Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

396. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 12, 1962, noon.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Planning for Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• For State
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Mr. Bell
  • Mr. Johnson (G)
  • Gov. Harriman
  • Mr. Sullivan
• For CIA
  • Gen. Carter
  • Mr. Cooper
• For White House
  • Amb. Bowles
  • Gen. Taylor
  • Mr. Forrestal
• For Defense
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Mr. Gilpatric
  • Adm. Nitze
  • Mr. Bundy
  • Gen. Lemnitzer
  • Adm. Heinz
  • Gen. Fontana

The Secretary opened the meeting by noting that the recent agreement on the formation of a government of national union in Laos had changed the politics of the situation in that country.¹ Therefore, the political side of the contingency planning for Laos would probably have to undergo some changes. However, these factors did not appear to alter the military shape of the problem and it seemed reasonable that military contingency planning should proceed on the same basis as previously contemplated.

The Secretary felt there was some difference between State and Defense concerning one aspect of the planning which had been done to date. The State Department placed considerable emphasis on the need to hold the Mekong River Valley. Such an objective was important not only to support the political settlement in Laos, but particularly to be consistent with our obligations in the rest of Southeast Asia. It was especially important to the Thai that the U.S. contemplate its defense of Thailand east of the Mekong rather than upon Thai soil.

Secretary McNamara said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department shared the Department of State’s concern for the retention of the Mekong River Valley, but felt it was unwise militarily to introduce U.S. forces for the sole purpose of occupying that valley. They thought such forces might find themselves immobilized in the valley and unable to control the movement of enemy personnel and equipment infiltrating into South Viet-Nam through the unoccupied portions of Laos. Despite this feeling, however, the Defense Department was prepared to go ahead with contingency planning which would take into account the sort of military and political objective which the State Department contemplated with respect to the Mekong River Valley. Having such planning in hand would be helpful to the President if and when he had to make a decision. However, there appears to be no need to request the President to make a decision at this stage.

Secretary McNamara said there was a decision which he would like to have made, affecting the lead time involved in any of these contingency plans for Laos. He felt strongly that it was necessary to build up logistical capabilities in Thailand which would reduce the lead time problem. He had in mind POL facilities, pipelines, railway equipment and other improvements which would assist the logistical base. He thought that a military construction battalion and a pipeline company could be assigned to Thailand to install some of this infra-structure. The costs would run somewhere upward of $25,000,000 to carry out the projects that he had in mind. He could finance $20,000,000 of it from 1962 contingency reserves and needed a decision rapidly to be able to put such a program into effect. He felt it would be effective in three areas: (a) support for contingent military operations in Laos, (b) support for the defense of Thailand itself and (c) the economic development of northeast Thailand.

In response to questions from the Secretary and from Governor Harriman, Secretary McNamara said that the program he had in mind could be termed “civic action” or “economic aid” if that made it politically more palatable. None of the funds involved would be taken away from any other projects or problems in Southeast Asia. The personnel involved would not be drawn from current reserves assigned to Southeast Asia, but would be additional to those reserves.

There then followed considerable discussion about the immediate future in Laos, the political risks involved, the prospects for Souvanna Phouma’s role, the behavior of the Viet Minh and the Pathet Lao, and the integration of Laotian military forces. Additionally, the form and nature of U.S. aid was touched upon as well as the responsibilities which the French would be assuming in this new period.²

The Secretary then returned to a discussion of the contingency planning currently being studied with respect to Laos. Secretary McNamara said that the military were working on four plans: (1) air strikes in response to a Communist rupture of the cease-fire, (2) an occupation of the Mekong River Valley which would not advance beyond that point but which would have a back-up capacity in Thailand to do so, (3) an occupation of the Mekong River Valley and an advance to take over the rest of the panhandle, and (4) an occupation with an advance to take over a lesser portion of the panhandle.

In response to a question, Secretary McNamara said that the Defense Department was not currently pursuing the plan for an amphibious operation at Vinh.

The meeting then turned to a discussion of the role which the FAR would play during the interim period before integration of the Lao forces and particularly the attitude of the U.S. Government and especially MAAG toward the FAR.³ This discussion touched on the role of the Meo tribesmen in relation to the FAR and on the attitude of Souvanna Phouma toward the FAR.

In closing, the meeting discussed the possibility of limited bilateral discussions with the British concerning contingency planning. It was agreed that these could be continued in much the same frame-work as they had previously been conducted. It was decided, however, that no discussion should be had with other SEATO members at this stage.⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1262. Top Secret. Drafted by Sullivan on June 12 and approved in S on June 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s conference room. The Secretary left at 12:50 p.m. for the White House for lunch with the President of Panama. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
1. Taylor’s Naval Aide Bagley, who is not listed as a participant but apparently accompanied Taylor, wrote an account of this meeting. He stated that Rusk and McNamara met privately in Rusk’s office prior to the meeting. At the outset, Rusk announced that there were two political objectives in Southeast Asia: a stable situation in Laos conducive to negotiations and U.S. action to provide psychological evidence that the United States intended to draw the line against Communist aggression. (Memorandum for the record by Bagley, June 12; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, SEA National Planning, T–019–69)
2. At this point, Bagley recorded a discussion of the desirability of making a prompt $3 million payment to Phoumi in response to his positive and cooperative attitude. When the present RLG resigned, payments would be switched to the Souvanna government. Rusk also announced his intention to use his forthcoming visit to France to remind the French of their responsibility to support Souvanna and assure his neutralism.
3. Bagley quoted Taylor as inquiring as to plans to maintain the readiness of FAR and it was agreed it should be supported at its current levels up to the point of integration. As for support after integration and FAR equipment stocks, the consensus was that the issue should be reviewed by Defense. Bagley also recorded an understanding that the United States should seek an agreement with Souvanna for support of a new national army when it was formed.
4. Bagley noted that the meeting ended with an agreement that there was no item for the President to make a decision on at the meeting scheduled for the next day (see Document 398), but McNamara proposed to describe the logistics buildup in Thailand, and Rusk suggested looking over existing contingency plans to make sure they were compatible with the new situation evolving in Laos.