Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

405. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

• LAOS: United States Government Actions with Respect to Geneva Conference and the Souvanna Government

The main lines of action which the United States is following in connection with the reconvening of the Geneva Conference on Laos and with the Souvanna Government are described below in summary form.

I. Diplomatic Moves

Tripartite Discussions

We are now participating in tripartite meetings in London to coordinate our tactics with the British and French for the final stages of the Geneva Conference. Differences between us primarily concern the draft Lao Declaration of Neutrality which we jointly plan to urge Souvanna to table at the Conference. In essence the British favor language which would prohibit the introduction into Laos of any civilian technicians in connection with future military assistance to the neutral government since the communists would be certain to take advantage of any loopholes offered. Our position has been that the Lao Government should be able to bring in some civilian technicians as we feel it would be useful for the FAR to have the services of the 300 Filipino technicians now in Laos and that in any case the communists could easily violate the agreement without detection. Much depends upon the willingness of the French in their prospective exclusive role as military trainers of the Lao forces to undertake functions the Filipinos perform; if the French prove sympathetic we would be inclined to alter our position.

We are also discussing with our allies the advice we should jointly provide to Phoumi and Souvanna on the cease-fire arrangements the Lao themselves will make and on integration of the armed forces. An important part of the cease-fire arrangements will be to obtain as much territory as possible for Souvanna of that now occupied by PL/Souvanna forces. Our advice on integration would be extended not so much with a view to early implementation but in order to give Souvanna and Phoumi a concrete program which they could propose to Souphanouvong. We have a tripartite draft proposal for this purpose.

Military Discussions with French

In Paris a Defense Department mission under Mr. William Bundy is discussing directly with the French future military and police assistance to Laos.¹ Our objectives in these discussions are to encourage the French to make a really effective effort in support of the military forces and gendarmerie in Laos; to encourage them to provide as much assistance as possible themselves; to obtain their cooperation in those matters where the United States will be able to remain active (in particular in the area of police training where there is some chance that we may be able to take a useful part). The chief difficulty we expect in these negotiations lies in convincing the French it is to the advantage of all concerned that we keep as effective a FAR as possible in being until the integration of forces takes place.

Discussions with the Canadians on their ICC Role

The agreements will provide that foreign forces must withdraw from Laos within a maximum of 75 days (30 days for the RLG in consultation with the ICC to establish withdrawal points, 15 days for the ICC to establish teams at the withdrawal points, 30 days thereafter for withdrawal). However, quick action by the RLG and ICC could reduce the total time. We believe that it will be to our advantage to see that the withdrawal period is extended to the full 75 days since this much time would be needed for the French to mount their effort and to move in efficiently and for our MAAG to phase out.

We are trying to convince the Canadians of the importance to us of the full period and are discussing with them how they could use their ICC role to extend the time for withdrawal to the maximum. One means to this end would be to insist upon the establishment of large number of withdrawal points near the Chicom and DRV borders. We are also working with the Canadians to determine ICC equipment needs for its hoped-for active role in Laos. We are prepared to transfer rapidly to the ICC, upon its request, items such as helicopters and radio communications equipment.

Economic Assistance

Economic assistance may prove to be our best instrument in helping Laos to maintain its independence. Ambassador Brown has already told Souvanna in very general terms that we are prepared to assist him economically, and we have developed contingency economic aid programs. However, before we can move forward we need to know more about Souvanna’s intentions and the direction the new government will take. We may get some initial indications of this from Souvanna during his talks with Governor Harriman in Europe, but the shape and size of future aid to Laos will take time to work out with the Lao. We are continuing present project activities, but do not plan further cash transfers or new programs until we have satisfactory assurances that our aid would be used in a manner acceptable to us. In any event, past practices will be carefully reviewed in light of the new situation which confronts us.

Unilateral Actions in the Military Field

Increasing Intelligence Capabilities for the Withdrawal Period

One of the most urgent problems which will face us after the signing of the Geneva Agreement will be how we can avoid withdrawing our MAAG from Laos in the absence of evidence that the Viet Minh is doing likewise. Among other things this would involve increasing our intelligence capabilities during the withdrawal period to determine whether the Viet Minh are actually withdrawing and the numbers involved. [2–½ lines of source text not declassified] Among our potential assets is one of Souvanna’s officers, General Khamouane, with whom we have established contact and whose forces control much of Phong Saly Province. Certain elements of the Kong Le forces and, of course, the Meo are also being developed for intelligence purposes.

Assistance to the FAR

In line with our policy of trying to maintain the strength and integrity of the FAR as far as possible up to the integration period, we are determining the types of equipment the FAR will need after the agreements go into effect and whether we should introduce certain categories of supplies into Laos before the agreements go into effect.

Another problem is how to accomplish the payment of the FAR under the conditions of a national union government. In our discussions with the French we are seeking to have the French assume support of significant portion of the military budget. Until we learn the attitude of the French and also of Souvanna we will not be able to move forward in our planning on this subject.

Policing of the Geneva Accords

The principal way the agreements can be policed is through action by the Soviet Union in its capacity as co-Chairman. The Soviets have, in fact, assumed the obligation to police the Viet Minh and Chinese Communist observance of the agreements through their acceptance of a supervisory role for the co-Chairmen. This means that we and the British co-Chairman must exert continuous diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to live up to their responsibilities by acting to limit bloc violations.

We can reinforce our diplomatic efforts by taking advantage of the provisions of the agreement which will make it possible for ICC members to report directly to the co-Chairmen. Article 8 of the Protocol says that among other things the Commission shall immediately report to the co-Chairmen “any important information which may assist the co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions.” These reports are not limited to results of investigations so that ICC members have wide latitude involving all matters pertaining to the Protocol and Declaration which they may bring before the co-Chairmen. There are provisions for minority reports elsewhere in the agreement and Article 8 further states that the co-Chairmen will circulate reports they receive to Conference members thus assuring publicity.

The ICC itself is given powers of supervision and control over the observation of the agreements principally by means of investigations and reports. The ICC will initiate investigations on the majority principle so that with the cooperation of the Indian Chairman, the ICC could follow a policy of moving quickly and vigorously on investigations and publicizing violations. Although we undoubtedly will not be able to stimulate the Indians to be as active as we would like we may convince them to play a somewhat more forceful role in the new ICC Laos than heretofore. Continuous efforts on the part of the Canadians will also be necessary if we are to exploit to the fullest the openings provided by the new agreements.

World attention to communist violations of the agreements and to the Soviet responsibility for policing them will have little effect unless the Soviets are convinced that the United States is determined to resist encroachments.

The Accords provide several openings for the RLG to obtain ICC assistance in preserving Lao neutrality and independence. We will need to devise means of encouraging Souvanna to take advantage of the Accords whenever possible and to prevent him from being frustrated by PL political pressure from doing so. It is too early to tell how the troika principle which the Lao have accepted for decisions on all “important questions” will apply. However, it is clear that Souvanna will not be as free to request ICC actions as we had once hoped, thus placing an even greater requirement for energy and alertness on the Canadians and Indians.

George Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2862. Top Secret. Drafted by Cross and cleared by Harriman and Koren. Kennedy requested this memorandum at a meeting on June 13; see Document 398.
1. These discussions are reported in a series of telegrams with the indicator Repnamto which are in the Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cables, Laos.