Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand⁰

Washington, June 16, 1962, 6:01 p.m.

2010. Bangkok Tel 1992,¹ Deptel 1977.² Following is our assessment new RLG which you may find useful as background for your talks with Thai:

Objective appraisal Souvanna government leads to conclusion it probably best that could have been achieved under circumstances. We could undoubtedly have obtained more favorable composition had agreement been reached some months ago. Must bear in mind that coalition government in essence means no one faction can retain more than reasonable share of critical posts however unpalatable that may be where pro-communists are involved.

1. We do not agree cabinet is “dominated by pro-communists” although numerical balance may seem tipped in favor of those opposed to former US/Thai pro-Phoumi policy. In addition to 4 right-wing members, Primin Souvanna is not sympathetic to communists, nor is any one of 4 Vientiane neutrals. We believe Pheng and Quinim are salvageable if treated with finesse (both by non-communist Lao and by free world representatives), intermingled with flattery to which they are known be receptive. Supplementing points refdeptel,³ Quinim as MinFonaff may not be ideal but now he has achieved life-long ambition, he may prove be more neutral in practice than RTG anticipates. This connection, he has indicated to Amb Brown he fully intends hew to strictly neutral line. Two of leftist leaning neutrals (Khamsouk and Tiao Sisoumang) will occupy relatively minor posts that will not permit them carry much weight in policy matters. Third XK neutral (Heuan) in Phoumi’s own opinion is weak, lacks initiative and can be controlled, whereas he has expressed a degree of confidence in fourth XK neutral, Khampheng Boupha.

2. Proceeding from premise government of national union was unobtainable unless Phoumi yielded Defense and Interior to center, there is some advantage in Souvanna’s holding MinDef personally since he has vested interest in working with Phoumi to keep PL forces under control and to ensure effective implementation of satisfactory demobilization/integration plan. MinInterior could have gone to much less desirable and less competent individual than Pheng.

3. Since troika principle of unanimity applies to all decisions involving Defense, FonAff and Interior, any disastrous action instigated either by PL or by Pheng or Quinim personally, should be precluded.

4. Again, re actual division of ministries, we recognize it unfortunate PL obtained MinInfo. However, this meant Phoumi group secured crucial MinFinance, Education, Sports/Youth. Religious Affairs, according Phoumi, in hands devout Buddhist (Bounthan) who presumably will make effort reduce PL influence over Buddhist clergy. Sananikone family represented by Ngon who in past has been responsive to Phoui’s advice and he should be helpful in contravening any public works programs PL seek to launch for own purposes. Presence of Keo Viprakone is most encouraging. One of most effective, dedicated younger Lao leaders, Keo as SecState Social Welfare will be in position keep eye on Social Welfare Min Pheng. Souvanna has also implied willingness arrange for Keo to continue supervision of rural affairs program which, as RTG knows, will play essential role in developing countryside support for new government and in counteracting PL inroads.

5. If suitable opportunity arises, you could point out to Thanat that outside of Phoumi and Leuam, present RLG representation in new cabinet is scarcely impressive, i.e., Phouangphet and Bounthong. Both of latter choices smack of nepotism despite our repeated advice to Phoumi that he should select “best available” leaving aside family or other interests.

6. We cannot overemphasize importance of Phoumi’s forming closest alliance with Souvanna from military and political action standpoints to protect government from PL undermining. This is Souvanna’s own view and one he has consistently expressed to us. Phoumi must therefore concentrate on bringing about reconciliation of Kong Le and Khamouane forces with FAR in order thwart PL. While Kong Le personally may be lost cause as result long association with and pressure from PL, plus VIP treatment he was given on recent tour of bloc countries, majority of his troops as well as those of Khamouane are now disillusioned with PL and ready to stand up against them. Faced with united non-communist forces, PL will not be able win out unless they continue receive VM support. Key to success of government of national union is therefore to get VM out of Laos. Soviets as co-chairman are committed to specific responsibility here and if they do not live up to it, evidence of VM failure to leave will be manifest.

7. You should tell Sarit and Thanat they can materially affect future course in Laos if they will be sensible and undertake to work with and support Souvanna. Otherwise Thais’ own interests may suffer.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1462. Secret. Drafted by Queneau, cleared in draft by Wright and Harriman, and approved by Cross. Repeated to Vientiane.
1. In telegram 1992, May 14, Young reported that the Thai Cabinet had concluded that in the prospective Lao Government “pro-Communist” elements predominated and held the most strategic posts. Thanat was “very upset.” (Ibid.)
2. See footnote 4, Document 394.
3. The points made in telegram 1977 to Bangkok, June 13, were 1) the troika concept extended to the Foreign Ministry reduced Quinim’s latitude; 2) Souvanna would direct foreign affairs and Quinim was amenable to his direction; and 3) the Department of State believed from previous experiences that it could work with Quinim. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1362)