Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

397. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 13, 1962.

11:30 a.m. Meeting on Contingency Planning for Laos¹

At a meeting yesterday in the Department of State,² the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed that it was not now necessary to ask you to make any decisions regarding the introduction of U.S. combat forces in Laos. Both Secretaries, however, do wish to take this opportunity to report to you on the status of planning and obtain your general approval of certain additional precautionary measures which the Secretary of Defense recommends with State’s approval.

The JCS and Defense are currently planning for all of the contingencies (except that involving an amphibious operation against North Vietnam) described in the joint State/Defense memorandum which you saw the week end before last. You will remember that six separate stages of U.S. intervention in Laos were proposed, ranging from a buildup in Thailand through the introduction of ground forces into Laos up to air strikes against North Vietnam. The JCS and Defense have specifically agreed to plan for the limited military intervention proposed by State, i.e. an occupation of the Mekong Valley area presently held by the RLG without engaging in an offensive action, although this is the contingency which least appeals to the JCS and Defense.

In addition to this planning exercise, Secretary McNamara will describe a buildup of logistic facilities in Thailand over the next 8 to 10 months which will enable the military to carry out any of the contingent operations which you might authorize in the event of a break down of the Geneva solution. More importantly, this logistic buildup will contribute greatly to the Thai economy and to the ability of Thailand to resist Communist subversion and insurgency in the Northern provinces which suffer from bad communications. Secretary McNamara will propose that we introduce into Thailand: (a) POL stores; (b) railroad equipment, including locomotives, tank cars, freight cars, etc.; (c) one construction battalion and one pipe line construction battalion; and (d) certain air field improvements.

The cost of Secretary McNamara’s proposals are estimated at between $20 and $25 million, virtually all of which can come from the current fiscal year’s Defense appropriations. Secretary McNamara also points out that most of these costs will be incurred in the United States.

At State’s suggestion, this kind of buildup will be publicized as economic or, possibly, military assistance to Thailand and will not involve any additional combat troops.

There will also be a report on the steps we shall be taking to support the Souvanna Government and insure the carrying out of the Geneva Agreements, including:

(1) installation of the Souvanna Government on or about June 18;

(2) economic aid to the Souvanna Government (especially troop payment to the FAR);

(3) resumption of Geneva Conference to clear up certain important open items and finally to sign Geneva Agreements;

(4) Souvanna’s relations with Marshal Sarit;

(5) intelligence activities required to insure that (a) Viet Minh forces are withdrawn from Laos, and (b) the Soviet air lift and the Corridor are not used for infiltration into South Vietnam;

(6) strengthening of Cambodia, and certain other actions designed to make our efforts more effective in South Vietnam.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/13/62–6/25/6. Top Secret.
1. See Document 398.
2. See Document 396.