Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

384. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 2, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Planning for Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• White House
  • General Taylor
  • Mr. Forrestal
• CIA
  • General Carter
• State
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Johnson
  • Mr. Harriman
  • Mr. Sullivan
• Defense
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Mr. Gilpatric
  • Mr. Nitze
  • Mr. Bundy
  • Gen. Lemnitzer
  • Adm. Heinz
  • Gen. Fontana

Secretary McNamara asked the Secretary to open the discussion. The Secretary said he had no problems on the political objectives. However, he had a number of questions he would like to pose on the military aspects of the intervention being considered. He was specifically concerned that our Military Commander have an adequate directive so that he knew precisely what his mission was and he was also concerned that the Commander have adequate forces appropriately positioned so that we would not suffer a succession of Dien Bien Phu’s.¹

Secretary McNamara said perhaps the best way to focus on these questions was to list the things which the Defense Department would recommend against with respect to Laos. He then listed four such moves: (1) Defense would be against a solo effort by the Thais to occupy Sayabouri, (2) Defense would be against U.S. encadrement of the FAR, (3) Defense would be against the use of United States air in combination with the FAR alone, (4) Defense would be against the substantial use of South Vietnamese forces in Laos.²

Secretary McNamara said there was a fifth negative which he would like to discuss in some detail. Defense would be opposed, he said, to a military plan designed to occupy and control the Mekong River Valley with only 8 or 10,000 United States forces. He feared that such a force would not be able to defend itself in the event of contingencies and could not depend upon the FAR for assistance. Therefore, Defense would propose a variant from the plans previously discussed. This variant would involve the use of approximately 40,000 U.S. personnel to handle the Mekong Valley operation, using most of these as a back-up in Thailand.³ These forces would then be able to move rapidly to secure the Panhandle if the Mekong Valley scheme did not produce effective results.

After some discussion between the two Secretaries concerning the possible use of United States air as an immediate reprisal for Communist action, Mr. Harriman commented on Secretary McNamara’s proposed variant plan. He said that any military action we undertook should have a political objective that world opinion would sustain. Secondly, our military action should be such as not to abandon protection of the Thai border. Finally, he felt we must recognize the possibility that our forces could be put in the Valley in pursuit of our political objectives and might have to stay there for a long period of time. He saw no inconsistency between this prospect and the need to have readily at hand adequate troops to protect those in the Valley in case they got into trouble.

General Taylor said that consideration ought to be given to further actions which we might not want to undertake. He had some doubts whether it was wise to contemplate the occupation of large areas which might lead us to a massive guerrilla pacification campaign. He felt that our primary purpose should be the protection of South Viet-Nam and Thailand and that we should not lose sight of that objective.⁴

General Lemnitzer said he agreed that the issue was basically the security of Southeast Asia and that the main threat to that security was North Viet-Nam. He thought we should, therefore, give consideration to means for hurting North Viet-Nam in the event they continued to make trouble. He characterized the present fighting as very comfortable for the North Vietnamese because of the sanctuary they enjoyed in their homeland. He then outlined a plan which would involve an amphibious operation against North Vietnamese territory in the vicinity of Vinh, designed to cut across North Viet-Nam at that point and seal off all the infiltration routes into Laos and South Viet-Nam. The JCS considered that in many ways such an action was less dangerous than the massive occupation of the Laos Panhandle.

The Secretary said that he, too, was very much interested in hurting North Viet-Nam and making them understand that their home base was not immune. He believed, however, that in laying out our plans we had to consider a phased operation which would make this clear to the North Vietnamese by progressive action. Secretary McNamara agreed and said that we should start with the River Valley.

Mr. Johnson then summed up the understandings by outlining six phases of our potential military response: (1) A buildup of military forces (2) Occupation of the River Valley, (3) U.S. air action in Laos, (4) Forward movement in Laos to secure the Panhandle, (5) U.S. air action against North Vietnamese targets, and (6) Amphibious action against North Viet-Nam.⁵

Secretary McNamara, in commenting on this outline, said that the buildup in the first place should be done quietly in such a way that it would not encourage Phoumi to further intransigence. Secondly, he said that he would contemplate U.S. air action in Laos only in conjunction with the movement of ground forces forward into the Panhandle. The Secretary, in commenting on these phases, stressed the need for a clear-cut directive to the Military Commander which would delineate the phase lines. Secondly, he stressed the need for readiness in Korea in the event the Communist response to our action took the form of North Korean, Chinese Communist, and possibly Soviet action at that point on the map.⁶ Thirdly, he felt that any presentation of these plans to the President should make clear that our estimate of the enemy reaction cannot be defined with certainty. We are not sufficiently informed about their thinking to provide totally reliable estimates of their actions.⁷

Considerable discussion then ensued among the participants concerning the basic question of whether it was really worth while taking any military action at all in Laos in order to protect Thailand and South Viet-Nam. While no firm decisions were reached, there was a consensus that, although Laos was not important in itself, the territory which it afforded, particularly in the Mekong Valley, was important for the defense of Southeast Asia. A similarly inconclusive discussion followed responsive to a question from General Taylor concerning the recommendations which the two Departments would make to the President in the event the Communists violently broke the cease-fire tomorrow. The meeting ended with a directive that State and Defense drafters prepare a memorandum which would form the basis for discussion with the President to be arranged for Tuesday afternoon.⁸

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–262. Top Secret. 1 Drafted by Sullivan and approved in S on June 12. The meeting was held in McNamara’s office at the Pentagon. Forrestal and Taylor also made records of this meeting: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62–6/5/62 and National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Das Buch, Laos. According to Rusk’s appointment book, his next appointment was at 12:10, therefore the meeting probably ended before that. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
1. According to Taylor’s account, Rusk also stated at this point that he “recognized that military commanders would require air support, not only for direct defense but also to interdict Communist air and ground activity. We should be ready, also, to hit targets in North Vietnam.” According to Forrestal’s account, Rusk raised the question of whether the United States would not have to be prepared to attack North Vietnam and cited Korea as well as Dien Bein Phu as examples to avoid.

2. At this point, Taylor’s account has his own observation as a separate paragraph as follows:

   “General Taylor commented that during the rainy season there was little danger of triggering a general offensive, although limited objective attacks were entirely possible. To punish the latter, he recommended the consideration of air reprisals from our side.”

3. Forrestal’s account had the conflicting detail that 30,000 of these troops would be in Laos and 10,000 in Thailand as a reserve. Forrestal also noted it would take 3 to 5 weeks to move such forces into the area after a decision to do so had been made.

4. Taylor’s account has a fuller exposition of his remarks as follows:

   “General Taylor also made the following points:

   “a It is against the U.S. interest to undertake military operations in the form of a guerrilla pacification campaign.

   “b. It is against the U.S. interest to attempt to occupy and hold any large areas in Laos.

   “c. We should not undertake to save Laos by military action of the Laotian Army won’t fight and/or if the RLG will not cooperate.

   “d. If, as we now believe, the Laotian Army will not fight, there is no purpose in intervening to save Laos. Any intervention should be justified in terms of its contribution to the defense of Thailand and/or South Vietnam.

   While the foregoing points were not formally accepted, there seemed to be no objection to them.”

5. In Forrestal’s account, Rusk and Lemnitzer raised this issue and stressed the importance of harassing North Vietnam if the United States became involved in a conflict in Laos.
6. In Forrestal’s account, Rusk asked Lemnitzer if the United States could defend South Korea from an attack from the north. Lemnitzer responded that there were minimum forces—18 ROK and 2 U.S. divisions—to defend against North Korean attack, but not a large-scale Chinese attack.
7. According to Forrestal’s account, Taylor asked if there were not several steps which could be taken in support of a cease-fire before U.S. combat troops were introduced into Laos: air attacks on PL/VM targets for example, and he stressed the need “to avoid a lengthy guerilla combat which might start if we tried to occupy too large an area.”

8. Forrestal’s account has a brief report of a meeting among the President, Rusk, and McNamara after this meeting. It reads as follows:

   “After the meeting Secretaries Rusk and McNamara conferred with the President. Messrs Bundy and Forrestal were also present. The two Secretaries reported on the substance of their earlier meeting; and the President confirmed that he would like the estimate of Generals Harkins and Tucker on the military value of holding various pieces of real estate in Laos.”