Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

381. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, May 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Planning for Laos

1. After reading the recent cables from General Harkins (DA IN 234703)¹ and General Tucker (ChMAAG Laos 300458Z)² today, I would like to advance the following thoughts on the planning requirements for the Laos situation.

2. Identification of Vital Interests in Laos. At this stage in our planning, we need to identify those breaches of the cease-fire which, if committed by the Pathet Lao, would cause us to consider a heightened response in Thailand or in Laos. It would seem to me that any one of the following situations would constitute infringements of vital interests which would warrant consideration of drastic action.

a. A general breach of the cease-fire throughout Laos.

b. A major attack or threat of major attack against Vientiane.

c. A major military movement penetrating or threatening to penetrate the Mekong line.

d. A breach of the cease-fire in the lower Laos Panhandle which would make difficult or impossible any subsequent extension of control of this area for the subsequent extension of control of this area for the protection of the South Viet-Nam border.

There may be other objectives which should be included in this list, but the listing is suggestive of the kind of identification of interests which is necessary.

3. Possible levels of US/SEATO reaction. Having made up our minds to the situations which might warrant us to raise the level of reaction, it then becomes a matter of determining the options open to us. Five such alternatives in ascending order are the following:

a. Bring additional forces into Thailand to constitute a base of strength from which to maneuver as the situation develops in Laos. At the same time, initiate measures in South Viet-Nam to improve control of the infiltration routes from Laos into South Viet-Nam.

b. Move forces into the key Mekong river towns in Laos in order to put pressure on the current negotiations and to impress opponents with the seriousness of our intentions.

c. Initiate retaliatory air and/or ground raids into Laos to punish the enemy for breaches of the cease-fire. The air raids could take out fixed installations as a reprisal for enemy attacks. The ground raids could be directed at the accessible points within Laos to punish the enemy and to acquire valuable information to support subsequent operational planning.

d. Move forces into the Panhandle for the purpose of closing the infiltration routes into South Viet-Nam and to mop up the key areas (this is essentially the plan to which General Harkins has responded).

e. Warn the authorities in North Viet-Nam that we will tolerate no further breaches of the cease-fire or further support of the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong. After having served such an ultimatum, attack targets in North Viet-Nam by air or make raids on sensitive targets along the seacoast.

There are probably other possible courses of action, but I believe that the foregoing cover most of the forms of reaction which we should consider at this time.

4. Further comments from General Harkins. As is often the case, General Harkins’ reply to the Department of Defense directive raises new questions requiring new replies. I am struck by Harkins’ early emphasis on the limitations of the Thai logistics system. We have always recognized that logistics would be a controlling factor on military operations in this area, but in the past the logistics analyses have been moderately encouraging. Now we have a responsible commander on the ground who is likely to take a much more realistic view of the situation than have the logistical planners in the past. It is of the utmost importance to determine now what are the limits of logistical supportability of the facilities in Thailand. If these limits can be established, they will set the notes and bounds for operational planning. We should get an early estimate from General Harkins as to the size of US/SEATO forces which he can accommodate in Thailand under present conditions, and request his recommendations as to short-term improvements to the logistics systems in Thailand and Laos which might be initiated.

We should also ask his comments on the alternatives listed in the preceding paragraph. With regard to the mop-up of the Panhandle, I think that the objective should be stated to him in terms which would allow him to recommend an operation less extensive than the complete clean-up of Southern Laos. In his recent cable, he seemed bound by an assumed requirement to control the territory all the way up to the narrow neck of the Panhandle in the north.

5. Retention of Flexibility. A final thought is that we should not freeze our thinking on any single course of reaction. I make this point because of an apparent trend in recent discussions to concentrate exclusively on a consideration of the occupation of the Mekong Valley towns. My experience has been that when the time of decision comes the favored course of action selected now will net be the one which fits the situation. I would recommend analyzing at least the five alternatives contained in paragraph 2 above, and cost them out in terms of manpower, equipment and logistical support requirements. Then it will be apparent which ones are feasible alternatives.

Maxwell D. Taylor³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/26/62–5/31/62. Secret. Also sent to U. Alexis Johnson.
1. In this telegram, May 29, repeated to the Department of State as 291345Z, Harkins argued against the potential Thai occupation of Sayaboury Province, “not a particularly valuable piece of real estate.” Its terrain was mountainous and lines of communication poor. Any military gains would not be commensurate with international complications. A much better alternative, Harkins suggested, was FAR/SEATO securing of the Laos Panhandle and holding Vientiane. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2962).
2. Not found.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.