Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

383. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, June 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Planning for Laos

Attached are the key papers for discussion with Defense tomorrow on Laos:

1. A draft memorandum for the President entitled “Plan for Possible Intervention in Laos”; and

2. Paper entitled “Analysis of the Situation for Military Planning re Laos”.

The first paper is the work of the State-Defense-JCS working group and follows the concept upon which Harriman, Ball, McGhee, Hilsman and myself all agree. Briefly, it involves occupying the Mekong River valley from Vientiane south. The political objective would be that of restoring the cease-fire and getting back to negotiations. If this political objective was not achieved, it could result in a de facto partition of Laos which would do much to protect Thailand and Cambodia and materially inhibit the Communist ability fully to exploit the corridor into South Viet-Nam. If the Communists did not accept such a de facto partition and subjected the allied forces to significant attack and harassment, the plan contemplates seeking a decision to move militarily into an occupation of the panhandle.

The Defense and JCS position differs in degree, but important degree, in that, while they would allow a few days after occupation of the Mekong River valley for a cease-fire to be reestablished and political negotiations resumed, if this did not result they would move immediately toward occupation of the panhandle. That is, they would not admit of any de facto partition that would leave the panhandle in Communist hands, although they agree that there would be strong DRV reaction to such a move.

If time permits, I would be glad to discuss it further with you.

[Attachment 1]

¹

Draft Memorandum for the President

SUBJECT

• Plan for possible Intervention in Laos

The Secretaries of State and Defense are agreed that if the development of events requires U.S. intervention in Laos, the concept outlined below should be the basis for U.S. action:

A. Concept of Operations

1. U.S. forces, plus other SEATO forces as may be made available, would occupy key points in territory held by the RLG at the time operations are initiated, in order to establish control of the Mekong River valley and deny its use to the Communists. Under present circumstances this would initially mean occupying as many as possible of the following: Vientiane, Paksane, Thakkek, Seno/Savannakhet and Pakse. Thai forces might occupy areas in Sayabouri Province.

2. Possible FAR reinforcement of Saravane and Attopeu.

3. Continued harassment of enemy supply lines and patrols by Meo and Kha tribesmen.

4. The holding of Luang Prabang would depend upon the situation. If the PL/VM continue to demonstrate a reluctance to attack the Royal Capital and if the FAR can hold it without committing a disproportionate share of forces, it should not be abandoned. If PL/VM dispositions and actions indicate a major effort to take Luang Prabang, the FAR garrison and the King should be withdrawn. Alternatively, the intervening force might be ordered to occupy it at a later stage.

B. Political Objectives

1. Stabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia by demonstration that the U.S.:

a. Is willing to commit military forces to halt the further expansion of Communist-dominated areas and peoples.

b. Desires to enforce a cease-fire until such time as a unified, neutral Laos can be achieved under a coalition government and the Geneva Agreements can be put into effect.

2. A de facto partition of Laos until such time as there is evidence that a unified Laos could be assured of its territorial integrity and its existence as a neutral and independent state.

3. Assurance to the Free Nations of Asia that the U.S. will honor its commitments to assist in their defense against Communist aggression, direct or indirect.

C. Military Objectives

1. To deny to the Communists use of the Mekong River Valley.

2. To improve the defense of Thailand and Cambodia.

D. Circumstances of Initiation

This plan would be put into effect upon decision of the President. Prior understandings with the Thais, consultation with other SEATO nations and an appeal to SEATO by the RLG would be required. Appendix A contains proposed draft of RLG’s appeal to SEATO.²

E. Consultation with Congress

Presidential action would be preceded by consultation with the Congressional leadership. This consultation could result in a Joint Resolution, similar to the “Middle-East Resolution”, if the leadership so desires. See Appendix B for proposed draft.

F. U.S. Action in SEATO and the UN

1. SEATO

a. The U.S. would proceed in the SEATO forum avoiding in the first instance resolutions, discussion of technical issues arising from treaty interpretation, and other excessively formal or legalistic treatment of the issue.

b. Accordingly, the United States would inform the other SEATO members that we will respond (or have responded) to the RLG request for assistance and encourage other SEATO members to do so. Voting on the issue should be avoided to minimize the risk that opposition to SEATO action would be recorded. In the absence of dissent there would exist a consensus accepting or favoring SEATO action and we could, as necessary, report that the conditions of Article IV, paragraph 2 have been met (”The parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense:).

2. UN

a. The United States will request an urgent meeting of the Security simultaneously with an RLG request to SEATO and the UN for assistance. This should be done when the RLG appeal is made public.

b. The United States will initiate in the Security Council a resolution which would endorse the neutrality and territorial integrity of Laos, call for restoration of the cease-fire, ask the ICC to verify the effectiveness of the cease-fire, and call for the conclusion and implementation of the Geneva Agreements which provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. A draft resolution is attached in Appendix C.

c. If such a resolution is not adopted in the Security Council because of a Soviet veto the United States should request immediately a special emergency session of the United Nations General where we would seek the adoption of the same resolution. Our purpose would be to have a United Nations or other international presence (ICC) effectively introduced as quickly as possible between SEATO forces and Communist forces in order to avoid military conflict.

G. Public Information

1. The U.S. would make clear to the world that our political objective is to restore the military situation existing as of the time a de facto cease-fire went into effect May 3 and to maintain that situation in Laos pending an effective cease-fire and the establishment of satisfactory controls so as to permit the achievement by negotiation of a unified, independent and neutral Laos. (Draft Presidential Statement in Appendix D.)

2. It would be made clear that the objective of the military action is not to “reconquer Laos.” At the same time, it would also be made clear that the forces were authorized to take the actions required to defend themselves and to fulfill the objective.

H. Force Involvement

1. The initial force involvement would include the 5,000 U.S. ground forces (Battle Group and Marine Battalion) now in Thailand, plus required additional forces from Pacific Command resources, to a total of approximately 9–10,000 U.S. troops in Laos and an additional 8,000 U.S. supporting forces in Thailand. Two or three Thai battalions (1,800 or 2,700) could be committed. Early commitment of the Commonwealth Brigade (4,400) and a Pakistani reinforced battalion (2,000) would be sought. Air support, if needed, would be provided by the U.S., augmented by SEATO member nations. (UK and Australia each has one fighter squadron now based in Thailand.)

I. Initial Rules of Engagement

The U.S.–SEATO forces employed in Laos would take only such action as necessary (1) to protect their occupied areas and connecting lines of communication, (2) to solidify their occupation of RLG-held territory, (3) to prevent harassing or guerrilla action against their positions and (4) to resist any force threatening their positions. They would not expand their actions into PL/VM held territory, without prior authorization therefor. (It is not contemplated that operations would in any instance expand into territory held by PL/VM on May 3, 1961, without a Presidential decision to change the basic concept of this operation.) Air operations would be defensive only and directly in support of the occupying forces.

J. Control and Role of FAR

1. The U.S. would press for increased operational control of FAR, in order to best utilize its capabilities in supporting U.S.–SEATO forces.

2. it is essential to supplement the program to strengthen conventional RLG military forces by an effective program directed at the civil populace in order to develop support of the RLG, to improve security, to help provide the political component of the intelligence network, and most importantly, to combat the subversive or insurgent tactics which the Communists are almost certain to adopt under the circumstances postulated. The weak social and political structure of Laos will present attractive opportunities for such tactics.

K. Possible Communist Reactions

SNIE 58–5–62, 21 May 1962,³ estimates the enemy reaction to this plan as follows:

“The Communist side would probably suspect that the U.S. intent went farther than the stated purpose—preservation of the cease-fire. Their judgment of the real U.S. intention would rest to some extent on the size and disposition of the allied forces moving into Laos and the size and composition of the forces backing them up in Thailand. In any case, they would probably believe that the U.S., though still prepared to accept a satisfactory political settlement, was willing and ready to participate directly in the event of subsequent Communist military activity in Laos.

“North Viet-Nam would almost certainly introduce additional forces into Laos. The Chinese Communists might take this opportunity to move “volunteers” or perhaps even regular troops into northern provinces, and the North Vietnamese and Soviets, although they might not welcome this development, would probably accede. Soviet logistical support would be stepped up. The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese participation, would probably step up the scale of their military actions throughout Laos with the intent of confining U.S.-allied control of the specific areas occupied. They would probably harass U.S. lines of communications, outposts, and patrols. Communists agents would probably undertake terrorist and sabotage activities within US.-occupied towns.

“We do not believe, however, that the Communist forces would attempt to drive the U.S. troops from the areas they occupied. The Communists probably would consider that over the long run, confinement of U.S. and allied forces to these areas would place the U.S. in an awkward military-political position, and might cause the U.S. to withdraw. Meanwhile, they would probably revert to pressures for a negotiated settlement with the withdrawal of U.S. troops as the initial objective of any agreement.”

L. Possible Subsequent Actions

The foregoing course of action is designed to serve the political end which has been the consistent goal of the Administration’s policy—a unified, neutral and independent Laos. If the positioning of United States/SEATO forces in Laos does not accomplish this result in a reasonable period of time, the premises of the concept of operations will have to be re-examined. If, for example, U.S./SEATO forces were not subject to direct and significant Communist attack but were intolerably harassed over an extended period of time during which the Communists were clearly increasing their use of the Laos corridor and consolidating their control over the eastern portion of the Panhandle, the Secretaries of State and Defense would seek a new Presidential decision. It would be their current opinion that, in such circumstances, the United States should move militarily to occupy all of southern Laos below the Nam Ca Dinh, Nam Muone line. Contingency plans for this operational concept are being drawn up. They would, of course, require an increase in the forces involved and would increase the risks of significant military engagement with North Vietnamese and possibly Chinese Communist forces. It is believed, however, that the operation could be successfully accomplished without escalation into unrestricted warfare with the Chinese Communists.

[Attachment 2]

⁴

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION FOR MILITARY PLANNING RE LAOS

A. Analysis

1. Assumptions.

a. The basic U.S. policy is to prevent the domination of⁵ Laos by the Communists, thereby dangerously threatening the security of all Southeast Asia.

b. It is determined that military action is required in the furtherance of this basic policy.

2. Possible Circumstances of Initiation.

a. While no major breach of the cease-fire occurs, there is a failure of negotiations to reach agreement on a coalition government, with continued Communist military pressure and creeping extension of control; or

b. There is a major breach of the cease-fire by the Communist forces, accompanied by a resumption of offensive action, possibly including the seizing of one or more key Mekong centers.

3. Political Objectives.

Dependent upon the circumstance of initiation, the political objectives of military action would be:

a. To enforce a cease-fire and to restore the military situation existing as of the de facto cease-fire on 3 May 1961, and to establish satisfactory controls in order to permit the resumption of negotiations for a unified, independent and neutral Laos.

b. To gain control and secure key areas of Laos in order to provide maximum security for Thailand and South Vietnam and to prevent Communist exploitation of Laos as a supply route and base for further Communist efforts in Southeast Asia.

Note: The political objective would not include defeat of North Vietnam except possibly as a response to major DRV intervention and action against our forces.

4. Military Objectives. (Corresponding to Paras. 3 a-b)

a. To deny to Communist forces the occupation and use of territory held by the RLG on 3 May 1961 and to improve the defensive posture of Thailand.

b. To occupy and hold these areas of Laos necessary to safeguard the security of Thailand and South Vietnam.

5. Alternative Military Courses of Action.

a. To achieve objective 4 a only:

U.S. forces plus other SEATO forces as may be made available, would occupy key points in territory held by the RLG at the time operations are initiated, in order to establish control of the Mekong River Valley and deny its use to the Communists. This would initially mean occupying as many as possible of the following: Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek, Seno/Savannakhet, and Pakse. Thai forces might occupy areas in Sayabouri. Offensive air action would not be taken.⁶

b. To concentrate on objective 4 b:

(1) Occupy Vientiane area held by the RLG, and take action to occupy and establish control over southern Laos from the general line of Paksane-Nape south. Take offensive ground and air operations with Laos as required, including air operations against the Plaine des Jarres.

(2) As (1) above, except that the Vientiane area would be held only by RLG forces, assisted by U.S. tactical air as required.

(3) As in (2) above, except that the area of southern Laos to be occupied would be restricted to that general area south of a line from Thakhek to the border with South Vietnam at the 17th parallel.

These courses of action would include continued harassment of enemy supply lines and patrols by Meo and Kha tribesmen. The holding of Luang Prabang by the FAR would depend upon the situation. Thai forces would be employed in the major operation and would not be deployed to Sayabouri, The FAR would be used within its limited capability, but massive encadrement would not be undertaken. Its operations would be supported by U.S. units as deemed profitable.

6. Probable Communist Reactions.

a. Course of action 5 a. is essentially “Course C” analyzed in SNIE 58–5–62. It is there estimated that the Vietnamese would reinforce their strength in Laos and step up the scale of their military actions throughout Laos, seeking to confine U.S.-allied control to the specific areas occupied. They would probably harass U.S. lines of communication, etc., but not attempt to drive the US forces out.

b. Course of action 5 B. is (with some territorial variations) essentially “Course D” and “Course E” analyzed in the same estimate. (Although the SNIE assumed that these courses of action were in response to Communist reopening of hostilities, the estimates would probably be about the same if the actions were taken in the ambiguous circumstances stated in 2 a.) The estimate is that the DRV would react strongly, would add reinforcements, and would resist strenuously any effort to clear the area of Southern Laos running over to the South Vietnamese border. Chinese Communist introduction of forces is estimated as possible, with the odds going up somewhat as the territory assumed to be occupied increases to the north, but is not rated as probable.

7. Conclusions.

From the military standpoint alone, occupation of Sayabouri in itself is not regarded as useful, and military courses of action short of direct use of U.S. combat forces (encadrement of the FAR, an increased advisory effort, etc.) are judged useless in themselves except as auxiliary to the use of such combat forces.

Moreover, in light of the estimated enemy response to course of action 5 a., this course of action would quickly lead to a situation where the U.S.-allied forces would be pinned down at several river towns with small surrounding areas. The effort would be more effective if it included Saravane and Attopeu, but occupation of these points would almost certainly subject the forces to serious harassment and the imminent threat of encirclement. On the river towns only basis, the course of action would not contribute effectively to the defense of Thailand, nor would it really create any useful bargaining situation in Laos. Thus, to be effective toward either of the possible political objectives, it must be concluded that this course of action would have to be accompanied by such a high degree of affirmative military action that it should be assessed, and the military implications planned for, essentially on the same basis as course of action 5 b. to 5 b. as a practical matter, even though the limited actions of 5 a. might have political usefulness an an opening gambit over a very short period of time.

If thus follows that military planning should be focussed on the variants of course of action 5b.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/6–162. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson
1. Top Secret. Dated May 31.
2. All appendices were attached, but none is printed.
3. The date of SNIE 58–5–62 is in error. It should be either May 23, preliminary approval, or May 31, final approval. See Document 375.
4. Top Secret. Drafted by Heinz and William Bundy on June 1.
5. Johnson wrote in the following at this point: “all of?.”
6. The next following paragraph was crossed out, apparently by Johnson. It reads: “A variant for this course of action would be to use U.S. air in Laos, without commitment of ground forces. Air would support the RLG as one alternative, and would take offensive action throughout Laos as a second alternative.”