Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

406. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, July 3, 1962, 7 p.m.

Confe 1177. From Harriman.

1. Pushkin opened our one-hour meeting July 2 by reading personal message from Khrushchev to me (septel)¹ expressing hope for continued US-Soviet cooperation in settling Laos question, noting importance of settlement as implementation of Vienna Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, and reaffirming its “decisive significance” in US-Soviet collaboration on world developments. I responded that President Kennedy placed similar importance on Lao settlement but underlined need for continued cooperation to see that agreement was implemented to achieve mutually agreed objectives.

2. Upon my introduction of Forrestal to Pushkin, Forrestal confirmed President’s great interest in Laos settlement. He said President was aware that progress on the Laos problem was unusual in the pattern of Soviet-American diplomatic relations, and that was an extra reason for desire for success. Pushkin commented that historical import of conference might be much greater than immediate participants suspected.

3. I outlined the two vital steps in implementing agreement, first, withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, and second, demobilization and integration of three armies. If these were carried out, new Laos Govt could achieve our agreed objective of a neutral, independent Laos.

4. Pushkin observed that new and unexpected element in working out settlement was movement of US forces into Thailand. This could complicate or upset arrangements for handling the SEATO problem and other issues. I asked whether Pushkin had seen story in today’s papers reporting withdrawal 1000 US Marines from Thailand. When Pushkin replied in negative, I gave him New York Times European edition.

5. I explained events at Nam Tha had upset Thai Govt, and US troops had been sent to reassure Thais. Anyway, conference not involved events Thailand. I also noted Thais were going through very emotional period, resulting from International Court of Justice adverse decision on Temple.² Government and national “face” was involved. However, Sarit had agreed to accept court decision, and had indicated Thais would participate in conference after all.

6. I commented that Lao Govt declaration was basic issue for conference as provisions of our declaration and protocol hung on it. Pushkin agreed and expressed regret that Souvanna and Quinim had not yet supplied text and said he would urge Quinim to induce Souvanna to arrive Geneva July 3.

7. Pushkin raised question of integration and demobilization of three forces and said that he had had a very sharp exchange with MacDonald on this subject yesterday. Claiming it was entirely a Lao internal affair, Pushkin urged US and UK drop this point. I said I thought that last January Pushkin had understood how strongly US felt about ensuring demobilization of all forces in Laos except those loyal to the govt, and had undertaken to find a way to satisfy US. Therefore, I was awaiting Pushkin’s solution. In any case, this matter had to be settled. We had agreed on a neutral, independent, unified, peaceful Laos, and without demobilization excess forces, Laos could be neither unified nor peaceful. I said that manner in which Laotian Govt integrated its forces was of course an internal affair but that demobilization of surplus forces was necessary to assure peace and peace certainly had international implications. Pushkin rejoined that elections and reorganization of governmental administration were also matters affecting future peace and unification of Laos; yet no one could envisage international supervision of these. USSR believed strongly that demobilization fell into same category. I indicated that we would have to have further discussions on this problem.

8. Besides confirming that he and MacDonald had agreed to re-establish former conference procedures (including informal meetings of four and six dels), Pushkin made it clear he wanted to have further private sessions with me to work on issues that proved troublesome during co-chairmen’s meetings. Pushkin expects conference be over in ten days and that Gromyko would come for signing.

9. I inquired about Khrushchev’s health, noting recent reports of his being exhausted. Pushkin insisted Khrushchev was very well and fully active and got rest by changing his subjects of work.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–362. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Bangkok, and Vientiane.
1. Confe 1176, July 3. (Ibid.)
2. A Thai-Cambodian dispute; documentation is included in volume XXIII.