Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

387. Memorandum from Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 5, 1962.

Contingency Planning for Laos

There is attached a draft memorandum to you from the Departments of State and Defense containing recommendations for action the United States might take in the event of a worsening of the military situation in Laos. (Tab A) The memorandum has not yet been approved by the Secretaries of the two Departments. It was prepared by the staffs of the two Departments following the meeting last Saturday, June 2,¹ of which you received a report from Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and does reflect their current thinking.

The memorandum does not attempt to answer the question whether from a strategic point of view Laos or any part of it is worth defending. I understand that Defense is still waiting for estimates from the field on this question. In the meantime, however, Roger Hilsman at State has prepared a summary of the Rand report on the Military Geography of Laos, and the policy implications of the report. (Tab B)² Roger’s paper reflects Averell’s thinking and that of the State Department up to Secretary Rusk, who has not yet taken a position on the question. Secretary McNamara will probably have his views ready on Thursday.

You will note that the State-Defense memorandum recommends not only an occupation of the Mekong River areas, but also offensive action against the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh, both on the ground and in the air, and both inside Laos and in North Vietnam. These latter recommendations are contingent upon a build up of Communist military activity in the face of our occupation of the Mekong River area to a point which we would find intolerable. Averell recognizes that the military will insist on being given some guidance on what to expect if the enemy decides to escalate the military situation; but he feels strongly that you should have another look at the situation before authorizing offensive action against the PL/VM and particularly before you authorize any action against North Vietnam.

In this connection, you will also find of value the current intelligence estimate of Communist reaction to the moves recommended in the State-Defense memorandum. They are contained in SNIE 58–5–62, a copy of which is attached at Tab C. Course C on pages 4–6 contains the relevant estimate.³

Tab A⁴

1–25577/62

June 4, 1962.

The root cause of the problem in Southeast Asia is the aggressive effort of the North Vietnamese to establish Communist control in South Vietnam and Laos, as well as a base for such control in Thailand. In response to this effort, we have pursued courses of action corresponding to the differing circumstances in Laos and South Vietnam. In Vietnam our assistance program is designed to enable the South Vietnamese themselves to drive the North Vietnamese back into their own territory by force. In Laos, we have been attempting to obtain North Vietnamese withdrawal by international agreement. Failure to consummate that agreement and the resultant continuation of the North Vietnamese presence in Laos would not only greatly jeopardize the prospects for successfully clearing them from South Vietnam, but would also constitute a serious threat to the security of Thailand and Cambodia. If therefore, we are to preserve the prospects for success in South Vietnam and keep our commitment to defend Thailand within manageable bounds, we must pursue our intention of obtaining North Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos. At a very minimum, we must deny them control of the Mekong River valley “freeway” down the center of Southeast Asia.

Our efforts over the past year to obtain North Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos by international agreement have gained for us a great deal of political capital internationally. They should, therefore, not be abandoned lightly or before we have exhausted their possibilities completely. Accordingly, insofar as circumstances permit, any plans for the employment of military forces in Laos should be consistent with a continuation of those efforts. If, of course, the North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao proteges mount a major military drive into the Mekong Valley in an effort which is clear to all the world as a move to conquer Laos, the nature of our response could be equally sharp. If however, as is more probable, the North Vietnamese effort is more ambiguous, we will have to plan a graduated response in several phases.

In examining the possible range of courses of action, we have concluded that courses of action short of the introduction of U.S. combat forces into Laos in some form would not be effective. This applies specifically to the possibility of an increased advisory effort along the lines of the South Vietnam operation, or to massive encadrement of the Lao Army. We consider that the Lao Army’s capabilities are so limited that any such measure would be of no use in itself, and of only limited use as an auxiliary to other actions. The basic brunt of operations in Laos must be borne by the U.S., and to a much lesser extent by Thai, forces. Every effort should be made to obtain substantial Commonwealth participation plus a token contribution from the Philippines. However, we have set forth strength requirements on the basis of U.S. forces except as noted.

We have also examined the desirability of Thai action to occupy Sayabouri province, west of the Mekong in Northern Laos, and have concluded that in isolation this would not be militarily helpful. It might, however, be considered if the Thais insist, as an adjunct to wider introduction of forces into Laos.

This memorandum outlines the sort of action which the Secretaries of State and Defense recommend to prepare for and to meet the contingency of a deterioration in Laos of such magnitude that the President considers it advisable to take military actions. Examples of such deterioration would be: (1) early collapse of the present efforts to form a coalition government, and an uneasy situation without any major breach of the cease-fire by either side; (2) a major Communist breach of the cease-fire, which could come at any time before or after the uneasy situation; (3) difficulties encountered even after a coalition government were formed.

Military Actions in Relation to our Political Objectives

1. Further military buildup outside Laos. So long as the coalition negotiations continue or at least until the current June 15 deadline of Souvanna Phouma’s departure, a marked further visible buildup in Thailand would tend to stiffen Phoumi to hold out and break the talks off, and would put on the U.S. much of the onus for failure. But this should not preclude buildup measures that would not become clearly visible to Phoumi and the Communists. If the coalition talks had collapsed because of unacceptable Communist demands, then we could go much further and indeed seek to make our buildup as visible as possible, as a deterrent to a quick military bite and as an inducement to the Communists to return to the negotiating track.

2. Occupation of the Mekong River areas. This could be carried out on the basis of confirming or re-establishing the cease-fire and getting negotiations started again. However, there would be major military risks in sending into Laos only the 10,000 men hitherto envisaged, with only another 8–10,000 in reserve in Thailand. While we could stay at the 10,000 level for a period (plus Thai and possibly Commonwealth forces), we should have at least 35,000 other forces readily available if we are to avoid the substantial chance of a series of small reverses, or alternatively sitting in the valley while the Communists proceeded to flood over the rest of Laos. That is, we must be physically capable and ready. At the same time, the military necessity for this degree of readiness will greatly complicate the political objective of getting a cease-fire back and negotiations re-started. The Communists will find it hard to believe our objective is limited in any case, and still less so if they see this scale of reinforcements at the ready.

Occupying the Mekong River areas would have considerable political and military usefulness in itself in securing more of the Thai border and reassuring the Thais, in preventing the Communists from taking over the north-south roads of Southern Laos and thus greatly expanding their supply route to South Vietnam, and (provided the Vientiane area could be included) in maintaining ready access to the Meo. However, if no agreement were reached, this situation could conceivably leave United States/SEATO forces stationed indefinitely in control of the valley, largely immobilized and subject to guerrilla harassment, but spared from major attacks, while North Vietnamese, and perhaps even Chinese Communist, forces consolidate their positions in the remainder of Laos. A critical decision would then have to be made concerning further actions, depending on two elements:

a. The threshold of Communist activity beyond which we would find their actions intolerable (presumably because of their threat to our forces in the area and to the security of South Vietnam and Thailand).

b. The nature of the U.S. response if and when that threshold is crossed.

It is difficult and indeed impractical, to try to define the threshold. That could only be judged in relationship to the action which the Communists might actually take. However, it is important to focus on the nature of the United States response. Basically, there are two alternatives:

a. Seeking by territorial means to block Viet Minh threats along the Thai border and Viet Minh exploitation of Southern Laos as a full-scale supply route into South Vietnam. This could mean seeking to hold by military action the Panhandle area of Laos, either from the neck south or from the 17th parallel south, and also if feasible holding Vientiane and its perimeter.

b. Seeking to deter and inhibit North Vietnamese aggressive action by non-territorial means, i.e., by some form of selective military action directed at North Vietnam itself. This would be justified to the world as the only effective way to deal with their aggression against South Vietnam and Laos and clearly threatened aggression against Thailand.

These two possible objectives are not wholly mutually exclusive. We could combine territorial measures with warnings or actual attacks against North Vietnam in some combination. Or we could go all the way in one direction or the other. Clearly, attacks against North Vietnam raise the chances of Chinese Communist intervention in force, and also would involve us in charges of aggression in the UN to a far greater degree than would actions confirmed territorially to Laos. We must calculate on a maximum North Vietnamese response in any case, however i.e., that they would respond to any occupation of the Mekong River areas by creeping action to consolidate their hold and extend it where possible, and that they would resist vigorously any attempt to clean out the Panhandle.

In dealing with our allies, with India, etc., we will be in a much stronger position if we proceed by stages throughout, taking initially only those military actions that can be related to continued pursuit of one effort to neutralize Laos by international agreement and moving into other actions only as Viet Minh positive response (which is likely) gives us added justification for asserting by other means our fundamental political objective of protecting the rest of Southeast Asia. Toward North Vietnam, the problem is more difficult: hard and quick action might be the most effective course, and certainly any series of graduated measures must convey the clear threat of moving to the next stage as we carry out each single stage. But we will stand much better chance of a good over-all political result, and minimum damage to our position elsewhere in the world, if we can proceed by stages. Therefore, it is proposed that the next stages of action be as follows:

3. Air attacks against selected Laos targets. These could be used with some effectiveness against a Communist breach of the cease-fire, without introducing additional U.S. ground forces. They might deter but would not stop a really determined Communist offensive, however, and would run a risk of causing the Communists to step up what might otherwise have been limited action into a full-scale offensive. If we simply used air attacks, and then took no further action as the Communist offensive spread, we would have made the consequences worse from a psychological standpoint by an apparent display of impotence.

4. Offensive Operations in Laos. From the Mekong River areas, we could conduct offensive operations that would deal effectively with at least the present Communist strength in Southern Laos, using air action against other areas in Laos and to inderdict reinforcements and using ground forces of about 45,000 U.S. plus perhaps two Thai divisions in Laos, and with 20,000 to 25,000 U.S. reserve and logistic forces in Thailand. If we tried to clean out the Panhandle against the likely strenuous resistance of the Communists, more forces might be required to meet DRV reinforcements. Even then, the terrain is such that we would still confront a lot of guerrilla action and the supply route to South Vietnam would not be wiped out, although it would be cut down in scale. This course of action would compel us to maintain large forces in this area for an indefinite period, since—taken alone—it does not eliminate continued North Vietnamese pressure.

5. Air Action against North Vietnam. Attacks against the North Vietnamese end of the main supply routes into Laos could be a part of the preceding military course of action. Alternatively, selected air attacks on North Vietnamese targets could be undertaken as an accompaniment to occupying the Mekong River areas (without extended additional ground action). This would raise the ante somewhat and might increase the chances of Chinese Communist air coming in to assist the negligible North Vietnamese air capabilities. However, we would be able to do much better on such an exchange, using carrier as well as Thai-based aircraft. At the upper limit, massive attacks could be made against Hanoi itself, but these would so raise the odds of Chinese Communist intervention (since they would appear to portend actual destruction of North Vietnam as a state) that they should not be considered except as a last resort.

6. Amphibious Operations against North Vietnam. A division-strength landing in the Vinh area, followed by a cut west to the Laos border, would seal the main routes into both Laos and South Vietnam, and provide a slice of North Vietnamese territory that we might offer to evacuate in return for North Vietnamese withdrawal from both Laos and South Vietnam. The full military needs of such an operation must be developed, and its risks more carefully assessed. Among these risks would be that of Chinese Communist air action from Hainan or via Hanoi, so that our military posture would have to include readiness to deal with such threats, as well as with the wider threat of subsequent Soviet involvement with advanced aircraft and with naval operations against our supply lines. However, in the absence of Chinese Communist intervention, this might be a more persuasive and cheaper action than an attempt to win control of the whole Panhandle.

Consequences of Inaction in the Face of Possible Contingencies. In a contingency involving an uneasy situation without any major breach of the cease-fire, the Communists would still be able to consolidate both their hold on the North (including Nam Tha province) and their hold on the eastern part of Southern Laos, stepping up their supply route to South Vietnam although not, in the early stages, being able to control good north-south roads that would put this on a massive basis. Almost certainly, Viet Minh reinforcement would continue, and the military balance would shift more and more to the Communists, so that they would be in a position to bite off all the RLG holdings in an even shorter time than at present. Unless the U.S. resumed its financial aid and stepped up its military advisory effort, the result would almost certainly be a fairly rapid decay of the RLG position, and all would be ripe for a quick Pathet Lao takeover, perhaps without any necessity to resort to a quick military bite. Even if the U.S. did resume financial aid and step up its advisory effort, the RLG would remain weak and ineffective and always in danger of some weakening series of events.

The practical likelihood is that the Communists would sooner or later take the military bite, first at Saravane and Attopeu, then at Luang Prabang or Thahek, and finally at Vientiane. They might quite easily do the first two at any time even before the coalition negotiations had finally collapsed. Failure to react by the U.S. would mean quick collapse of the RLG.

Collapse of the RLG would mean Pathet Lao-Viet Minh control of all of Laos, with the resulting threat to the Thailand border along its entire length, and with the possibility that the supply route to South Vietnam would be put on a much more massive basis using the main river road via Pakse into Attopeu.

Recommendations for Immediate Action

1. Pending the outcome of the current negotiations, buildup measures orienting forces towards SEA, should be authorized only to the extent that these can be carried out without appearing to Phoumi and the Communists as a major strengthening of our position. This would permit some unit movements toward Thailand in the guise of possible rotation of forces now in Thailand, and possible movements of equipment and logistics personnel to nearby areas.

2. In the event of a Communist military move of “triggering” level before a major reinforcement is completed (which cannot be in less than three weeks), we should immediately seek UN action, and should accompany this by the use of air against Communist forces at least at the point of breach. Moreover, the Marine BLT and the Army Battle Group in Thailand should be moved promptly to the maximum number of key points which they could successfully occupy. These forces would be reinforced immediately by forces now in the Far East, and plans should be made to follow this with the most rapid possible deployment (assuming the Communists do not restore the cease-fire) to occupy all the Mekong River areas envisaged in Phase 2, and to build up ready strength in Thailand and Laos to the 45,000 level.

3. If and when the coalition talks break down, a major reinforcement and strengthening of U.S. forces in Thailand should proceed as rapidly as possible, but with minimum publicity. It will of course be clear both to the RLG and the Communists.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office File, Countries, Laos Security, 6/5/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Forrestal.
1. See Document 384.
2. Tab B was a 7-page summary which stated that the military geography of Laos was dominated by four features: its central position in Southeast Asia, the inaccessible Great Annamite mountain chain, the Mekong Valley lowlands, and the narrow defiles from the mountains into the lowlands. The major conclusion drawn by the study was that Laos was inherently vulnerable to infiltration from China and North Vietnam, and the same terrain which made it easy to infiltrate also acted as a natural barrier to large-scale military operations. Hilsman and INR concluded that if the Mekong lowlands of Laos were lost, the general U.S. position in Laos would sharply deteriorate, the threat to Thailand would increase sharply, and infiltration into South Vietnam would be easier.
3. See Document 375 and attachment 1 to Document 383, which extracts the portion of the SNIE that Forrestal recommended for the President’s attention.
4. Top Secret. The source text was attached to another copy of Forrestal’s memorandum ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62–6/5/62)