with the President on Contingency Planning for Laos

The President met at 11:30 a.m. on June 13, 19621 in the Cabinet Room with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Messrs. Gilpatric, Nitze, Harriman, William Bundy, Cooper (CIA); Generals Lemnitzer and Taylor; and Messrs. McGeorge Bundy and Forrestal.

The Secretary of State reported to the President that the new Government of national union in Laos was expected to be formed by the 18th [Page 847] of June. Thereafter negotiations would be resumed in Geneva for the completion of the Geneva Accords. The Secretary said that he was somewhat concerned about the apparent plan for Souvanna to remain in Paris, General Phoumi to head the delegation in Geneva, and Prince Souphanouvong to remain in Laos during the Geneva negotiations. It was a situation which underlined the need for contingency planning in the event of a breakdown of the status quo.2

The Secretary of State briefly described the type of planning which was now in progress. Basically four types of operation are involved: (1) air operations in Laos and North Vietnam; (2) defensive ground operations in Laos; (3) offensive ground operations in Laos, including holding the Vientiane salient and holding and recapturing the Panhandle; (4) a less extensive offensive type of operation designed to hold the Mekong Valley area as proposed by State.

In order to reduce the lead time in mounting any of the above operations, the Secretary of Defense proposed a buildup of logistical facilities in Thailand including: (a) building of pipelines in Thailand for the transportation of air fuel; (b) expanding railroad facilities; (c) improving air fields. Secretary McNamara estimated that these operations would cost approximately $20 million and would involve 1500 to 1700 U.S. personnel. These logistic support activities will be publicly described as civic action or economic assistance activities.

In response to a question by the President, the Secretary of Defense said that not less than 90 percent of the total cost would be U.S. procurement.

In response to a question by the President, General Lemnitzer reported that present plans contemplated a 2-month rotation for the Marines and the Army battle group now in Thailand.

The President asked whether it would be possible to build a bridge between Souvanna and Kong Le. Governor Harriman replied that this was being attempted through the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] State Department. He added that the French would be asked to help to bring Souvanna in closer contact with Phoumi’s forces. He also said, [Page 848] and the President agreed, that Souvanna should be invited to visit Washington on his way back from Geneva.

The President requested a memorandum on the political action which the State Department expected to take in connection with the Geneva Conference and subsequent thereto.3 He is particularly interested in the techniques which we might consider using to insure effective policing of the Geneva Accords.

[Here follows discussion on the Status of Forces Agreement in the Republic of Korea.]

The President agreed to send personal messages to Souvanna and Marshal Sarit, congratulating both on the achievement of the Lao Government of national union.4

After the meeting the President decided that he wished on Friday to discuss further with the Secretaries of State and Defense the proposed increase in logistic support for Thailand mentioned above.5

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/13/62–6/25/62. Top Secret. Prepared by Forrestal. A note on the top margin in McGeorge Bundy’s hand reads “weekend reading.”↩
  2. According to Kennedy’s appointment book, this meeting at the White House began at 11:55 a.m. and lasted until 12:25 p.m. William Bundy was listed as a participant and Paul Nitze was not. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)↩
  3. In a telephone conversation with Harriman, June 13 at approximately 4:15 p.m., Rusk told Harriman that he was “really very much disturbed about a colossal booby trap on this Laos business.” He feared that if Phoumi went to Paris and Souvanna stayed there while Souphanouvong remained in Laos there could be a coup. Rusk noted that “we’ve lost 5 European countries that way after WW II.” Harriman admitted it was troubling, but remarked that it was a different situation and there was no Red Army in Laos. Rusk explained that Souphanouvong could come to Vientiane bringing a couple of hundred of his “henchmen, assassinate a couple of people, PL forces would move in.” Harriman and Rusk agreed to try to make sure that Souphanouvong was not left alone in Vientiane. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Telephone Conversations, June-December 1962)↩
  4. Document 405.↩
  5. The messages are in telegrams 1111 to Vientiane and 1976 to Bangkok, both June 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1362)↩
  6. An account of this meeting on June 15 is printed in volume XXIII.↩