Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

388. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, June 5, 1962, 7 p.m.

1663. Embtels 1655¹ and 1661.²

I reported to Phoumi June 5 my conversations with Souvanna (Embtel 1661). I said Souvanna inviting Phoumi and Boun Oum to meet at Plaine des Jarres June 7. They could bring any escort they wished, and Addis or ICC Commissioners if they desired. Invitation would say that if work could not be completed on 7th, Phoumi and Boun Oum were invited to spend night. Phoumi said they would go to PDJ on 7th, would take one platoon of troops and would spend night if Boun Oum had no objection. He wanted Addis present.

I said Souvanna had said neither he nor Souphanouvong would raise any new conditions, but hoped the talks could resume where they had last broken off. Souvanna accepted principle of unanimity for important decisions with respect to Defense and Interior and that respective forces should remain in being pending mutual agreement on method of integration. He was quite confident that Souphanouvong would also agree, as was Quinim.

Souvanna’s first proposal would be that there should be three Secretaries of State. If they disagreed, question would be referred to Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister either alone, or in Cabinet or in a restricted Cabinet committee, or, as suggested by King, in Council of Ministers. If there were difficulties on concept of Secretaries of State because of “General Kong Le”, Souvanna might have another name to suggest.

Souvanna hoped that Boun Oum and Phoumi would come with power to decide. Phoumi said they would. Phoumi did not think meetings need take very long. I said that if they stayed overnight at Khang Khay Souphanouvong would probably be willing to go to Luang Prabang for final signatures. Phoumi said this would be a good idea. They could get everything settled and a draft prepared at Plaine des Jarres, which they could consider and adopt finally at Luang Prabang.

I said Souvanna had been encouraged by King, who said that his mandate was still in force, but that he should act quickly to end killing. Souvanna said King agreed to procedure that Assembly give full powers to King who would then directly designate new government.

I urged Phoumi work hard to get strong representation of Vientiane neutrals for center and to insist on at least a 6–4 division. He said he would. I said I thought he would run into some difficulty in proposing Phoui as a neutral. Phoumi said he recognized this but would still propose it. I said this was fine. Phoumi said he was going to see Phoui tomorrow afternoon. Phoumi mentioned Nouphat, Leum Rajasombath, Keo, Chao Souk, as other possibilities for Vientiane neutrals. I suggested Outhong Souvanna vong. He said yes. He also mentioned Bouasy, but with marked lack of enthusiasm, and said Dr. Oudom too weak for FonMin.

I said Souvanna had suggested and I agreed that it was important to concentrate first and foremost on question of new govt and only after agreement had been reached on this to raise other questions. He nodded.

I asked how Phoumi planned handle Nam Tha. Phoumi said he did not plan to raise question of Nam Tha as any kind of condition to formation of a govt. He would say that he thought it essential that Souvanna insist that Nam Tha not be left to exclusive control of Pathet Lao. Perhaps it should be under Souvanna’s troops. He did not think that Souphanouvong would give it back to RLG. This was important question but he would not insist on any more than agreement that something should be done about it. He would insist on agreement that there be henceforth a real cease-fire. I said I was glad to hear this, because if Nam Tha were raised by him as any kind of condition Souphanouvong would undoubtedly raise condition that U.S. troops should first leave Thailand and there would be arguments about whose fault Nam Tha had been. Phoumi said, “Yes, we would never finish.”

I said I hoped there would be quick agreement on new govt because we were anxious to resume our wholehearted support of Laos. Phoumi said, “That is very important. Future is not certain. That is why I raised question with you as to what would happen if Souvanna should turn against us.” I said I did not think he would. I had definite impression that Souvanna wanted Phoumi’s support in trying to make go of a genuinely neutral Laos and winning elections against Pathet Lao. He said, “I think so too. He has often told me he wants my help.”

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–562. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Paris, London, and Bangkok, and to CINCPAC for POLAD, Geneva for Fecon, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Kuala Lumpur, and New Delhi.
1. In telegram 1655, June 4, Brown reported a conversation with Phoumi of that day in which Brown suggested that all sides in Laos concentrate on the formation of a government of national union leaving other matters to be dealt with later. Phoumi agreed entirely and stated if Souvanna and Souphanouvong agreed to the Trioka principle for Defense and Interior and maintenance of forces pending an agreement on integration, there would be no problem. Phoumi said, “Mr. Ambassador, I will do exactly what I promised you.” (Ibid., 751J.00/6–462)
2. In telegram 1661, June 5, Brown informed the Department of a conversation he had with Souvanna who was prepared to establish a coalition government much along the lines outlined by Phoumi. Souvanna said that Souphanouvong would require no new conditions, but he was unprepared to withdraw from Nam Tha. Brown commented that if the United States wanted a coalition, it would have to accept the “bitter pill” of the loss of Nam Tha province. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–562)