385. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Contingency Planning for Laos
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have reported to you the highlights of the meeting on Laos which they held last Saturday with a few advisors.1 They are on your calendar for 6:00 p.m., Tuesday,2 to carry forward the discussion.
Several thoughts came out of the Saturday meeting which I pass on now, as I may not be present at the Tuesday session. The first is the recent trend to concentrate on a single contingency the possible need to occupy the Mekong Valley towns to achieve a political effect by a demonstration of willingness to commit forces to Laos. The effect sought would be to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia and to convince the adversary that he should restore or maintain the cease-fire and proceed with negotiations for a coalition government.
The second point which came through clearly in the recent discussion is that the Department of Defense is raising its estimate of troop requirements for an initial movement into Laos. On Saturday, Secretary McNamara talked in terms of 40,000 U.S. troops as necessary to provide [Page 814] a force to move into the Mekong Valley, to maintain itself there, and later to be able to undertake initial operations in Southern Laos. There seemed to be general agreement that General Harkins’ estimate of a four division force to clear and secure the Panhandle was low. At the end of the meeting, Secretary McNamara and others were wondering out lout whether there was a military solution for securing the Panhandle which was really feasible and not so costly as to cast doubt on the wisdom of making the attempt.
A third point in the discussion which struck me was Secretary Rusk’s willingness to contemplate a freer use of U.S. air power in Laos and, if necessary, in North Viet-Nam. This to me was good news, as I have long felt that before we put a soldier into Laos to restore and maintain a cease-fire (an impossible military mission), we should consider taking reprisals in the form of air attacks in Laos on fixed targets and on the Communist supply transport.
My personal comments on the foregoing trends are as follows:
- a.
- Are we sure that it is necessary to put U.S. troops into Laos to accomplish the desired political effect? The strategic build-up in Southeast Asia which Mr. McNamara is considering, plus an evidence of willingness to intervene in Laos by air, may do the trick without the movement of any troops into the Mekong Valley. At least, this course of action deserves a try as a preliminary to ground intervention.
- b.
- If we go into Laos and the desired political effect is not attained, what becomes the military objective of our forces? While we would like to salvage those parties of Laos useful for the defense of Thailand and South Viet-Nam, it is very difficult for me to conceive of any ground military operation to clear and hold any significant area in Laos which does not run the clear risk of bogging down into endless counter-guerrilla fighting. I suspect that, when the returns are in from the military planners, we will be told that we can count on limited help from the FAR and from SEATO, and that we must depend almost exclusively on U.S. forces to establish and hold a partitioned Laos. At that time, we may well conclude that the price of direct intervention on the ground is too high for the uncertain gains, and that we had better shore up the Laotian borders as best we can from the outside, while retaliating against the enemy from the air and sea. This retaliation could extend to strikes against the enemy homeland in North Viet-Nam.
- c.
- The rainy season which is beginning now makes it unlikely that the enemy will initiate major military moves for several months; however, he is always capable of a limited breach of the cease-fire like Nam Tha. We should be thinking now how to react to such a breach and how to use the next few months to improve our overall position in Southeast Asia. A pressing question is what to do about improving the FAR.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62–6/5/62. Secret.↩
- See Document 384.↩
- June 5.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩