382. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council to the President’s Special Assistant for National Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Status of Laos Planning
As I mentioned to you this morning, the Interdepartmental Temporary Task Force headed by Bill Sullivan has agreed on a joint State-Defense recommendation to the President. At this point agreement has only been reached at the staff level; and neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense have given the staff recommendations their approval.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are meeting on the recommendations tomorrow; and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will meet on Saturday.1 I have suggested but not advised anyone definitely that the President might be interested in having the recommendations on Monday.2
[Page 800]Very briefly, the paper as it now stands sets forth the outlines of a recommended U.S. intervention in Laos in the event that developments move the President to order such an intervention. U.S. forces plus any other available SEATO forces would occupy the major river towns from Vientiane to Pakse for the political objective of enforcing a cease fire pending the achievement of a coalition government, and future military objective of improving the defences of Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam. The paper does not attempt to consider the circumstances under which the President might order such an intervention.
The paper, relying on SNIE 58–5–62,3 estimates that while the ChiComs and the Viet Minh would probably step up the scale of their military activities, they would probably not attempt to drive U.S. forces from the occupied areas.
The paper also emphasizes that if the achievement of a government of national union becomes impossible, or if U.S. forces were intolerably harassed, it would be necessary to seek another Presidential decision under which the United States might move militarily to occupy all of the Panhandle. Contingency planning for this event is also under way.
The points on which there is disagreement at the staff level have thus been postponed. The military are inclined to think that U.S. occupation of the entire Panhandle with the surrender of all of northern Laos is eventually inevitable. There is some indication that the Air Force (principally General LeMay) believe that the Communist military reaction to our moves will require planning for attacks on sources of supply in North Vietnam.
The State Department is more inclined to believe that moves to support the political objective of obtaining a cease fire will not escalate. They also say that the decision to intervene in support of the cease fire will not make a later decision to withdraw from Laos any more difficult than it is today. I am not sure I agree with this last thought.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/26/62–5/31/62/ Top Secret.↩
- June 2.↩
- June 4.↩
- See Document 375.↩